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This thesis investigates the relationship between ethnic-based political inequalities and political 
conflict. Building on recent theoretical and methodological advancements, I develop three 
empirical chapters that investigate distinct, yet unrelated mechanisms linking ethno-political 
configurations to disparate forms of contentious action. These chapters each utilise quantitative 
methods, and new subnational-level and actor-level data, to uncover a number of important 
findings regarding types of conflict behaviour not captured by civil war analyses.  
The first empirical chapter focuses on ethnic riots, a type of non-militarised violence 
involving violent clashes between civilians of rival ethnic groups. I argue that this previously 
overlooked form of political violence is likely to emerge when there is: politically dominant 
ethnic groups coexisting with a group facing systematic political discrimination or a loss of 
power. I find support for this argument through the first cross-national and subnational analysis 
of ethnic riots in Africa. The second empirical chapter focuses on the incidence of mass 
nonviolent action, which involves the mobilisation of large numbers of diverse people. I argue 
that cleavages within and across ethnic groups often undermine this kind of political 
mobilisation, but that cross cutting grievances can overcome this issue and facilitate resistance. 
Testing this argument sub-nationally, I find support for my argument that the relationship 
between ethno-political inequalities and nonviolent action is dependent on the existence of 
cross-cutting grievances, as this provides opportunities for disparate groups to unite against the 
state. The final empirical chapter (co-authored with Govinda Clayton and Andrew Thompson) 
explores the relationship between ethnic militias, either recruited from politically dominant or 
disadvantaged ethnic groups, and civil war duration. We thereby move beyond assumptions 
that the government-side is unitary. We argue that coethnic PGMs (i.e. those recruited from 
the same ethnicity as the ruling elite) are associated with longer conflicts, as they have strong 
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incentives to maintain ethno-political power and further polarise ethnic divisions. We find 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Inequality is often raised as an important determinant of political conflict. Contemporary 
research suggests that group-based inequalities are most likely to have a detrimental effect on 
conflict behaviour (see Stewart, 2002; Stewart, 2008).1 This type of group-based inequality is 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµKRUL]RQWDOLQHTXDOLWLHV¶+,V+,VDUHLQHTXDOLWLHVEHWZHHQJURXSVRISHRSOHZKR
share a common ethnic identity and heritage. In contexts where high levels of HIs exist, group 
grievances can be greatly enhanced and more easily politicised. This often facilitates collective 
mobilisation and political conflict (Stewart, 2010b). 
+,V DUH GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH IURP µYHUWLFDO LQHTXDOLWLHV¶ ZKLFK DUH GLVSDULWLHV EHWZHHQ
individuals or households, rather than groups. Classical structural-grievance approaches have 
historically measured economic inequalities between individuals, drawing on relative 
deprivation theory. Relative deprivation occurs when there is a growing disparity between an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDVSLUDWLRQV DQG Wheir actual standing in relation to others. Relative deprivation 
generates discontent, frustrations and anger over these disparities that motivates an individual 
to engage in violence (Gurr, 1970). With various studies finding little evidence that vertical 
inequalities relate to violent conflict behaviour, theories of inequality have largely moved in 
favour of group-based explanations (see Lichback, 1989; Brush, 1996). This new emphasis 
also builds upon theoretical objections that too much focus has been placed upon the individual, 
which undermines the symbolic importance of group identity and cleavages between ethnic 
groups. HIs theory builds upon this relational context in which common ethnic identity 
combined with overlapping inequalities generate grievances that are most likely to relate to 
conflict (Stewart, 2002; Ostby, 2008). 
                                                          
1 Also see Stewart (2010a), Brown and Langer (2010), and Ostby (2017) for a review. 
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The concept of HIs has various similarities with earlier notions of ethnic inequalities, 
VXFKDV*XUU¶VUHODWLYHGHSULYDWLRQEHWZHHQPLQRULW\JURXSV+RURZLW]¶VUDQNed 
HWKQLFJURXSVDQG7LOO\¶VFDWHJRULFDOLQHTXDOLWLHV7KHUHDUHIRXUGLPHQVLRQVRI+,VWKDW
are likely to generate conflict: political (political participation), economic (wealth, state 
resources, assets), social (education, health, housing, sanitation), and cultural (recognition of 
language and cultural norms). Recent quantitative research has found strong evidence that the 
likelihood of armed conflict is increased by the existence of HIs and related group grievances. 
In particular, Large-N evidence shows that civil war is most likely to occur in contexts where 
socioeconomic and political HIs are at their greatest (Gurr, 2000; Ostby, 2008; Cederman, 
Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Deiwiks, Cederman 
and Gleditsch, 2012; Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Basedau et al., 2015). 
Yet much of the contemporary quantitative literature treats conflict as synonymous with 
specific forms of armed violence. These studies rely on civil war datasets that impose exclusive 
criteria in order to measure this subset of political conflict. This has led quantitative studies to 
almost exclusively focus on types of conflict that are militarised and involve battlefield deaths, 
and types of actors that are included in definitions of civil war (i.e. the government and rebel 
forces).2 Consequently, other forms of conflict behaviour and types of non-state actors that fall 
outside ZKDWWKH8&'3ODEHOµQRUPDOZDUIDUH¶KDYHEHHn largely underexplored. 
Qualitative literature, however, highlights a number of possible relationships between 
high levels of HIs and various types of political conflict. A burgeoning collection of work, 
deriving mainly from the CRISE network at the University of Oxford, relates HIs to various 
                                                          
2 Two leading data projects emerged setting thresholds based on a certain number of battlefield deaths and the 
type of actors involved. The Correlates of War (COW) project requires conflicts to experience at least 1000 
annual battlefield deaths in order for this to warrant inclusion within their civil war dataset (Sarkees and 
Wayman, 2010). The University of Uppsala Data Project relaxes this threshold somewhat to include conflicts 
WKDWH[SHULHQFHDWOHDVWEDWWOHILHOGGHDWKVSHU\HDUDQGUHVHUYHWKHEDWWOHILHOGGHDWKVWKUHVKROGWRµPDMRU
FRQIOLFWV¶Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
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types of political conflict not included in civil war analyses. Stewart (2002), who originally 
developed the concept of HIs, found early on that HIs have led to sporadic riots and criminality 
in the US and Brazil, race riots in Malaysia, coups in Fiji, as well as civil war in Sri Lanka, 
South Africa and Uganda. Other case-based literature provides similar findings (Horowitz, 
2003; Ukiwo, 2008; Basedau, Vullers, Korner, 2013), which includes evidence from intra-
country studies (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan, 2004; Mancini, 2008; Ostby et al., 2011). The 
general conclusion is that inequalities impact different and disparate types of conflict 
EHKDYLRXU:KLOHUHVHDUFKKDVµEULGJHGWKHJDS¶EHWZHHQTXDOLWDWLYHDQGTXDQWLWDWLYe research 
on armed conflict (Ostby, 2013), more empirical research is needed to further explain other 
types of conflict behaviour. Various questions therefore persist. Is case study evidence 
replicable across different cases? Is there a systematic relationship between HIs and other types 
of conflict behaviour?  
7KLV WKHVLVFRQVLGHUVSROLWLFDOFRQIOLFWPRUHEURDGO\DV WKH³SXUVXLWRILQFRPSDWLEOH
goals by different JURXSV´5DPVERWKDP:RRGKRXVHDQG0LDOOSJ&RQIOLFWVUDUHO\
result in battlefield deaths, are not always directed at the state, and in most cases do not involve 
violent methods at all. Actors have a repertoire of possible strategies at their disposal when 
responding to incompatibility interests such as high levels of inequality (Ackerman and 
DuVall, 2000; Florea, 2012).3 
Together with the three empirical chapters, this thesis seeks to explore HIs theory more 
broadly in relation to different types of conflict behaviour that can be violent or nonviolent, 
                                                          
3 Political conflict encompasses unconventional action against government, based on incompatibilities that relate 
to political motivations and political goals. This is distinguishable from criminal behaviour, such as gang 
violence.  Political motivations may overlap with criminal aspects. For example, rioters and rebellious activity is 
often labelled as criminal. Some theories see armed actors are criminal entities greed theory (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004), and new wars perspective (Kaldor, 2013). Criminal gangs may also be motivation by structural 
and political conditions that facilitate their emergence, for example in El Salvador. For the purpose of this 
thesis, political behaviour is related to clear political incompatible goals. For discussions on possible overlaps 
between criminal and political conflict (see Kalyvas, 2015; Idler and Forest, 2015). 
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and are not restricted to dyadic violence between the government and rebels. This provides 
important contributions to our broader understanding of HIs and political conflict. Firstly, this 
thesis builds on existing case-based literature, to systematic ally explore the relationship 
between HIs and various types of conflict behaviour. In doing so, this thesis also provides two 
related and additional contributions: one theoretical and one methodological.  
The theoretical contribution derives from the uncovering of new theoretical 
mechanisms that link HIs to different types of conflict behaviour. While HIs are not restricted 
to explaining conflict that results in civil war (Gurr, 1993; Stewart, 2002, 2008), it is unclear 
what mechanisms drive different types of conflict behaviour. Some studies show that different 
conflict outcomes are caused by specific factors that are distinct from civil war (Regan and 
Norton, 2005; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017). Yet HIs theory merely suggests that different 
outcomes can be attributed to regime type or how accommodating or repressive the state is 
(Gurr, 2000; Stewart, 2008).  
Other studies have relied on civil war mechanisms to explain the relationship between 
ethnic inequalities and other types of political conflict. As Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) state, 
this is problematic since civil war mechanisms are poorly suited to explain other outcomes that 
involve very different types of mobilisation. Some types of conflict are more sporadic and 
incidental and are likely to have much lower barriers to participation. Nonviolent action also 
involves the use of very different tactics and strategies than coercive action, meaning the 
mobilisation process is likely to be very different to those associated with armed conflict. 
Therefore, while ethnic grievances may provide general motivations to seek political change, 
these grievances are unlikely to facilitate different types of mobilisation in the same way. 
This thesis clarifies the mechanisms between HIs and disparate types of conflict 
behaviour, by moving beyond a one-size-fits-all approach. As a whole, this thesis broadens our 
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theoretical understanding of the various causal pathways between HIs and distinct conflict 
behaviours. Across the three empirical chapters this thesis looks at how HIs relate to three 
largely unexplored types of conflict behaviour: ethnic rioting between civilians, mass 
nonviolent action against the government, and how HIs impact the behaviour of ethnic pro-
government militias and the consequences this has for civil war duration. The individual 
contributions of these chapters are explored in greater detail when introducing the chapters 
below.  
Finally, by expanding the focus of HIs theory to other types of conflict, this thesis also 
makes key methodological contributions. Most of these pertain to the use of new disaggregated 
data, both at the subnational-level and actor-level data, which captures conflict actors and 
behaviour not included in civil war analyses. Exploration at the subnational level improves 
upon existing quantitative literature that tends to focus on country-level comparisons or case 
studies. The exploration of new conflict actors moves beyond tendencies to treat dissimilar 
conflict actors and outcomes as monolithic. With regards to conflict outcomes, existing studies 
on HIs tend to lump together disparate types of protest rather than analysing nonviolent action 
and incidental violence separately.4 In terms of conflict actors, existing literature largely 
assumes the government side is unitary, and often ignores the role of irregular armed groups 
that operate on behalf of the government, such as pro-government militia.5  
These methodological issues can be largely explained by the previous lack of data. Here 
I build upon recent innovative data collection efforts, without of which this thesis would not 
have been possible. Firstly, new event data enables the disaggregation of conflict actors and 
                                                          
4 )RUH[DPSOHVWXGLHVµVRFLDOGLVWXUEDQFHV¶OXPSWRJHWKHULQFLGHQFHVRISURWHVWGHPRQVWUDWLRQVDQGDFWVRI
WHUURULVP8UGDO2VWE\¶VVWXG\RIFLWLHVIURPWKH8UEDQ6RFLDO'LVRUGHUGDWDVHWRXWOLQHVWKH
rising gap of inequality in cities DVDQLPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWRIµVRFLDOGLVWXUEDQFHV¶<HWWKHVHW\SHVRI
disturbances differ from each other considerably 
5
 Exceptions of course being literatures on fragmentation and pro-government militias which are explored in 
much detail in Chapter 4. 
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the exploration of conflict at the subnational-level. Most notably, outlets such the Social 
Conflict Analysis Dataset and Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset now provide geocoded 
conflict events in Africa.6 These datasets provide various types of events including: protests, 
demonstrations, strikes, riots, and communal violence. Secondly, new data on non-state actors 
has also enabled the exploration of civil war actors not classified as rebel forces or as part of 
the state security apparatus. In particular, the Pro-Government Militia dataset (Carey, Mitchell, 
and Lowe, 2013) provides new data on militias (PGMs) that operate on behalf of the 
government, but outside of conventional security structures. Such data enables us to move 
beyond assumptions that the government is unitary, and now isolate the effect that pro-
government non-state actors have upon civil war processes.  
Thirdly, the above data has coincided with the development of new group-level data by 
the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010).  The EPR 
data provides information on levels of inequality between politically relevant ethnic groups. 
This data is used to explore HIs at the actor-level in Chapter 4, and the subnational-level in 
Chapters 2 and 3. The subnational analyses have been made possible by the extension of the 
EPR project to include the Geo-EPR dataset. The Geo-EPR data provides information of the 
location of ethnic settlement areas, and combined with EPR categories allows group-level 
inequalities to be explored at the subnational-level. Finally, exploring types of group settlement 
areas and the location of conflict events also requires an appropriate subnational unit of 
analysis. Here the development of the PRIO-GRID has been hugely influential (see Tollefsen, 
Strand and Buhaug, 2012). This has provided a standardised geographical grid structure that 
does not vary by country, and is exogenous to factors this thesis seeks to capture at the 
subnational-level. Building on data innovations, each chapter has produced unique data, 
                                                          
6
 See Raleigh et al (2010) (for ACLED), and Salehyan et al (2012) (for SCAD) for published introductions to 
these datasets. This thesis uses the SCAD dataset due to longer temporal coverage, and greater detail on each 
event that better enables the recoding and operationalisation of specific outcomes. 
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including: geo-referenced data on ethnic riots and nonviolent protests in Africa, and a global 
dataset on ethnic pro-government militias and there ethnic linkages to the state. 
 The remainder of this introduction will explore the existing literature, placing these 
contributions within the existing debate on inequality. The second section will then outline the 
institutional-grievance framework that is drawn upon throughout this thesis. The final section 
will introduce the empirical chapters and their more specific contributions. 
 
1.2. Contributions to the Wider Literature 
This following section places these broader contributions within the wider literature on political 
conflict. This section specifically highlighting existing strengths and weaknesses within the 
conflict literature. Broadly speaking there are four key structural approaches to political 
conflict: structural grievances (mentioned previously and largely related to vertical 
inequalities), institutional grievances, opportunism, and resource mobilisation. The first two 
perspectives emphasis the motivations to engage in conflict. The latter two approaches are built 
XSRQDPRUH UDWLRQDOLVW IUDPHZRUNDQG IRFXVRQ WKH µIHDVLELOLW\¶RIFRQIOLFW7KH IROORZLQJ
section will explore these approaches sequentially in order to show the development of these 
approaches and related limitations. 
 
6FHSWLFLVPRI*ULHYDQFH$SSURDFKHVE\µ)HDVLELOLW\3HUVSHFWLYHV¶ 
Many studies have long questioned the role of grievances, arguing that grievances are simply 
too common, and often citing the lack of empirical evidence from structural grievance studies 
on vertical inequalities (Brush, 1996; Cramer, 2006). Strong criticisms have come from studies 
that emphasise the value of opportunity structures and resources that make political conflict 
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PRUHµIHDVLEOH¶7LOO\6NRFSRO1979). Such theorists pointed to rational calculations, in 
which actors only engage in collective action when they have the adequate opportunities and 
resources to do so. This highlights two alternative rationalist approaches, known as the 
opportunities perspective and resource mobilisation theory. Similar to HIs research, 
TXDQWLWDWLYHVWXGLHVIURPERWKµIHDVLELOLW\¶DSSURDFKHVKDYHDOVRIRFXVHGRQDUPHGFRQIOLFW 
In the early 2000s there was a clear shift to a greater rejection of grievances in support 
of opportunism, with the fruition of influential empirical studies that found no evidence that 
grievances were are cause of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gissinger, Hegre and 
Gleditsch, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; for a review see: Blattman and Miguel, 2010). At 
the forefront of this body of work are two highly cited studies. The first interpretation by Collier 
DQG+RHIIOHUSRLQWHGWRµJUHHG¶DVDFDXVHRIFRQIOLFWLQZKLFKWKHH[LVWHQFHRISRYHUW\
produces lower opportunity costs of fighting, and natural resources that provides incentives for 
self-enrichment and looting. In the second interpretation, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that 
WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR UHEHO LV FRQWLQJHQW RQ WKH ZHDNQHVV RI VWDWH LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG WKH VWDWH¶V
capacity to tackle the insurgency.  
Qualitative studies on collective action have explored different outcomes, but remain 
vague on what opportunity factors relate to different types of outcomes.7 This body of work 
has argued that particular political opportunities signal to opposition groups that general 
collective action is more feasible and arise: when the regime is unstable or is politically more 
open (Tilly, 1978; Goldstone 1991; Meyer, 2004), when divisions exists within the regime 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001), and when state institutions are weak (McAdam, 1999). 
                                                          
7 Research on contentious action has tried to more broadly bring together different types of political conflict in 
order to highlight differences and similarities between different types of conflict (see McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011). They associate different conflict outcomes with different opportunities structures 
but similar to HIs literature focus on characterises of the state such as regime type and levels of repression.  
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But what type of conflict behaviour are we likely to observe in response to the emergence of 
specific opportunities?  
Resource mobilisation approaches instead relates feasibility to the capability of 
assembling adequate resources to engage in political conflict. This approach has also become 
a dominant explanation of civil war, with a strong emphasis on natural resources in providing 
a source of funding for armed rebellion. This literature has found empirical evidence that a 
range of natural resources, including oil, gas, drugs, diamonds and timber, increase the 
likelihood of civil war and help rebels sustain their fight (Ross, 2006; Rustad et al., 2008; 
Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 2009; Lujala, 2010).  
Qualitative research on collective action also sets expectations that resources also 
increase the feasibility of other types of political behaviour (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; 
also see Opp, 2009), but remains equally unclear on what specific resources are required for 
other outcomes. Research on civil resistance has taken some important steps in this regard, 
pointing to differences between nonviolent and violent mobilisation. Because mass 
participation is key for nonviolent movements to be effective, mobilisation potential must be 
very high (DeNardo, 1985; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). For scholars of civil resistance this 
relates to the existence of organisational capacity, information resources, people resources 
(such as innovation, different skillsets, and tactical diversity), and social resources and 
coordination advantages associated with urbanisation and social networks (Goldstone 1991; 
Lohmann, 1994; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Siegal, 2009; Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011; Wallace, 2013). Other research has shown that social networks have facilitated 
participation in ethnic rioting in Nigeria (Scacco, 2010), and in the Rwandan genocide 
(McDoom, 2013; 2014). This points to the strong possibility that different behaviours may 
require different types and levels of resources. 
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I argue here that it is inconceivable that opportunities and resources alone cannot 
explain conflict behaviour. While these approach explains how populations may mobilise, it 
does not explain why. In reality grievances and feasibility are likely to be complementary in 
explaining different conflict behaviours. But how this plays out in regards to disparate conflict 
outcomes remains unclear. 
 
1.4. AdditionDO3UREOHPVZLWK([LVWLQJµ)HDVLELOLW\¶$SSURDFKHV 
Various studies have questioned the premature rejection of grievances with many citing poor 
data and poor proxies used to measure inequality (Sambinas 2005; Cramer, 2006). Criticism 
has most notably come from a new generation of grievance models, which refers us back to 
HIs theory. HIs builds directly on early research that points the importance of ethnic-based 
grievances, biased state institutions and the importance of ethnic politics, rather than mere 
economic determinism (Horowitz, 1985; Gurr, 1993; 2000; also see Stewart, 2008; Cederman, 
Gleditsch, Buhaug, 2013). From this emphasis, HIs literature outlines two key criticisms. 
)LUVWO\µIHDVLELOLW\¶DSSURDFKHVKDYHODUJHO\UHOLHGRQKLJKO\DJJUHJDWHGQDWLRnal-level 
data.8 This level of aggregation is too high, since national-level data is poorly suited to capture 
mechanisms related to inequality, opportunities or resources. For example, GDP has been used 
to proxy both state weakness (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), and poverty (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). National-level proxies are also unable to specify precise theoretical mechanisms that are 
in play, as they do not capture group-level factors such as HIs (Sambanis, 2005).9 This level of 
aggregation also makes generalised assumptions about conditions within a country, without 
                                                          
8
 With notable exceptions (see Buhaug, Gates, Lujala, 2009; Lujala, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2011). 
9
 Most studies test or control for the GINI coefficient. This national-level measure, captures inequality between 
individuals within society (i.e. vertical inequality), and ranging from 0 (perfect inequality) to 100 (perfect 
equality). The problems often associated with this measure is missing data, and also its capture of countries that 
appear to be more equal in terms of vertical inequality, but in fact are severely unequally along group lines (see 
Cramer (2003) for a critique). 
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being able to capture subnational variation in HIs, opportunity factors and access to resources 
(see Buhaug et al., 2011). Various studies have shown the importance of exploring subnational 
disparities between ethnic groups (Ostby, 2008; Hegre, Ostby, and Raleigh, 2009; Fjelde and 
Ostby, 2014; Raleigh, 2014), although the focus of these subnational studies has also been on 
armed conflict. 
The final criticism relates to the tendency of many studies to view ethnicity as purely 
demographic. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) argue that this ignores the political 
context and the importance of ethnic politics in defining key differences between ethnic groups 
competing within the national arena. They contend that this relates largely to the state being 
treated as ethnically neutral, when in fact the state is central to ethno-exclusive policies and 
unequal distribution. This extends to empirical objections to proxy national-level measures of 
ethnic diversity, such as the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index (ELF). These proxies merely 
UHLQIRUFH ³WKH DSROLWLFDO UHQGHULQJ RI HWKQLFLW\ WKDW IDLOV WR DFFRXQW IRU LW DV DQ H[SOLFLWO\
SROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSRISRZHU´&HGHUPDQ*OHGLWVFKDQGBuhaug, 2013; pg 16). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that measures of diversity have produced non-findings since they ignore the 
ethno-political context. Seeing ethnicity as purely demographic is also unlikely to capture the 
key disparities between ethnic groups that may relate to other types of conflict behaviours. 
 
1.5. Ongoing Problems with the Institutional Grievance Perspective 
The institutional grievance perspectives builds upon many of these FULWLFLVPV +RURZLW]¶V
(1985) influential book Ethnic Groups in Conflict, was first major attempt to switch the 
attention to intergroup disparities, and away from economic determinism. He brings ethnic 
politics and biased institutions into our understanding of conflict by introducing the concept of 
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µUDQNHG JURXSV¶ ZKHUH DGYDQWDJHG DQG GLVDGYDQWDJHG FRPSHWH RYHU SROLWLFDO SRZHU 7KLV
formed the basis for future research on HIs and political conflict. 
While HIs literature has gone on to greatly enhance our knowledge of conflict, two 
limitations remain. Firstly, and returning to the motivations of this study the almost exclusive 
focus on civil war processes and civil war actors. There has been some movement in the study 
of HIs and other conflict behaviours, but not without limitations. Studies on HIs, protest, and 
rioting have drawn on data at the level of the ethnic group. In what was the first systematic 
attempt to measure ethnic inequalities in relation to the state, Ted Gurr and his team produced 
the Minorities at Risk Dataset. Using this data, studies found a strong relationship between 
ethnic inequalities and the onset of protest, rioting, and violent rebellion (Gurr, 1993, 2000; 
Olzak, 2006). However, although this moves away from the national-level to focus on 
important group characteristics, this data only codes minority groups rather than including all 
relevant groups regardless of political status or size. This data issue has recently been overcome 
by the EPR data but as yet has largely been used to explore civil war processes. More recent 
research on HIs remains largely split between the qualitative focus on broader conflict, and the 
quantitative focus on civil war.  
The final withstanding issue is that while quantitative civil war literature has explored 
the impact of political HIs, studies on non-civil war outcomes continue to focus on economic 
HIs. Many studies looking at sporadic forms violence or protest have associated these outcomes 
with economic disparities within society (Blau and Blau, 1982; Olzak, Shanahan, and 
McEneaney, 1996; Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan, 2004; Mancini, 2008; Ostby et al., 2011). The 
innovative development of the EPR dataset has ushered in a new research agenda exploring the 
relationship between ethno-political inequalities, yet this agenda has focused its attention on 
explaining the onset and dynamics of civil war. However, as this thesis contends, switching the 
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focus to ethno-political HIs in order to explain wider forms of political conflict is important for 
two key reasons. 
Firstly, ethno-political power does not only provide political advantages for groups 
included in the executive, but also has social and material consequences - i.e. who gets what, 
for members of groups that are included or excluded from power. This is not to say other 
dimensions are not important, but that political power enables groups to dictate the distribution 
of resources, and therefore can prevent excluded groups from gaining important socioeconomic 
goods and cultural rights in other dimensions (Stewart, 2008). Therefore, political motivations 
are also likely to generate mass grievances and demands for change, which moves beyond the 
common assumption that mass grievances within a population are more associated with 
socioeconomic HIs (Stewart, 2010b). Following the concept of HIs, ethno-political HIs involve 
restricted ethnic group access to political power and political decision making. Following 
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), this forms part of an ethno-political hierarchy in 
which groups exhibit various levels of political representation, with groups either facing 
inclusion or exclusion from governmental positions. These grievances are likely to manifest 
themselves in many forms, in outcomes that are not limited to armed rebellion against the state. 
Secondly, new events data on various conflict outcomes and data on political 
inequalities, introduced in the motivation, now enables this thesis to assess political contexts 
in which politically relevant ethnic groups are more likely to engage in specific forms of 
FRQWHQWLRXVDFWLRQ7KLVWKHVLVGUDZVXSRQ(WKQLF3RZHU5HODWLRQV(35¶Vhierarchical coding 
that captures the level of ethno-political inclusion and exclusion from power (Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min, (2010). This hierarchy includes: monopoly groups (have a total monopoly 
on power), dominant groups (ZKR LQFOXGH µWRNHQ¶PHPEHUV IURPRWKHUJURXSV VHQLRUDQG
junior partner groups (within a powersharing government), regional autonomy (regional 
power), separatist autonomy (defacto independence), powerless, and discriminated groups 
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(systematic). The next section outlines the theoretical approach of this thesis, before outlining 
the empirical papers that deploy this approach to different types of conflict behaviour. 
 
1.6. Theoretical Framework 
This thesis draws on a two-stage theoretical framework: firstly, political inequalities generate 
grievances that motivate potential conflict, and secondly, distinct mechanisms translate ethnic 
grievances into different conflict behaviours.  
 In the first stage of this framework, I draw upon the well-established institutional-
grievance perspective that highlights how political HIs transform political inequality into ethnic 
grievances. This approach emphasises the importance of ethnic politics, and the role of state 
institutions in distributing power and resources unequally along ethnic lines (see Stewart, 2008; 
Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug, 2013). Ethno-exclusive policies of the state are unequal and 
target specific groups, which in turn, generates politicised grievances along ethnic lines.  
 In the second stage of the causal chain, politicised ethnic grievances, under certain 
conditions, can result in different forms of conflict behaviour either against the state or in 
support of the state. Here I also GUDZLQVSLUDWLRQIURP7LOO\¶VUDWLonal-actor perspective 
that highlights the importance of opportunity when understanding the emergence of conflict. I 
argue that different ethno-political contexts and opportunity structures can jointly explain the 
proliferation of disparate types of conflict behaviour. Taken together with the nature of ethno-
political exclusion, which prevents institutional avenues to address grievances, often prevents 
disputes from being channelled through conventional forms of action (see Stewart, 2008). Each 
empirical chapter highlights novel and unique mechanisms that link ethno-political inequalities 
to distinct types of conflict behaviour and conflict actors that fall outside of conventional 
definitions of civil war (i.e. dyadic armed violence between the government and rebels). Before 
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outlining this framework in more detail, it is important to explain why ethnicity is important in 
this process. 
 
The Importance of Ethnicity 
Those pointing to the importance of ethnicity highlight the ascriptive nature of ethnicity that 
makes ethnic group members more identifiable (Eck, 2009), and more salient than other social 
groupings (Mueller, 2004; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). For example, the football 
team you support has less social importance and an individual can change who they support. 
Similarly other membership categories such as ideology are more easily changed and are more 
difficult to identify. In contrast a person cannot change their race or readily change their 
language, religion or tribal afflictions, which is constrained by the social context (Stewart, 
2008). Following Horowitz (1985), I define ethnicity as a broad and ascriptive identity based 
on lines of common descent and collective cultural affiliations such as: race (South Africa), 
language (Zambia), tribal (Kenya), religion (Nigeria), or a combination of these boundaries. 
The salient and recognisable nature of ethnicity has provided a convenient way to 
organise politics and form political coalitions, since coethnic members share a common culture 
and are clearly identifiable sources of political support (Bates, 1983). This makes ethnic 
attributes more serviceable than other categories such as ideology or class (Fearon 1999; 
Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Ethnicity therefore provides a convenient way to distribute state 
resources, particularly in post-colonial states that lack the state resources to provide public 
goods, such as jobs and healthcare, equally across the country (Wimmer, 2013). In line with 
HIs literature this thesis highlights the importance of the group-level that exists within the 
structures of the state and above the individual-level.10  
                                                          
10 A group is a socially defined collection of individuals who identify with each other based on common and 
shared characteristics, such as beliefs, values, interests, experience, and in some cases cultural similarities such 
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What makes ethnic differences more socially significant and more likely to influence 
conflict behaviour? There are three different perspectives to ethnicity that seek to explore these 
questions and form foundation for different structural approaches to conflict considered above: 
primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist approaches (Young, 1993; Stewart, 2008).11 
The primordialist approach assumes ethnic identity is fixed, firmly bounded, and readymade 
from birth. Ethnic differences are considered to be the root cause of ethnic conflict due to the 
high emotive and often irrational attachment to ethnic affiliations (Lake and Rothchild, 1998). 
However, ethnic identity is not fixed, but rather is fluid and situational. Ethnic identity can 
change in significance over time, and the importance of a particular identity can often be short 
lived (Stewart, 2008). This thesis does not deny the importance of emotions or attachment to 
RQH¶VLGHQWLW\EXWPRYLQJEH\RQGPHUHHWKQLFGLIIHUHQFHVYLHZVFRQIOLFWDVDUHVXOWRIVSHFLILF
ethno-political contexts (Horowitz, 2003). 
The instrumentalist approach instead takes a more rationalist viewpoint, and relates 
FORVHO\ WR µIHDVLELOLW\¶SHUVSHFWLYHVRIFRQIOLFW(WKQLFERXQGDULHVDUHVHHQDVVXVFHSWLEOH WR
manipulation by political elites who aim to achieve certain political goals. . Instrumentalists 
argue that ethnicity is not unique from other social memberships, rather is convenient in 
particularly contexts (Bates, 1983; Fearon, 1999). Ethnic conflict is therefore seen to be a cost-
EHQHILWFDOFXODWLRQZKHUHHWKQLFLW\LVµUHLQYHQWHG¶DQGPRVtly irrelevant in wider social life. 
This is drawn upon by the opportunist approach which argues that ethnic grievances are simply 
a discourse used by political entrepreneurs to mobilise specific populations (Cramer, 2006).  
                                                          
as ethnicity. Generally groups must be identifiable to members and people outside the group, often using 
common markers to associate an individual with a group. In essence, group identity is important to social life, in 
which collective identity relates to social norms and emotional attachment, which impacts the collective 
behaviour of individuals (Tajfel, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1988).  




The constructivist approach instead takes the middle ground, accepting the rational 
logic within the instrumentalist approach, but also highlights the importance of the social 
context in shaping the political relevance of ethnicity. Ethnicity is instead considered costly to 
invent, arguing the remaking of ethnic boundaries relates to exhaustive elite attempts to 
continually emphasise ethnic differences (Bates, 2006; Stewart, 2008). This approach therefore 
sees ethnicity as relational and grounded in both political and social perceptions of group 
ERXQGDULHV LQ ZKDW $QGHUVRQ  GHVFULEHV DV µLPDJLQHG FRPPXQLWLHV¶ &RQIOLFW LV
therefore rooted in the cognitive aspects of group identity and the social system that breeds it, 
rather than ethnic differences or pure elite pragmatism (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 
2002). 
From an institutional-grievance perspective and HIs approach, the constructivist view 
of ethnicity can help explain why high levels of ethnic-based inequalities are likely to cause 
political conflict. This relates to social comparisons over group disparities and elite incentives 
to manipulate ethnic differences for political gain. This constructivist approach also offers 
some response to questions on whether ethnic groups are meaningful actors due to the changing 
nature of ethnicity (Brubaker, 2004). I build on the constructivist idea that the significance of 
ethnicity is defined by politically relevance at a given point in time and is susceptible to change, 
which is reflected in the EPR data that is used throughout this thesis. 
A more serious criticism is over the cohesion of ethnic groups, since intra-ethnic 
divisions do exist (Brubaker, 2004; Kalyvas, 2008). While this thesis is aware of this criticism, 
a cautious approach is taken when assuming ethnic groups are both unitary and meaningful 
conflict actors. Chapter 3 accepts that the existence of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic divisions 
are likely to be a key obstacle for nonviolent mobilisation. Chapter 4 also accepts the ethnic 
defection that occurs during civil war, highlighting the emergence of ethnic defector PGMs 
that can be recruited from the same ethnic kin of the opposition. Chapter 2 makes stronger 
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assumptions about ethnic cohesion, but in relation to highly localised intergroup violence 
where cohesion is easier to maintain. 
 
Stage 1: From Ethno-political HIs to Ethnic Grievances 
)ROORZLQJ&HGHUPDQ*OHGLWVFKDQG%XKDXJ,GUDZXSRQ7LOO\¶VSROLW\PRGHO
of ethno-exclusive states to explain the emergence of ethnic grievances. In this model 
politically included groups within the polity enjoy and seek to maintain their privileged access 
to power, while excluded groups outside of the polity seek to challenge this status quo 
(Wucherpfennig et al., 2012; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013; Wimmer, 2013). This 
conceptualisation places the state at the heart of competition between politically advantaged 
included ethnic groups and disadvantaged excluded groups over power and control of the 
distribution of state resources. This essentially politicises ethnic differences which in turn 
generate ethnic-based grievances. Exploring ethno-exclusive politics and patronage enables us 
to tease out the opposing motivations: for excluded groups to challenge the status quo, and for 
included groups to uphold it. 
Ethno-exclusive policies form part of a political strategy to control and maintain 
political power (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013; Wimmer, 2013). Deploying this 
strategy serves two distinct purposes for included groups, which come at the expense of others. 
Firstly, this enables ethnic incumbents to dominate and consolidates the power of their own 
ethnic group, by enacting favourable policies that ensure the greater status of the group. 
Moreover, ethno-exclusive policies are often extended to the security sector, where coethnics 
are recruited into the police and army or are promoted to leading positions within these 
institutions to ensure the survival of the regime (Stewart, 2008; Wimmer, 2013). This strategy 
is often used to reduce to likelihood of coups within from rival ethnic factions (Roessler, 2011). 
However, ethno-exclusive policies generate security dilemmas and grievances among excluded 
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groups that fear repression, impunity and marginalisation, and therefore have strong incentives 
to challenge the status quo (Lake and Rothchild, 1998). From the perspective of included 
groups this creates strong collective incentives to maintain political power due to their own 
fears of marginalisation if they allow other groups to gain power (Horowitz, 1985).  
Secondly, dominating state institutions allows government elites to gain economic 
advantages, and distribute SDWURQDJHRU ³FOXEJRRGV´ WRFRHWKQLFV LQ H[FKDQJH IRUSROLWLFDO
support at the expense of others (Posner, 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Habyarimana 
et al., 2009; Wimmer, 2013; Kramon and Posner, 2013). This not only secures political support 
for the regime, but leads to the favouritism of government areas that reinforces expectation that 
access to state resources can only be gained through coethnic elites. Whether a community 
needs services such as improved sanitary systems, access to healthcare, land ownership or jobs, 
co-ethnic leaders are seen to be more reliable in providing patronage than leaders of other 
groups (Posner, 2005; Bangura, 2006; Habyriamana et al., 2009). This creates strong 
motivations for group members to uphold political power to secure advantaged access to state 
resources, and in turn, strong incentives for excluded groups to seek change in order to gain 
access to these resources. 
Unequal ethno-political configurations effectively creates winners and losers, and little 
appetite for political accommodation by the regime (Stewart, 2008; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012; 
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013). Building on the discussion above, ethno-exclusive 
policies are likely to increase zero-sum rivalries over fears of political and economic 
marginalisation, which generate ethno-political grievances over disparities bHWZHHQDJURXS¶V
current access to resources and perceived entitlements (Gurr, 1993; Tilly, 1999; Stewart, 2008; 
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013). While included groups aim to uphold the status quo, 
excluded groups are likely to resent politically dominant groups who they perceive have no 
entitlement to their advantaged and exploitative position (Peterson, 2002). Groups who face 
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genuine hardships, have little or no access to state institutions, and fear the domination of other 
groups, have strong common motivations to challenge the status quo and seek coethnic 
representation (Tilly, 1978; Wimmer, 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013). This 
relational approach to intergroup relations draws upon the constructivist approach to ethnicity. 
As to the nature of unequal ethno-political systems, conventional forms of political 
action are either blocked or limited for groups excluded from power. This necessitates 
engagement in unconventional political conflict of various kinds. Excluded elites share similar 
aversions towards other groups over political disadvantages but have more narrow incentives 
to seek political power via political conflict.  
 
Stage 2: From Ethnic Grievances to Conflict 
Various contexts can explain why ethnic grievances transform into specific types of conflict. 
Armed rebellion, which has long been the focus of the institutional-grievance approach, 
emerges when rebels use common ethnic grievances to arm and mobilise ethno-politically 
excluded groups against the state. The state is not an neutral actor and is often dominated by 
other ethnic groups. In order to maintain power the regime may respond with indiscriminate 
repression ZKLFKRQO\IXUWKHUDLGVWKHUHEHO¶VFDXVH (i.e. Stewart, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch 
and Buhaug, 2013). Ethnicity provides a convenient way to organise support, with rebels 
claiming to represent an ethnic group against the injustices of groups that hold a dominant 
position in the government and have incentives to sustain their dominance. Ethnicity also 
JUHDWO\ IDFLOLWLHV DUPHG PRELOLVDWLRQ DV LW LV PRUH µVWLFN\¶ WKDQ RWKHU UHFUXLWPHQW
characteristics, and can be manipulated in order to generate strong collective emotions about 
group membership and makes potential recruits more identifiable (Eck, 2009).  
 Yet ethnic grievances do not always escalate into armed rebellion, and when they do, 
their influence is not limited to the behaviour of rebels and the government during civil war. 
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Specific conflict behaviours can be explained by certain ethno-political contexts, particular 
opportunity factors, and specific types of grievances that facilitate disparate forms of 
mobilisation. The interplay between these factors and different types of conflict behaviour are 
explored at length throughout this thesis. 
The following and final section of this chapter will introduce the three empirical 
chapters and the unique mechanisms that each chapter has uncovered (see figure 1). Each build 
upon the institutional-grievance framework to explore the relationship between ethno-political 
HIs and three distinct conflict behaviours: ethnic riots, mass nonviolent action, and ethnic 
PGMs during the course of civil war. 
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1.7. Introducing the Empirical Chapters 
The three distinct empirical research chapters within this thesis utilise quantitative 
methodology, various statistical models, and new data to explore new mechanisms between 
ethno-political inequalities and various types of political conflict behaviour. I will now 
introduce these empirical chapters, the mechanisms that translate grievances to each type of 
behaviour and their respective contributions in more detail. 
 
Chapter 2: The Language of the Unheard: Ethno-Political Exclusion and Ethnic Riots in Africa 
This chapter explores the political determinants of ethnic rioting, and why ethnic riots occur in 
some locations but not others. Ethnic rioting has scarcely been explored by HIs literature, yet 
the ethnic nature of this violence means that ethnic motivations are likely to be central to 
understanding its emergence. Studies on incidental ethnic violence has emerged but remains 
confined to case-study evidence. Research has linked high HIs to an increased risk of various 
types of ethnic violence in Nigeria (Ukiwo, 2008), the Ivory Coast, Tanzania (Basedau, 
Vullers, Korner, 2013), and in the 2007 election violence in Kenya (Stewart, 2010a), while 
Horwitz (2003) remains one of the only attempts to link HIs specifically to ethnic rioting. Other 
more dominant explanations of ethnic rioting instead point to the incentives of elites to use 
violence to enhance their political power, while others attribute ethnic rioting to the proximity 
of antagonistic groups. Yet none of these factors are sufficient alone to explain the onset of 
ethnic riots. Intergroup interaction rarely leads to violence, while ethnic riots do not always 
relate to the incentives of instrumental elites or occur in all areas that have inequalities. 
Other quantitative research on HIs and low-intensity and incidental ethnic violence has 
largely been limited to intra-country analyses, in particular Indonesian provinces (Barron, 
Kaiser and Pradhan, 2004; Mancini, 2008; Ostby et al., 2011), while Large-N quantitative 
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research has focused on militarised communal disputes between armed groups that often occur 
in the periphery and in rural areas. (Fjelde and Ostby, 2014; Raleigh, 2014). HIs research has 
yet to systematically explore ethnic rioting, a more urban and incidental form of ethnic 
violence. Therefore to the best of my knowledge, this chapter offers the first subnational 
analysis of ethnic riots across various African countries, and further contributes to existing 
studies of incidental ethnic violence and intra-country analyses of ethnic riots on India (i.e. 
Wilkinson, 2004; Varshney, 2002), Indonesia (i.e. Tajima, 2014), and 1LJHULD¶VPLGGOHEHOW
(Scacco, 2010). 
Ethnic rioting are distinct. They are sudden, sporadic, and involved non-militarised 
violence between civilians of at least two ethnic groups.12 Violence is specifically directed at 
civilian members and buildings associated with the rival ethnic group (Horowitz, 2003; 
Wilkinson, 2004). This includes the burning of houses, shops, and cultural sites. The violent 
nature of these disputes clearly excludes peaceful forms of unconventional action. To be clear 
this violence does not include xenophobic violence or non-ethnic violence. 
Ethnic riots involves large numbers of participants, which differs from urban 
neighbourhood brawls between rival group members, which instead are labelled as routine 
violence (Ostby et al., 2011; Brass, 2003). Finally, ethnic riots are incidental and are more 
loosely organised than other forms of contentious action (Horowitz, 2003). Although not 
entirely unplanned, ethnic riots lack the high level of planning and organisation associated with 
pogroms or genocide. This also differs from violent rebellions which are highly planned and 
orchestrated forms mobilisation, and militarised armed violence by organised non-state actors 
(Brass, 2003; Horowitz, 2003; Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016). 
 
                                                          
12
 Ethnic riots have also been referred to as turmoil (unorganised mass violence) or episodic violence. 
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I argue that ethnic riots can be explained by both: sufficient ethnic motivations and the 
close proximity of particular groups which allows localised violence to occur. I argue that 
ethno-political discrimination and a recent loss of political representation provide sufficient 
motivations for low-intensity violence, while close proximity with dominant groups provides 
the opportunities for violence. 
Moving beyond existing subnational studies on armed and organised violence, I explore 
the impact of ethno-political HIs on the location on ethnic riots across Africa (1990-2008). This 
also expands on existing literature on rioting, that either focused on riots against the state, or 
lumps different types of rioting together (Wilkinson, 2009). To capture ethnic riot outcomes, I 
generate a new variable using the SCAD data to capture their geographical location and onset.13 
Using a series of rare-events logistic regression models, these events are explored at the grid-
level (PRIO-Grid) in conjunction with data on the settlement areas of ethnic groups and their 
level of political representation.  
The chapter was presented at the European Peace Science Annual Conference 
(University of Warwick) in June 2015 and at various workshops at the University of Kent. This 
chapter is under review at Journal of Global Security Studies.  
 
Chapter 3: The Hunger Games: Food Prices, Ethnic Cleavages and Nonviolent Unrest in 
Africa 
This chapter studies the relationship between ethno-political cleavages and mass nonviolent 
action against the government. Incompatibilities are often challenged through nonviolent 
means, including in cases where high HIs exist (i.e. Gurr, 1993, Stewart, 2002). Nonviolentn 
                                                          
13 Using information on the actors and details about the event I code all events where two ethnic groups 
classified in the EPR dataset engage in non-militarised interethnic violence. Coordinates are used to combine 
these events with the PRIO-Grid. 
31 
 
action can have both maximalist claims of regime change and claims relating to government 
policy, and encompasses hundreds of nonviolent methods. These methods can broadly 
characterised as persuasive tactics (i.e. protests, demonstrations), and noncompliant tactics (i.e. 
strikes, sit-ins, boycotts) (Sharp, 2005). Such methods are used outside of institutional 
channels, which differs from conventional nonviolent action such as lobbying (Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011).  
Yet the emergence of nonviolent action remains poorly understood, especially when 
you compare this with the expansion of civil war literature, which has greatly improved our 
understanding of why armed conflict occur. Part of the problem is that structuralist literatures, 
which have relied on civil war mechanisms to explain nonviolent action, have grown in 
isolation to civil resistance literature, which instead argues that violent and nonviolent 
mobilisation are very different processes. While civil war requires a few hundred recruits that 
can often be recruited from one ethnic group, civil resistance literature argues that nonviolent 
action is successful with larger and diverse numbers, meaning recruitment during nonviolent 
mobilisation is more often conducted across ethnic lines.  
This chapter combines two previously unrelated literatures on HIs and protest, which 
has tended to focus on minority ethnic groups and their engagement in ethnic protest (Gurr, 
1993; Olzak, 2006; Brown, 2009), and civil resistance literature, which both favours agency 
over structural explanations of nonviolent action and has focused on the outcomes of 
nonviolent campaigns rather than why they emerge in the first place (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 
2017). Following civil resistance literature, I move beyond existing grievance approaches to 
protest to conceptualise nonviolent mobilisation as both vertical (against the state) and 
horizontal (in bringing diverse social groups into the protests). This broader conceptualisation 
moves beyond existing HIs studies that focuses on ethnic-based protests by minority ethnic 
groups (Gurr, 1993; Olzak, 2006). Instead mass nonviolent movements more often seek support 
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across social lines, and actively encourage diversity, in order to gain wider support and further 
pressure the government (see DeNardo, 1985; Sharp, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). 
As Thurber (2017) shows, only 13% of civil resistance campaigns are mobilised along ethnic 
lines in pursuit of ethnic goals.  
The strategy of mobilising large numbers of people across group lines is often 
undermined by local-level cleavages both within and between ethnic groups. These cleavages 
which promote division and differing group goals that provide a distinct obstacle to cooperation 
across group lines (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Bhavnani and Jha, 2014). Yet activists 
operating in diverse locations have successfully managed to unify divided ethnic groups to 
engage in mass nonviolent action. Building upon this puzzle and this unique collective action 
problem, I explore how nonviolent movements overcome local ethnic barriers to engage in 
mass nonviolent action, providing a new understanding of how grievances relate to the 
emergence of nonviolent action. 
Building on opportunism logic, I argue that the incidence of nonviolent action is greatly 
aided by the existence of broader cross-cutting grievances, which enable movements to broaden 
their appeal and unify various intra and interethnic groups. I focus on increases in domestic 
food price spikes due to their widespread economic impact on consumers from all ethnic 
groups. Food price spikes have been shown to cause general social unrest (see Smith, 2014), 
but have not been explored in relation to mass and more organised forms of nonviolent action. 
Food prices generate common cross-cutting grievances and immediate hardships, which 
coupled with political exclusion, provide strong short-term incentives to engage in protest. 
These incentives provide a unique opportunity for opposition movements to mobilise across 
group lines and link common hardships to wider political issues. 
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Bringing HIs research in line with research on civil resistance, I analyse local ethnic 
barriers to nonviolent action, across grid-cells (PRIO-GRID) of 41 peacetime African countries 
(1990-2008). I develop a new indicator of mass nonviolent action at the grid-level, coding 
SCAD events that are anti-government, nonviolent, organised, and involve at least 1000 
participants. Fixed-effects logistic regression models are used to explore this outcome in 
relation to politically excluded ethnic settlement areas and changes in domestic food prices.  
This chapter has been presented at the International Studies Association Annual 
Conference (Atlanta) in March 2016, the European Peace Science Annual Conference (Milan) 
in June 2016, and the Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Modelling Conflict Workshop 
(University of Essex) in September 2016. This chapter was also awarded the 2016 BISA 
African Affairs Postgraduate Paper Prize and the 2017 Cedric Smith Prize. I have revised and 
resubmitted this article to the Journal of Peace Research. 
 
Chapter 4: Ethnicity, Pro-Government Militias and the Duration of Civil War 
The final chapter is co-authored with Govinda Clayton (ETH-Zurich) and Andrew Thompson 
(Queens University Belfast). As lead author of this chapter I have led both the theoretical 
argument and empirical analysis.  
This chapter covers the final type of political behaviour that is explored in this thesis, 
ethnic PGMs and their influence on civil war duration. This chapter moves beyond the existing 
tendency to focus on government and rebel dyads, which treats the government as a unitary 
actor in civil war processes. Missing from conventional definitions of civil war are Pro-
Government Militias, which encompasses a range of non-state and pro-government actors, 
including: paramilitaries, self-defence forces, militias, and death squads. PGMs are organised 
armed groups, which operate on behalf on the incumbent government, but function outside of 
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conventional security forces (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013: 250). These organisations are 
complex and exist for various purposes, so therefore can be categorised differently, in terms 
of: informal or semi-official links to the state, local or national links to society, the context in 
which militias emerge, and membership characteristics (Carey and Mitchell, 2017).  
HIs literature has recently moved beyond the unitary actor assumption on the rebel-side 
to explore the impact that HIs and varying ethnic linkages of rebel organisations has on civil 
wars (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Like rebel groups, PGMs may also recruit along ethnic and 
non-ethnic lines and have their own motivations to fight depending on their ethnic linkages to 
the state. In this chapter we explores the different ethnic linkages of pro-government militias 
(labelled as Ethnic PGMs or EPGMs), highlighting government incentives to use coethnic 
PGMs (same ethnicity as the government) and defector PGMs (drawn from the opposition), 
and in turn, their respective effects on civil war duration. This builds on existing PGM research 
that has previously explored militias in relation to civilian violence, human rights abuses, and 
civil war intensity, but has yet to explore the impact of ethnic linkages on conflict duration (see 
Carey and Mitchell, 2017). 
These categories are operationalised by combining politically relevant ethnic groups, 
and whether they are included or excluded from power (EPR data), with the Pro-Government 
Militia Dataset (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013). This data is similar to the ACD2EPR, where 
rebel groups were coded in relation to their political linkage to ethnic groups (see 
Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). EPGMs are recruited from one ethnic group, or a coalition of 
aligned groups, where ethnic identity is used as a basis of inclusion within these groups. 
Various EPGMs may also recruit from the same ethnic group. In some cases this includes non-
native PGMs which are recruited from a transnational ethnic-kin and support the host 
government, such as the numerous groups operating within the DRC. In addition to ethnic-
based recruitment, EPGMs also have clear political aims to uphold ethnic goals, often relating 
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to maintaining ethno-political power, or providing community-based protection to a particular 
HWKQLF FRQVWLWXHQF\ 7KLV FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI (3*0 GLIIHUV IURP µHWKQLF PLOLWLDV¶ PRUH
generally, which may have the goal of protecting their community, but are often not pro-
government or have no association with the state (Raleigh 2014; Alden, Thakur and Arnold 
2011). For example, groups such as the non-affiliated Pokot militia in Kenya are 
distinguishable from EPGMs. 
We argue that coethnic PGMs have strong motivations to uphold the existing ethno-
political regime, and provide the government with unique opportunity to develop a cheap and 
loyal force to counter internal security threats. We argue that these motivations have long term 
consequences for conflict duration, since coethnic PGMs have strong incentives to fight on for 
longer and resist government concessions regarding power. In contrast, we argue defector 
PGMs provide the state with effective counter-insurgents that provide unique local knowledge 
and divide the opposition, which reduces conflict duration. However, this can lead to 
fragmentation within the opposition, which in turn, can complicate the bargaining process by 
increasing the number of interests that need to be resolved. Using Cox proportional hazard 
models and case analysis, these new typologies of PGMs are explored globally across all civil 
war episodes that have terminated between 1981 and 2007.14 
This chapter has been presented at the International Studies Association Annual 
Conference (Atlanta) in February 2017. A previous version was presented at the Conflict 
Research Society in September 2016 (Canterbury), and at the Sié Chéou-Kang Center for 
International Security and Diplomacy (University of Denver) in November 2016. This paper is 
currently under review at International Studies Quarterly. 
                                                          
14 We follow the UCDP definition (armed contestation that experience at least 25 battlefield deaths per year), due 
to the problem of measuring the exact number of battlefield deaths. Moreover, the UCDP definition) ensures the 
inclusion of conflicts in smaller countries that are proportionately more likely to experience fewer deaths. Civil 
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Ethnic riots are sporadic and localised incidents of low-intensity violence, with civilians from 
one ethnic group engaging in vicious attacks on a rival ethnic group. While systematic research 
on ethnic violence has almost exclusively focused on organised armed conflict, comparably 
little research has considered the determinants of low intensity ethnic violence. This article 
explores the relationship between political inequalities and ethnic riots. Building on existing 
case-based research on inequality and the geographical proximity of groups, it argues that 
ethnic rioting can be jointly explained by collective motivations for group violence that emerge 
from extreme political inequalities, and the close proximity of such groups. To test this 
argument, the article deploys a spatially disaggregated grid-level analysis of all African states 
between 1990 and 2008, combining new dyadic data capturing the location of ethnic riots with 
disaggregated grid-level data on ethno-political representation. I find ethnic riots are more 
likely to occur in discriminated group areas and where a group has recently lost political 




In recent decades research exploring the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict has 
flourished. Yet empirical research has almost exclusively focused on organised armed conflict, 
relating ethnic inequalities and intergroup competition to armed rebellion against the 
government (see Stewart, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), inter-rebel violence 
(Bakke et al., 2012; Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz, 2012) and violence 
between armed communal groups (Fjelde and Von Uexkull 2012; Butler and Gates, 2012; Eck 
2014; Fjelde and Østby, 2014; Raleigh, 2014). As a consequence there has been much less 
V\VWHPDWLFDWWHQWLRQWRORZLQWHQVLW\YLROHQFHRUµHWKQLFULRWLQJ¶ 
Understanding ethnic rioting is important for several reasons. First, ethnic rioting is a 
common phenomenon, and while some incidences are non-lethal (Wilikinson, 2004), others 
are very deadly; between 1990 and 2008, at least 268 ethnic riots occurred in Africa, resulting 
in more than 43,000 deaths.15 Such violence is hard to predict, since it is sporadic involving 
civilians from one ethnic group specifically targeting persons or property associated with a 
rival ethnicity in non-militarised attacks (Horowitz, 2003; Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004).16 
This leaves us with fewer answers as to what systematic factors cause less intense ethnic 
violence.  
Secondly, human insecurity is not solely threatened by organised armed violence. Many 
African countries experience these various forms of ethnic violence, which differ in terms of 
goals, level of organization, types of violence and the locations in which they occur. While 
systematic research has enriched our understanding of armed ethnic rebellion (i.e. Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), it is a highly organised and largely rural endeavour, involving 
                                                          
15
 These 268 ethnic riots are recoded events from the SCAD dataset (see research design). 
16
 Following Horowitz (1985), I define ethnic groups as broadly based on fluid but ascriptive identities including: 
race (South Africa), language (Zambia), religion (Nigeria), tribal (Kenya), or a combination of affiliations. Similar 
to Wilkinson (2004) and Varshney (2002), I focus specially on politically relevant ethnic groups that are 
competing in the national political arena. 
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the training and recruiting of an armed force that aims to overthrow the government or seeks 
to establish a new state (Sambanis, 2004). Another body of research on non-state conflict has 
enriched our understanding of communal violence that occurs between armed and organised 
identity groups. This is related to competition over local natural resources and grazing rights 
(Eck 2014; Fjelde and Østby, 2014; Raleigh, 2014), and often occurs in the periphery between 
politically irrelevant groups, where the state is weak and unable to mitigate armed disputes 
(Raleigh, 2014).  
Ethnic riots are more localised and largely occur in towns and cities rather than in the 
periphery,17 in which violence mobilisation is more loosely organised than large-scale forms 
of ethnic violence and highly orchestrated mass violence such as pogroms and genocide 
+RURZLW]  9LROHQFH LV SHUSHWUDWHG E\ FLYLOLDQV DJDLQVW PHPEHUV RI WKH ³RWKHU´ DQG
associated property but often involves non-lethal physical violence (Varshney, 2002; 
Wilkinson, 2004; Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016).18  
A final justification for attempting to explain ethnic riots is because they are distinct 
and are not simply a substitution of other forms of ethnic conflict. As suggested by Table 1, 
they largely occur outside of active armed conflict zones and can occur as long as 44 years 
after a civil-war.19 There is also little spatial overlap with armed communal violence, which 
reflects a rural-urban distinction. Where violence does co-occur, this involves different actors 
engaged in different locations within a grid and is largely confined to Nigeria which is a country 
                                                          
17
 For example, Wilkinson (2004) finds that 93% of Hindu-Muslim riots in India between 1950 and 1995, have 
occurred in urban areas. 
18
 Ethnic riots involve mass numbers of civilians, but differ from other community violence such as localised 
gang violence, neighbourhood brawls, and everyday social violence (Horowitz, 2003; Brass, 2003; Scacco, 
2010).  
19
 When looking at the distribution of violence events across geographical grid locations, only 15 ethnic riots 
have occurred in the same locations as an ongoing armed conflict. Of these armed events, only six were directly 
UHODWHGWRHWKQLFULRWVDOOLQ6RXWK$IULFD,QWKHVHHYHQWVYLROHQFHRFFXUUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH$1&DQG,)3¶V
armed wings and escalated from ethnic riots, not the other way around.  
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facing multiple security challenges. Lastly, ethnic riots are not simply the result of protests that 
have escalated into violence.20  















Ethnic Riots  
39 (17%) 15 (7%) 28 (12%) 16 (7%) 29 (13%) 
No Overlap with 
Ethnic Riots 
186 (83%) 210 (93%) 197 (88%) 209 (93%) 196 (87%) 
 
Much of what we currently know about ethnic rioting has relied on evidence from disparate 
case studies. A dominant approach argues that ethnic rioting is the result of the political 
incentives of elites to use violence to enhance their political power during elections and 
democratic transitions (i.e. Throup and Hornsby, 1998; Brass 2003; Wilkinson, 2004). Yet, 
while elites may have incentives to stoke violence in certain contexts, empirical evidence has 
been limited to India and Indonesia where there was clear elite collusion in the violence.21 This 
is problematic since there is very little evidence of elite collusion in other contexts; including 
Jos in Nigeria (Scacco, 2010), post-conflict Northern Ireland (Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-
Folch, 2016) and in the United States (Olzak, Shanahan and McEneaney, 1996) ± thereby 
providing little support that elite incentives alone explain ethnic rioting.  
 Alternatively, other case-literature points to ethnic inequality and the competition it 
generates over urban resources such as jobs and public goods (i.e. Olzak, Shanahan, and 
McEneaney, 1996; Ukiwo, 2008; Basedau, Vullers, and Korner, 2013), or geographical 
proximity, since ethnic riots are common in towns and cities where intergroup interaction 
                                                          
20
 While 15% of ethnic riots overlap with areas with protests, only seven cases actually led to ethnic riots: an 
Fulani general strike in Cameroon (1991), an anti-government strike that escalated into Hutu-Tutsi clashes in 
Burundi (1994), four violent Muslims-Christian clashes in Kano after protests in Nigeria (1991), and Xhosa-
Zulu violence in Johannesburg, South Africa (1994), after an IFP party march.  
21
 Qualitative literature on Kenya also points to elite collusion (Throup and Honsby 1998). 
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provides opportunities for violence (Olzak, Shanahan and McEneaney, 1996; McDoom, 2013; 
Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016). But these explanations are explored in isolation 
and are not solely sufficient to explain ethnic rioting. For instance, ethnic rioting does not occur 
in all contexts of intergroup inequality, while intergroup interaction alone cannot explain local 
variations in violence, since the mast majority of interaction in heterogenous communities does 
not result in violence. What explains the significant variation of where such violence occurs? 
Why do some groups engaged in ethnic rioting while others do not? 
Building on these various arguments, I explore the local determinants of ethnic rioting 
and theorise that their occurrence is dependent on distinct extreme local ethno-political 
contexts, which produce sufficient motivations to engage in intergroup violence, and where 
such groups are in close enough proximity for such violence to occur. I argue that intergroup 
interaction increases the risk of ethnic rioting where politically dominant groups coexist with 
groups that are discriminated or have recently lost political power. These contexts raise the 
stakes in intergroup competition over jobs and access to public provisions and generate fear, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of what Horowitz (2003) labels, µLQWHUJURXSDQWDJRQLVPV¶. 
In these contexts antagonistic intergroup competition generate high social distance, translating 
geographical proximity into violence. In doing so, this article extends our understanding of 
spatial and temporal contexts in which ethnic rioting are likely to occur. 
Using newly available events data, I assess these propositions at the geographical grid-
level using a new dyadic measure of ethnic riots across subnational locations of all African 
countries. This approach contributes to existing case-based literatures on low intensity ethnic 
violence, by capturing varying contexts both within and across countries of where ethnic rioting 
does and does not occur. The results are consistent with my theoretical expectations; the 
location of ethnic riots is jointly determined by highly unequal ethno-political power 
configurations and the geographical proximity of politically unequal ethnic groups. The 
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findings make a notable contribution by explaining intra and cross-national variation of a type 
of violence that has been largely overlooked by wider quantitative literature on ethnic violence. 
 
2.2. Existing Literature on why Ethnic Riots occur 
In existing literature on ethnic riots, the most influential stream of research relates ethnic rioting 
to a number of contexts in which elites may wish to incite violence for political gain. For 
example, in highly competitive regions they may have local electoral incentives to use ethnic 
tensions to alter the ethnic composition of the electorate (Throup and Hornsby, 1998; Harris, 
2012) or to strengthen their support among co-ethnic constituents (Brass, 2003; Wilkinson, 
2004; Berenschot, 2011). Other studies point to elite incentives within the context of political 
transition and democratisation. These authors argue elites have local incentives to politicise 
interethnic tensions and draw support along ethnic lines in the political vacuum left by a 
departing authoritarian regime (van Klinken, 2007; Bertand, 2008; Tajima, 2014; Toha, 2017).  
 While some of this research is quantitative in nature, this evidence is largely derived 
from riots in India and Indonesia, where there is clear evidence of elite incentives and collusion. 
This selection bias is largely the result of data availability which has previously prevented 
cross-national analyses. A second, largely qualitative literature, challenges the notion that 
ethnic riots are a result of clear electoral purposes and incentives to organise along ethnic lines. 
Scacco (2010: 6) explores two ethnic riots in Nigeria (Kaduna and Jos in 2000-2001) where 
the political context provided incentives that discouraged elites from manipulating ethnic 
tensions. She instead argues that the onset of ethnic riots can be traced to poverty which 
motivates riot participation. Others move beyond absolute poverty to argue that inequalities 
between ethnic groups provide the broader ethnic motivations that drive this form of violence 
(Horowitz, 2003), with numerous case studies pointing to various group inequalities as a 
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contributing factor in Nigeria (Ukiwo, 2008), the Ivory Coast, Tanzania (Basedau, Vullers, and 
Korner, 2013), Indonesia (Tadjoeddin and Murshed, 2007; Østby et al., 2011) and the United 
States (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996).22 While inequalities have featured in studies 
of low-intensity ethnic violence, this literature is also limited to particular cases. It remains 
unclear what determinants of violence, and what types of inequality if any, have a broad 
nomothetic impact on ethnic rioting. Another concern is that ethnic grievances are often 
regarded as too common. In contrast, ethnic riots which are relatively rare, sporadic and only 
occur in specific areas. 
 The third literature argues that it LV WKH µSUR[LPLW\¶ RI HWKQLF JURXSs that provides 
opportunities for violence since it increases the likelihood of intergroup interaction (Olzak, 
Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996; McDoom, 2013; Bhavnani et al., 2014; Balcells, Daniels 
and Escriba-Folch, 2016). Yet even in close proximity the vast majority of intergroup 
interactions are unlikely to lead to violence.  Even in countries where violence does occur, 
violence is clustered in certain areas, only arises between certain ethnic groups. For example, 
in 2001 the Nigerian city Jos saw seven days of clashes between Christians and Muslims, 
resulting in more than a thousand deaths,  while nearby towns and cities in the middle belt 
reported no intergroup violence. Ethnic riots are also episodic - occurring during some periods 
but not others. This literature fails to account for this variation or the fact that some types of 
inequalities between groups are more polarizing than others. In what context are two 
neighbouring groups more likely to engage in intergroup violence? Why did ethnic rioting in 
Kenya occur between the Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, but did not extended to the Mijikenda or 
Somali communities?  
                                                          
22
 Following social psychology literature, studies on ethnic disparities assume the group is an important source 
of group member identity with individuals comparing the position of their own group with that of others. When 
a group has a lower status, individual identity is diminished (Tajfel, 1981). 
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 This article addresses this gap, moving beyond much of the literature that explores 
motive and opportunity in isolation and either focuses on elite incentives or economic 
marginalisation. This article draws on the importance ethno-political inequalities which have 
largely been absent from most explanations of low-intensity violence despite being strongly 
and systematically related to armed communal violence (Raleigh, 2014), and civil war (Gurr, 
1993; Stewart, 2008; Buhaug, et al., 2008; Østby, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 
2013). The next section develops an argument that ethno-political inequalities are central to 
explaining where ethnic rioting occurs and between what groups. This is built on the 
importance of ethnic politics and proximity that provide the foundations of how grievances 
manifest into violence. 
 
2.3. The Importance of Ethnic Politics and Proximity 
Ethnic politics is a key starting point when understanding the generation of ethnic grievances. 
Bates (1983) argues that in post-colonial African states, ethnic groups are a convenient and 
identifiable source of political support; they enable elites to build political coalitions based on 
a shared cultural identity. Accordingly, those in power tend to sponsor their own ethnic support 
base, at the expense of other groups, in an attempt to maintain political power (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007; Habyarimana et al., 2009; Kramon and Posner, 2013). Constituents perceive 
that co-ethnic leaders are more reliable in channelling state resources than leaders are of other 
groups. In essence the state is not a neutral actor and the convenience of organising politics 
along ethnic lines makes ethnic groups important political agents (Wimmer, 2013; Raleigh, 
2014). Having control over patronage enables a group to access public services such as: 
improved sanitary systems, healthcare, land, jobs and to gain security provisions such as co-
ethnic police (Posner, 2005; Bangura, 2006; Habyriamana et al., 2009; Berenschot, 2011; 
Fourchard, 2012). Literature on party competition in Africa speaks of the importance of ethnic 
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identity in voting behaviour whereby co-ethnics vote along ethnic lines (Posner, 2005; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2013).  
Ethnic groups therefore provide the basis for zero-sum politics and intergroup 
competition. This nature of ethnic politics makes political representation in government 
particularly salient. Politically disadvantaged groups have poorer access to resources, such as 
jobs and land, and compare their relatively deprived access to patronage with that of other more 
politically advantaged groups. This comparison generates grievances over status concerns, 
disparities and access to state resources (Gurr, 1993; Stewart, 2008) While politically 
advantaged groups enjoy material advantages (state resources, patronage networks, public 
sector employment and land rights) and political advantages (favourable policies), politically 
disadvantaged groups have incentives to challenge this status quo in order to overcome political 
and material disadvantages (Tilly, 1999; Wimmer, 2013).23 6XFKµXV¶DQGµWKHP¶FRPSDULVRQV 
as a result of unequal access can generate zero-sum contestation, antagonist outgroup behaviour 
and bread ethnic tensions particularly when jobs and state resources are scarce (Gurr, 1993; 
Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996). 
Political disparities also generate security dilemmas as disadvantaged groups are also 
aware that groups included in power can gain security advantages, leaving excluded groups 
fearful of repression and marginalisation (Posen, 1993). This fear hardens collective grievances 
and generates hostility towards the politically included groups (Tilly, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; 
Gurr, 1993; Varshney, 2002; Petersen, 2002; Horowitz, 2003). Advantaged groups have fears 
of losing their dominance and muster their own hostility towards disadvantaged groups 
                                                          
23
 Østby and Fjelde (2014) argue that these grievances relate to economic inequalities. However, it is not only 
poorer groups that are likely to be disadvantaged, since the distribution of patronage depends not on which 
JURXSLVSRRUHUEXWRQDJURXS¶VOHYHORISROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHZKLOHWKH.LNX\XDUHUHODWLYHO\
the wealthiest group in Kenya, before 2003 they were excluded from political power and held strong grievances 
over the unequal distribution of land. 
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(Horowitz, 1985). This in turn provides strong motivations for groups to act collectively and/or 
for elites to manipulate ethnic tensions for political gain. 
While ethno-political inequalities generate motivations for potential violence, a 
growing literature points to a spatial relationship between this proximity and violence in 
flashpoint areas (Horowitz, 2003), shared spaces (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010) or 
interfaces (Cunningham and Gregory, 2014; Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016). These 
areas where groups coexist become arenas for disputed spaces over intergroup competition, 
group status and threat perceptions. The close proximity of groups greatly facilitates intergroup 
comparison, competition and fear between groups and provides opportunities for intergroup 
violence to occur (Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016). 
Intergroup contact can intensify group competition in shared spaces, particularly in 
contexts where relative gains matter, exacerbating inequalities and their consequences for 
access to public space and public goods, the ability to influence patronage, and decision making 
concerning policy and the distribution of public services (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 
1996; Horowitz, 2003; Field et al., 2008; Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010). The proximity 
of ethnic groups can also reduce trust and generate fear that increases social distance and 
segregation between groups. In turn, low levels of contact reduce the likelihood of positive 
LQWHUDFWLRQVDQGLQFUHDVHVQHJDWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH³RWKHU´/LFKEDFK&DODPHDQG
Charlesworth, 2012; Kasara, 2017). In some instances, higher rates of intergroup contact can 
increase social distance by further entrenching perceived differences, prejudice and stereotypes 
(Forbes, 1997; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013) particularly when mixing following prolonging 
periods of segregation (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996). 
Yet violence is effectively contingent on the extent of social distance between groups, 
which is not determined by geographic proximity alone (Horowitz, 1985; Bhavnani et al., 
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2014). The vast majority of diverse areas, shared spaces or potential flashpoint areas do not 
witness violence between groups, even in situations of where groups compete and have high 
levels of mistrust towards out-groups. Moreover, in most contexts increased intergroup contact 
has a tendency to reduce social distance and the potential for violence rather than increase it.  
 
2.4. Ethno-Political Contexts in which Ethnic Riots Occur 
Building on previous research, I argue the extent of social distance of proximate groups is also 
closely determined by ethno-political contexts where disparities in political representation are 
at their greatest. I explore two types of extreme configurations. Where discriminated groups 
and dominant groups coexist and where an ethnic group recently loses political power. These 
contexts are most conducive to greater social distance and violence because they intensify zero-
sum competition, produce higher levels of mistrust and generate the strong ethnic-based 
grievances that are necessary to provoke sporadic violence. Here I draw on Jasper (1998), who 
distinguishes between two types of emotions that provoke violence; affective emotions based 
on strong common identity and reactive emotions that emerge in response to provocative 
information and incidents. I argue that both are more likely to be present within these ethno-
political contexts. 
The geographical proximity of ethnic groups further facilitates ethnic rioting in 
extremely unequal contexts, because it raises the possibility of encounters between members 
of rival communities (Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016). Ethnic riots are often 
triggered by antagonistic incidents that lead to reactive responses, such as interethnic 
neighbourhood or vicious rumours about WKH³RWKHU´ZKLFKwould otherwise be trivial in less 
polarised contexts (Horowitz, 2003; Scacco, 2010). Violence often occurs between groups, 
rather than against the state because it is reactive, requires fewer resources, less planning and 
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is less risky than other forms of violence (Horowitz, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004). Moreover, it is 
extremely rare to have all state institutions dominated by one ethnic group; at least some 
institutions, often security forces, are likely to be neutral in local disputes, meaning violence is 
GLUHFWHGDWWKHµRWKHU¶ (Varshney, 2002). 
 
Ethno-Political Discrimination and Ethnic Riots 
Ethno-political discrimination strongly facilitates affective emotions as it is the most restrictive 
type of political exclusion. While other groups may enjoy some representation at the regional 
level and powerless groups may have token access to patronage, discrimination by definition 
involves a systematic attempt to prevent a group from gaining representation. This systematic 
exclusion blocks group access to state resources and security provisions that are fundamental 
to everyday life, provoking strong emotive perceptions of common identity, collective 
grievances and shared fear of dominant groups (Wimmer, 2013). For their part, dominant 
groups have everything to lose and therefore are also likely to hold strong affective emotions 
about their own identity, built on strong incentives to maintain their status and uphold material 
and political advantages (Horowitz, 2003).  
In heterogeneous areas containing both discriminated and dominant groups, interethnic 
tensions should be at their highest; with one group controlling policy and distribution of local 
resources and the other systematically removed from the process and facing local social 
exclusion (Østby, 2016). Here, stronger affective emotions increase the negative perceptions 
and mistrust between coexisting groups, and render intergroup comparisons as more visible 
(Horowitz, 2003; Petersen, 2002; Claassen, 2016). These strong affective emotions have two 
consequences. Firstly, they harden group boundaries by increasing the likelihood of hostile 
interactions and the salience of competition over patronage and material resources. (Horowitz, 
1985, 2003; Østby, 2016). Secondly, strong affective emotions facilitate mobilisation through 
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denser ethnic networks that can draw coethnics into the violence (McDoom, 2013; Wimmer, 
2013) and generate norms whereby members have an obligation to act in defence of group 
interests and have less opportunities to free-ride (Coleman, 1990; Jasso and Opp, 1997).  
By hardening group identity, extremely unequal political contexts then increase the 
likelihood of reactive emotions in response WRSURYRFDWLYHµDQWDJRQLVWLF¶LQFLGHQWV. Reactive 
emotions arise in response to symbolic incidents that strike at the heart of ethnic grievances, 
which provoke anger and violent behaviour (Horowitz, 2003; Claassen, 2016). For example, 
in Jos, Nigeria, ethnic riots suddenly erupted in 2001 after a routine argument between Muslims 
and Christians, but within a context of high levels of tensions between the groups (Scacco, 
2010).  
As political discrimination restricts institutional and peaceful avenues for political 
change, violence becomes a viable alternative strategy for political change. Violence in shared 
spaces is aimed at controlling contested territories in the defence of group interests (Stewart, 
2008), in the interest of enhancing collective security (Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 
2016), in an attempt to gain access to local resources that are unequally distributed (Olzak, 
Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996), or simply to challenge the local urban social order (Østby, 
)RUH[DPSOHGXULQJ.HQ\D¶VHOHFWLRQWKHYLROHQFHODUJHO\LQYROYHGWKH/XR, who 
had lacked political power since the end of 2005, and the Kikuyu, who had won the election. 
This election reaffirmed the discrimination of the Luo, and since political dominance is known 
to ensure access to these goods, violence occurred due to questions of as well as competition 
and access over resources such as jobs, public services and land (Field et al., 2008; Kasara, 
2017). This leads us to expect that ethnic riots should occur wherever ethno-political 
discrimination exists and in locations where such groups coexist:   
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H1a:  Ethnic riots are more likely to occur in areas where groups are explicitly 
discriminated against in obtaining political representation. 
H1b: The risk of ethnic riots should increase where groups experiencing political 
discrimination are neighbours to or coexist with a politically dominant group. 
 
Ethno-Political Changes in Power and Ethnic Riots 
Other studies view ethnic rioting as a consequence of political change in the form of 
democratisation (van Klinken, 2007; Tajima, 2014; Toha, 2017) or elections; with one-third of 
African elections resulting in some form of violence (Harris, 2012; Salehyan and Linebarger, 
2015). Yet the importance of ethno-political inequalities alerts us to the potential consequences 
of changes in ethno-political power (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009). The most 
detrimental form of political change is downgrading, where a group experiences a loss of 
political representation. Regardless of whether political downgrading comes in the form of 
elections, coups, or transitions, changes in ethno-political power is generally threatening due 
to the high stakes involved. Redrawing on the importance of proximity, I argue risk of ethnic 
riots is likely in areas where groups have experienced a loss of ethno-political power and co-
exist with groups that have gained power.  
Effectively political downgraded is an exogenous shock that can provoke strong 
emotions over the loss of power, prestige and control of resources which generates fears of 
future insecurity (Petersen, 2002; Horowitz, 2003). As a temporal shock, downgrading can 
provoke affective and more immediate reactive group emotions as it promotes uncertainty as 
to how change will impact and threaten the group (Horowitz, 2003; Bertand, 2008; Tajima, 
2014). This uncertainty increases interethnic tension and competition, generating a unique 
sense of urgency among group members. Urgency combines with affective emotions can 
further lower risk estimations of collective action. In threatening situations brought about by 
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political change, urgency facilitates reactive violence as it is perceived as far less costly than 
waiting and facing imminent violence (Elster, 2009). 
In 1999, the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria lost their domination of governmental power 
which led to interethnic violence in both the middle-belt and major urban centres in the 
competitive environment that had replaced military rule. In Kenya, ethno-political 
representation is tied to patronage because of how it relates to land redistribution. After the 
2002 elections, the Kikuyu had a strong-hold over government giving them control of land 
distribution. This led to post-election violence against the Kikuyu by the politically 
downgraded Kalenjin who feared land would be redistributed (Harris, 2012). 
Finally, some types of downgrading are a greater political threat than others. More 
severe forms of downgrading, such as newly experienced discrimination or a recent removal 
from government, are likely to increase the risk of intergroup violence. In the most severe form 
of downgrading, groups have recently been systematically discriminated against in political 
representation. Clashes in the DRC occurred during the 2006 elections after the northern groups 
(Ngbandi, Mbandja, Ngbaka), represented by former rebel leader Jean Bemba lost the 
governmental representation they had enjoyed in the post-conflict power-sharing government. 
Significantly, the more severe the level of change the greater the uncertainty and intergroup 
tension. This notion informs my final hypotheses: 
H2a:  Ethnic riots are more likely in areas where a group has recently experienced a 
downgrade in political representation. 
H2b:  The more severe the political downgrading in an area the higher the likelihood 
of ethnic riots. 
H2c:  Ethnic rioting should be more likely in areas where politically downgraded 
groups coexist with politically upgraded groups. 
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2.5. Research Design 
My theoretical claims and hypotheses are tested across geographical grid-years in Africa from 
1990 to 2008. Based on the PRIO-*ULG7ROOHIVHQHWDOWKHVWXG\¶VGHVLJQSHUPLWVD
temporal and spatial analysis of when and where ethnic riots occur. I specifically focus on 
Africa for two reasons. Firstly, such violence is very common in Africa and the continent 
exhibits considerable variation in levels of ethno-political representation. Secondly, consistent 
and systematic data availability is limited for riot events outside of Africa. Ethnic riots have 
only occurred in 0.14% of all grid-years; therefore, I use a rare-events logistic regression model 
suitable for rare events and binary outcomes (Tomz, Zeng, and King, 1999). This method 
adjusts for the tendencies of conventional logistic models to underestimate the likelihood of 
rare-events (King and Zeng, 2001).24  
 
Dependent Variable 
Using new spatially disaggregated events data, this study develops a new indicator of ethnic 
riots in Africa (see Table 5, - appendix). The data were collected by recoding a subset of 
broader riot events found in the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 
2012). For each event, the SCAD Dataset provides information on dates, geographical 
coordinates, and a description of incidents and actors, permitting a subnational analysis of 
ethnic riots across time and space.25  I code ethnic riots as events that involve civilian members 
of two politically relevant ethnic groups engaged in violence against each other (Wilkinson, 
2004). This dyadic conflict includes non-militarised forms of communal violence and inter-
                                                          
24
 While the results of logistic regression are identical to mine using rare-events logistic regression, the latter 
amends the standard errors which effect levels of statistical significance. 
25
 While response bias is a concern when using events data, SCAD events are based on news reports from the 
Associated Press and Agence France Presse newswires, both of which use local news sources that have extensive 
knowledge of the countries they cover. SCAD also improves on other event datasets. For example, the Cross-
National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive is based solely on reports from the New York Times. See Salehyan 
et al (2012) for a further discussion. Possible reporting bias over time is addressed in the robustness checks. 
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party violence when involving clearly defined ethnic political party supporters.26 For example, 
clashes between Kikuyu supports of President Kibaki and Luo supporters of opposition leader 
Odinga in Kenya. 
I add further criteria to my definition of ethnic riots. A second condition is that ethnic 
riots are sporadic events, in contrast to sustained types of action working towards a long-term 
political goal such as mass protests or armed conflict against the state. Finally, ethnic riots 
involve mass participation; I code events that have a minimum of 100 participants to exclude 
neighbourhood brawls (Brass, 2003). Grid-years containing at least one ethnic riot event are 
assigned a 1, otherwise a 0. 
Figure 1. Locations of Ethnic Riots in Africa (1990-2008). 
 
                                                          
26
 An ethnic party is defined as clearly representing the interests of one group or set of groups at the specific 
exclusion of others (Chandra, 2011). Note: this is sensitive over time. 
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Overall, 268 ethnic riots occurred in 225 grid-cell locations across 28 African countries 
between 1990 and 2008 (Figure 1). As suggested in the theory, the majority of the violence 
was between politically advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Nevertheless, there is some 
variation in this dyadic relationship with violence occurring, albeit less commonly, between 
included groups and on very rare occasions, between excluded groups.  
 
Independent Variables 
To operationalise ethno-political representation, I use existing ethnic group-level data from the 
EPR dataset (Version 3.0) which codes the levels of political representation of all politically 
relevant ethnic groups (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009).27  The levels of ethno-political 
representation are broken down into a series of dichotomous variables for all groups in the 
ethno-political hierarchy of political power: undivided groups (have a monopoly on or 
dominate the executive), senior and junior partners (in a power-sharing government), regional 
autonomy (regional power), powerless, discriminated groups (systematic exclusion from 
power) and a dummy variable for grids without politically relevant ethnic groups.28 For changes 
in ethno-political representation I generate three further dummy variables: groups experiencing 
a change in political power in the last two years (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), 
groups experiencing new discrimination, and groups facing serious downgrading (removed 
from government). I include identical variables to control for recently upgraded groups. 
To capture ethno-political configurations at the subnational grid-level, I use geo-
referenced data from the Geo-EPR dataset on the settlement areas of the different types of 
                                                          
27
 The lack of systematic data prevents an individual-level analysis of group member motivations. The 
Afrobarometer provides some individual-level data on ethnic affiliation. However, the Afrobarometer data 
provides no specific questions on group member motivations to engage in violence, meaning group-level 
assumptions would have to be made regardless of the unit of analysis. Furthermore, the data is only available in 
some countries across four rounds (years), which prevents the analysis of individual-level ethno-political 
dynamics over time and across all African countries. 
28
 Excludes separatist areas as no events occur in these grid-years. 
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ethno-political groups (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). I produce five dummy variables at the 
grid-level for the five types of political representation and a dummy variable for grids not 
inhabited by a politically relevant ethnic group.29 Unlike previous group-level analyses (see 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), my approach accounts for spatial variation across 
ethnic group settlement areas as not all areas within these settlements will witness ethnic 
violence (Varshney, 2002). 
Figure 2. PRIO Grid, Group Settlement Areas, and Ethnic Riots in Kenya (1990-2008) 
    
Using Kenya as an example, Figure 2 provides a visual illustration of the data, with ethnic riot 
locations and geo-referenced group areas overlaid by the PRIO-GRID. For the first hypothesis, 
the variable of interest is discriminated group areas. Figure 2 also highlights in bold the Kikuyu 
settlement areas in the centre of the country.  
 
                                                          
29
 Dominant group areas are used as the reference category against other ethno-political categories and grids 
without ethnic groups. 
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Before the 2002 elections, these Kikuyu grid-years are coded as politically 
GLVFULPLQDWHGDUHDVWRUHIOHFWWKHJURXS¶VV\VWHPDWLFUHPRYDOIURPSROLWLFDOSRZHU$OWKRXJK 
the EPR data are based on ethnic homelands where a particular group is numerically dominant, 
the dyadic nature of ethnic riots show there is ethnic heterogeneity within these homelands. 
While the Geo-EPR is not best placed to capture this heterogeneity within group settlement 
areas, my dyadic coding of ethnic riots ensures the participation of other EPR groups in these 
areas. Moreover, violence is more likely in settlement areas where disadvantaged groups have 
a numerical advantage. This bigger presence reduces the risks to the ingroup of engaging in 
violence but also increases perceptions of threat within the out-group (Horowitz, 2003; 
Balcells, Daniels and Escriba-Folch, 2016).  
To analyse the additional role of proximity within the first set of hypotheses, I generate 
an interaction term that captures grids where discriminated and dominant (have undivided 
power) groups coexist or border each other. Finally, to assess the proximity downgraded and 
upgraded groups, I create an interaction that captures the coexistence of upgraded and 
downgraded groups (both 1 otherwise 0). 
 
Controls 
This study includes a number of grid-level controls (see Table 6, - appendix). Firstly, it includes 
the natural log of grid-level GDP taken from G-Econ wealth estimates (Nordhaus, 2006) as 
poorer populations are more likely to participate in riots (Scacco, 2010). Secondly, it employs 
the natural log of grid-level population (CIESEN, 2005) since higher and more concentrated 
populations increase the risk of unrest (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009; McDoom, 2013).30 Thirdly, 
I add a set of controls including the time (minutes) to the nearest urban centre, and distance 
                                                          
30
 Grid GDP and population data are estimated at 5-year intervals. I take the average between these time periods 
to extrapolate data within these time periods. 
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(kilometres) to the capital (Tollefsen et al, 2012) as urban areas facilitate social networks that 
enable unrest. Finally, I include a lagged dependent variable and a spatial lag (the percentage 
of riots in contiguous cells in a country year) to account for dependence over time (Wilson and 
Butler, 2007) and spatial correlation (Ward and Gleditsch, 2008). 
The study includes standard national-level controls related to violence: a natural log of 
national population (World Bank, 2013), the Polity2 measure for regime type (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2010), and the number of peace years. It also includes the size of excluded ethnic 
groups as larger groups are more willing and better placed to challenge dominant groups 
(Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014).31  A dummy variable is added for national election 
years as African elections are particularly susceptible to unrest (Lindberg, 2009). Lastly, the 
number of excluded groups in the state is included since governments are less likely to 
compromise when facing many oppositional groups (Walter, 2006). 
 
2.6. Results 
This section presents the results of multiple rare-events logistic regression models across the 
196852 grid-cell years of 56 African states.32 My first hypothesis expects that areas containing 
politically discriminated groups are more likely to witness ethnic riots. With dominant (groups 
with undivided power) settlement areas used as the reference category, model 1 (Table 2) 
provides strong support for the hypothesis (p <0.01). Since coefficients are difficult to interpret 
in logistic regression models, I run marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals to assess 
the marginal effect of this relationship. When I compare grids without a discriminated ethnic 
group to grids with this type of group, I find ethnic riots are twice as likely to occur. 
                                                          
31
 Also EPR data (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009) 
32 Grid-cells with a sparse population less than 100 are excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 2. Rare-Events Regression: Ethno-Political Discrimination and Ethnic Riots 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Ethnic Riot Ethnic Riot 
Undivided Power (Dominant Group Grid)  0.200 
   (0.274) 
Dominant and Discriminated Coexist  1.334** 
   (0.419) 
Senior Group (power-sharing) Grid -0.011 0.260 
  (0.362) (0.336) 
Junior Group (power-sharing) Grid -0.036 0.208 
  (0.199) (0.158) 
Autonomous Group Grid 0.527 0.735 
  (0.737) (0.735) 
Powerless Group Grid -0.131 0.141 
  (0.309) (0.331) 
Discriminated Group Grid 0.762*** 0.594** 
  (0.212) (0.228) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.198*  
  (0.535)  
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.044 0.104 
  (0.099) (0.111) 
Grid Population (log) 0.843*** 0.865*** 
  (0.088) (0.085) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 4.381*** 4.213*** 
  (0.543) (0.536) 
Size of Excluded Group in Grid 0.528 0.402 
  (0.448) (0.513) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to Capital (km) -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups (nationally) 0.058 0.077+ 
  (0.040) (0.040) 
National Population (log) -0.213+ -0.161 
  (0.117) (0.110) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.091*** 0.096*** 
  (0.026) (0.028) 
National Elections 0.805** 0.834** 
  (0.281) (0.291) 
Number of Peace Years 0.006 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.577*** -0.577*** 
 (0.118) (0.129) 
Spline1 -0.025 -0.029 
 (0.035) (0.036) 
Spline2 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Spline3 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -11.875*** -13.946*** 
  (1.557) (1.569) 
Observations 196852  196852 
+ p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001        Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
All models are clustered around country-level standard errors (47 clusters). Reference category: 
Model 1: monopoly/dominant group settlement areas. Model 2: no EPR groups in the grid-year. 
 
 
Table 3. Rare- events Regression: Ethno-Political Downgrading and Ethnic Riots 
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  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Ethnic Riot Ethnic Riot Ethnic Riot Ethnic Riot 
Downgrade in Political Power 0.535* 
  
0.168 
  (0.211) 
  
(0.184) 
Upgrade in Political Power 0.267 
  
-0.084 
  (0.226) 
  
(0.181) 


























Recent Entry to Govt Power 
  
-0.231  
   (0.249)  
Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    1.092** 
  
   
(0.397) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.179* -1.207* -1.230* -1.183* 
  (0.536) (0.537) (0.538) (0.536) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.022 0.021 0.054 0.013 
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.078) 
Grid Population (log) 0.876*** 0.870*** 0.858*** 0.887*** 
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 4.381*** 4.213*** 4.251*** 4.178*** 
  (0.543) (0.536) (0.385) (0.376) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.528 0.402 0.529* 0.664** 
  (0.448) (0.513) (0.242) (0.229) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to Capital (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.058 0.077+ 0.061+ 0.067+ 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.033) (0.035) 
National Population (log) -0.213+ -0.161 -0.232+ -0.202 
  (0.117) (0.110) (0.128) (0.132) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 
  (0.026) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) 
National Elections 0.805** 0.834** 0.800* 0.744* 
  (0.281) (0.291) (0.311) (0.298) 
Number of Peace Years 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011+ 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.577*** -0.577*** -0.561*** -0.611*** 
 (0.118) (0.129) (0.107) (0.105) 
Spline1 -0.025 -0.029 -0.023 -0.035 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) 
Spline2 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Spline3 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -17.74*** -17.89*** -18.46*** -12.573*** 
  (2.378) (2.761) (2.869)   (1.652) 
Observations 196852 196852 196852  196854 
+ p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are clustered around country-level 





I move to my second hypothesis that states the onset of ethnic riots should be more likely in 
areas where ethno-politically discriminated groups and dominant groups coexist. I include an 
interaction between discriminated and dominant group settlement areas in model 2 and find 
intergroup violence is more likely in these ethnically mixed regions (p < 0.001). Marginal 
effects show that ethnic riots are five time more likely to occur in these highly contentious 
heterogeneous grids than in other grids. 
I now evaluate my final set of hypotheses. Firstly, ethnic rioting should be more likely 
in areas where a group has recently faced a downgrade in political representation. Secondly, 
the risk of violence should be higher for more severe types of downgrading. Finally, the risk 
should also be exacerbated by the close proximity of downgraded and upgraded groups. These 
claims are strongly supported by models 3-6 (Table 3). Model 3 shows the risk of ethnic riots 
is increased in areas inhabited by a group that has faced a loss of power in the last two years (p 
<0.001). Models 4-5 show that the likelihood of ethnic violence is further increased when the 
type of downgrading is more severe; in locations where a group has recently lost governmental 
power or has been newly politically discriminated against (both p <0.05). These three results 
are in contrast to the results found in areas inhabited by a group that has experienced an upgrade 
in political representation (not statistically significant). This supports my theoretical 
expectations, because upgraded groups have access to patronage and face fewer security 
dilemmas and should have less incentive to engage in violence. Finally, model 6 provides 
strong support that the proximity of downgraded and upgraded groups also increases the 
likelihood of ethnic rioting. 
To assess the nature of the relationship between ethno-political downgrading and ethnic 
riots, I run further marginal effects. The risk of intergroup violence in areas where groups have 
recently been downgraded is nearly twice as likely as in areas without change. The risk of 
violence is exacerbated by the close proximity of downgraded groups. Areas where a group 
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has gained political power and another has lost power are three times more likely to see ethnic 
rioting than areas without these groups. Finally, more severe types of downgrading also 
increases the risk of violence with ethnic riots being three times more likely to occur where a 
group has been completely removed from power or are removed and also face discrimination. 
Table 4 provides a summary of the marginal effects of all key explanatory variables on the 
onset of ethnic rioting. 
Table 4. Marginal Effect Differences in Ethno Political Status: Present (1) vs. Not Present (0)  
Explanatory Variable % Risk (0) % Risk (1) Increase risk in Ethnic Riots 
Discriminated Group Area 0.00106*** 0.00215*** Twice as likely 
Coexistence of Discriminated 
and Dominant Groups  
0.00110*** 0.00375** Three times more likely 
Downgraded Group Area 0.00108*** 0.00177*** Nearly twice as likely  
Newly Discriminated Area  0.00111*** 0.00318* Three times more likely  
Recent Loss of Power Area 0.00109*** 0.00347* More than three times likely 
Coexistence of Downgraded 
and Upgraded Groups 
0.00108*** 0.00308* Three times more likely 
Significance of predictive margins: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
 
The control variables have generally behaved as expected. More populated grids, recent 
violence in previous years, and violence in neighbouring locations are consistently strong 
predictors of violence. Larger excluded groups also impact the likelihood of ethnic riots 
although this is not always statistically significant. In contrast to Scacco¶V (2010) findings at 
the individual-level, I find no significant relationship between levels of wealth and intergroup 
violence at the grid-level. I also find little evidence that the distance to capitals although ethnic 
riots are more likely to occur close to urban centres. At the country-level, violence is more 
likely to take place in more democratic rather than autocratic states and is strongly related to 
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national election years, one potential cause of ethno-political downgrading. Finally, the number 
of excluded groups has a small effect but larger national populations and peace years have no 
significant effect on ethnic riots.  
 
Robustness Checks 
To further determine the soundness of my findings I run a series of robustness checks (see 
Tables 7-12, - appendix). Firstly, I check whether the theoretical mechanisms are unique to 
ethnic riots and not simply a substitution of organised and armed communal violence as the 
descriptive statistics suggest. Following Fjelde and Østby (2014), I rely on data from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP-GED; 
(Sundberg and Melander, 2013) to capture armed communal violence.33 Models 7-10 (Table 7 
± Appendix) show that while armed communal violence increases the likelihood of ethnic 
rioting, most probably through further increasing ethnic tensions, this does not change the main 
results.  
I then explore armed and organised communal violence as an alternative outcome 
(Models 11-12). There is one similarity, in that ethnic discrimination drives both ethnic rioting 
and communal violence. Yet there are mostly key distinctions. Firstly, powerless groups as 
well as discriminated groups are more likely to engage in communal violence, while 
downgrading has no effect. Secondly, unlike ethnic rioting, communal violence is also likely 
to occur in the periphery where no politically relevant ethnic groups reside (No EPR Group in 
GridJLYLQJVXSSRUWWR5DOHLJK¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWFRPPXQDOYLROHQFHRFFXUVEHWZHHQ
remote and politically irrelevant ethnic groups. Most significantly is that proximity has no 
impact on communal violence unlike ethnic rioting. In fact, communal violence does not occur 
                                                          
33
 This includes violence between organised ethnic groups, and excludes violence between rebel groups. 
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in at all in areas where dominant and discriminated groups, and downgraded and upgraded 
groups coexist. The joint importance of proximity and ethno-political inequalities sets ethnic 
rioting apart from more organised forms of ethnic violence. 
Next I test for potential endogeneity between ethno-political representation and 
violence by rerunning the results with lagged independent variables and the results produced 
are identical (Models 13-14). Fourthly,  I control for other possible alternative explanations for 
the onset of ethnic rioting. The findings could be explained by heightened by particular 
institutional designs with the debate continuing on whether parliamentary or presidential 
systems reduce the likelihood of violence (see Horowitz, 1985; Linz, 1990). I find that 
parliamentary systems reduce the risk of ethnic rioting, but which does not change the results. 
Next I account for other controls that may explain ethnic rioting: economic group inequalities 
(Fjelde and Østby, 2014), the lack of political rights (Freedom House), national resource rents 
which can create intergroup competition over natural resources (Basedau and Pierskalla, 2014), 
youth bulges, as younger populations are more likely to participate in political action (Urdal, 
2008), and state repression which can result in violent backlashes (Tables 8-10). While state 
repression and youth bulges are positive predictors of ethnic rioting, this does not change the 
robustness of my explanatory variables.  
Fifthly, I explore the possibility that the results are driven by reporting bias. I include 
the year as a control to account for any reporting bias of events, and include a dummy variable 
for Nigeria where 34% of the ethnic riots occurred. My results still remain robust (Tables 10-
11).34 Lastly, I rerun the analyses with alternative models to check if the results are driven by 
model choice. I rerun the models using a country-year fixed effect logistic regression, which 
                                                          
34
 When I exclude Nigeria from the analysis,  
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restricts the analysis to country-years where violence occurs.35 I then rerun the main analyses 
with count model. Both produce similar findings. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
For the most part, the local ethno-political drivers of ethnic rioting has been overlooked in the 
literature on ethnic riots. While literatures on ethnic violence have tended to focus on the 
incentives of elites to provoke ethnic rioting, other literatures have pointed to the broader 
importance of ethnic politics and the proximity of groups. This article contributes to the 
literatures on low-intensity ethnic violence by bringing approaches together to explain why 
ethnic riots occur in some locations, but not others, and why violence occurs between some 
groups, but not others. I argue that the location of violence can be explained by highly unequal 
ethno-political configurations and changes in power, that produce collective group motivations 
that derive from tense intergroup contestation over state resources, and increasing fear of the 
other. Ethnic riots are localised and are facilitated further by the close proximity of such groups 
which increases the likelihood of intergroup interaction and antagonistic incidents that provoke 
ethnic rioting. 
 My results provide convincing evidence that ethno-political discrimination, 
downgrading and close proximity with dominant or newly ungraded groups help to explain 
where ethnic riots are likely to occur. This allures to the second key contribution of this study; 
the systematic exploration of ethnic rioting both within and across various African countries. 
This builds on case-study literature that has provided important and nuanced contributions to 
our understanding of low-intensity violence, but which often are often liable to selection bias 
                                                          
35
 While it is important to test alternative models, I do not believe a FEs model best complements my research 




and questions of external validity. Using newly available geographically disaggregated events 
data has allowed this study to highlight general ethno-political conditions that increase the risk 
of ethnic riots and where they occur. This highlights the value of using large-N quantitative 
subnational research to explore the locations of ethnic violence. 
The article also has important policy implications. For one thing, the discrimination of 
certain ethnic groups not only increases the risk of armed rebellion and communal violence, 
but also entails a greater risk of low-intensity violence, namely ethnic riots. This highlights the 
importance of reducing inequalities and developing inclusive systems to manage ethnic 
relations peacefully. For another, governments need to be responsive to the concerns of their 
citizens by providing fairly distributed public services, security, and strong institutions to 
address citizen concerns. Last but by no means least, policy makers should be particularly 
mindful of the consequences of political change in tense interethnic environments such as 
national elections and democratic transitions. Such instruments are considered a key part of 
peacebuilding and ongoing state-building, but if incorrectly implemented could lead to further 
conflict. 
This study focuses on group-level ethno-political configurations and asks how these 
influence the location of violence, but individual motivations are likely to play a part as well. 
Future research should develop more systematic micro-level survey data on ethnic motivations 
to participate in conflict and explore these motivations more closely. This would help to explain 
why some individuals participate and others do not. Moreover, further research is also needed 
to understand other mechanisms related to participation such as economic drivers of 
participation. This article does not suggest ethno-political configurations are the only drivers 
of violence. Other quantitative studies should explore other mechanisms, such as infighting 
between governmental groups and resource structures. While this analysis considers one type 
of communal conflict, future research could seek to explain other distinct forms of communal 
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conflict. For instance, service delivery protests, xenophobic violence and intra-ethnic violence. 
Finally, more multilevel theoretical and empirical research is needed to explore the complex 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ethnic Riots 196852 0.001 0.037 0 1 
Undivided ± Dominant Group in Grid 196852 0.156 0.363 0 1 
Senior Group (Powersharing) in Grid 196852 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Junior Group (Powersharing) in Grid 196852 0.246 0.431 0 1 
Autonomous Group in Grid 196852 0.021 0.143 0 1 
Powerless Group in Grid 196852 0.241 0.428 0 1 
Discriminated Group in Grid 196852 0.067 0.249 0 1 
Downgraded Group (one-level) in Grid 196852 0.031 0.173 0 1 
Upgraded Group (one-level) in Grid 196852 0.036 0.187 0 1 
Newly Discriminated Group in Grid 196852 0.007 0.085 0 1 
New Loss of Group Power in Grid 196852 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Post Group Discrimination in Grid 196852 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Group Upgraded to Government in Grid 196852 0.022 0.147 0 1 
No EPR Group in Grid 196852 0.278 0.448 0 1 
Grid-Level Controls 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 196852 7.384 1.206 4.621 16.705 
Grid Population (log) 196852 9.483 2.085 4.605 16.319 
Unrest Previous Year (grid) 196852 0.001 0.033 0 1 
Violence in Neighbouring Grid 196852 0.001 0.015 0 1 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) 196852 684.686 699.883 0 6133 
Distance to Capital (kilometre) 196852 645.764 411.957 4 1948 
National-Level Controls 
Size of Excluded Group (%) 196852 0.057 0.128 0.000 0.850 
No. Excluded Groups 196852 2.885 3.641 0 12 
National Population (log) 196852 16.590 1.085 13.668 18.834 
PolityIV2 196852 -0.746 5.277 -10 10 
Elections 196852 0.192 0.394 0 1 








Table 7. Robustness checks I 













Violence DV36 EPR Data T-1 EPR Data T-1 
Undivided Power (dominant group) 
 
0.267         
   (0.289)         
Dominant and Discriminated Coexist  1.349**         
   (0.429)         
Senior Group (powersharing) -0.138 0.181   0.469  0.428   
  (0.307) (0.280)   (0.609)  (0.335)   
Junior Group (powersharing) -0.114 0.178   0.233  0.395*   
  (0.199) (0.170)   (0.316)  (0.169)   
Autonomous Group 0.247 0.517   0.454  0.549   
  (0.758) (0.751)   (0.352)  (0.701)   
Powerless Group -0.299 0.020   0.896***  -0.061   
  (0.318) (0.341)   (0.261)  (0.274)   
Discriminated Group 0.592** 0.441   1.030**  0.716***   
  (0.228) (0.275)   (0.382)  (0.215)   
Downgrade in Political Power   0.600** 0.170  -0.632   0.965*** 
    (0.219) (0.197)  (0.533)   (0.210) 
Upgrade in Political Power   0.139 -0.259  -0.221   -0.126 
    (0.257) (0.211)  (0.287)   (0.208) 
Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    1.327**     
    (0.427)     
No EPR Group in Grid -1.344*  -1.218* -1.226* 1.111** 0.491 -0.921+ -1.157* 
  (0.550)  (0.546) (0.545) (0.371) (0.339) (0.530) (0.542) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.029 0.085 0.026 0.024 -0.252 -0.275 0.067 0.033 
  (0.098) (0.104) (0.085) (0.081) (0.188) (0.192) (0.093) (0.092) 
Grid Population (log) 0.804*** 0.822*** 0.824*** 0.826*** 0.490** 0.492* 0.831*** 0.874*** 
  (0.090) (0.088) (0.097) (0.096) (0.168) (0.195) (0.089) (0.094) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.822+ 0.669 0.695** 0.664** -1.036 0.083 0.841* 0.758* 
  (0.424) (0.510) (0.237) (0.240) (0.936) (0.482) (0.410) (0.294) 
                                                          
36
 Note: No communal violence events occur in areas of coexistence between dominant and discriminated groups, and downgraded and upgraded groups. Therefore, the 
model with this interaction could not be replicated for communal violence outcomes. This is further evidence that ethnic riots and armed communal violence are distinct 







Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.000 -0.000 -0.002* -0.002+ 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to Capital (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.056 0.075+ 0.052 0.056 -0.125** -0.106* 0.071+ 0.053 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.053) (0.037) (0.033) 
National Population (log) -0.257* -0.190+ -0.256* -0.238+ 0.144 0.090 -0.189 -0.216+ 
  (0.120) (0.111) (0.127) (0.127) (0.200) (0.196) (0.117) (0.128) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.063** 0.068*** 0.067** 0.080*** 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) 
National Elections 0.762** 0.792** 0.761* 0.754* -0.032 0.040 0.866*** 0.896*** 
  (0.279) (0.295) (0.315) (0.293) (0.194) (0.165) (0.256) (0.244) 
Number of Peace Years 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 -0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.462** -0.437* -0.425** -0.600*** -1.333*** -1.285*** -0.589*** -0.564*** 
(or Communal Violence) (0.170) (0.180) (0.161) (0.103) (0.357) (0.354) (0.129) (0.122) 
Spline1 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.037 -0.067 -0.049 -0.026 -0.021 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.033) (0.086) (0.085) (0.036) (0.037) 
Spline2 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 0.005 -0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.036) (0.035) (0.016) (0.016) 
Spline3 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.012 0.014 0.003 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
UCDP Communal Violence 2.703*** 2.706*** 2.750*** 2.780***     
  (0.379) (0.393) (0.369) (0.386)     
Constant 
-10.508*** -12.832*** -10.969*** -11.227*** -10.871*** -9.343** -12.622*** -12.288*** 
  
(1.617) (1.562) (1.424) (1.387) (2.768) (2.917) (1.521) (1.909) 
Observations 
196854 196854 196854 196854 196854 196854 
196852 196852 















Table 8. Robustness checks II 






















   (0.272)    (0.271)   
Dominant and Discriminated Coexist  1.371**    1.342***   
   (0.431)    (0.401)   
Senior Group (powersharing) 0.047 0.302   -0.012 0.286   
  (0.354) (0.328)   (0.360) (0.337)   
Junior Group (powersharing) 0.017 0.243   0.015 0.288+   
  (0.194) (0.151)   (0.189) (0.148)   
Autonomous Group 0.621 0.817   0.753 0.965   
  (0.728) (0.726)   (0.797) (0.792)   
Powerless Group -0.053 0.203   -0.107 0.176   
  (0.283) (0.302)   (0.304) (0.322)   
Discriminated Group 0.804*** 0.622**   0.745*** 0.587*   
  (0.218) (0.234)   (0.216) (0.236)   
Downgrade in Political Power   0.594** 0.119   0.543** 0.184 
    (0.216) (0.177)   (0.192) (0.153) 
Upgrade in Political Power   0.274 -0.091   0.221 -0.086 
    (0.245) (0.186)   (0.222) (0.172) 
Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    1.242**    1.051** 
    (0.380)    (0.381) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.136*  -1.173* -1.197* -1.358*  -1.362* -1.388* 
  (0.542)  (0.538) (0.534) (0.560)  (0.568) (0.574) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.076 0.146 0.065 0.060 0.130 0.187+ 0.109 0.109 
  (0.103) (0.114) (0.087) (0.081) (0.107) (0.106) (0.093) (0.087) 
Grid Population (log) 0.854*** 0.878*** 0.887*** 0.881*** 0.827*** 0.853*** 0.860*** 0.870*** 
  (0.089) (0.086) (0.093) (0.097) (0.091) (0.086) (0.097) (0.099) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 4.151*** 3.965*** 4.001*** 4.053*** 4.255*** 4.102*** 4.105*** 4.045*** 
  (0.582) (0.594) (0.404) (0.354) (0.529) (0.521) (0.387) (0.385) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.504 0.391 0.509* 0.585** 0.218 0.145 0.236 0.338+ 
  (0.435) (0.496) (0.220) (0.210) (0.431) (0.491) (0.237) (0.204) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 







Distance to Capital (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.050 0.068+ 0.059+ 0.062+ 0.016 0.038 0.021 0.024 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) (0.031) (0.033) 
National Population (log) -0.192+ -0.144 -0.223+ -0.204+ -0.210+ -0.158 -0.227+ -0.199 
  (0.109) (0.102) (0.120) (0.121) (0.112) (0.104) (0.126) (0.128) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.082*** 0.088*** 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.025) 
National Elections 0.811* 0.844* 0.810* 0.840* 0.839*** 0.871*** 0.840** 0.790** 
  (0.324) (0.342) (0.361) (0.329) (0.249) (0.263) (0.279) (0.267) 
Number of Peace Years 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010+ 0.012* 0.016** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.501*** -0.509*** -0.478*** -0.632*** -0.567*** -0.564*** -0.554*** -0.622*** 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.104) (0.113) (0.128) (0.138) (0.117) (0.114) 
Spline1 -0.011 -0.017 -0.007 -0.038 -0.025 -0.028 -0.023 -0.038 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
Spline2 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Spline3 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Parliamentary Systems (Dummy) -0.803*** -0.873*** -0.832*** -1.049***     
  (0.187) (0.227) (0.250) (0.240)     
Freedom House (political rights)     0.351** 0.329** 0.344*** 0.368*** 
      (0.110) (0.104) (0.093) (0.094) 
Constant -12.691*** -14.768*** -12.599*** -12.767*** -13.976*** -16.026*** -14.064*** -14.772*** 
  (1.472) (1.517) (1.519) (1.497) (1.570) (1.537) (1.701) (1.677) 
Observations 196852 196852 196852 196854 196852 196852 196852 196854 















Table 9. Robustness checks III 









Rents Youth Bulge Youth Bulge Youth Bulge Youth Bulge 




  0.198 
 
 
   (0.292)     (0.287) 
 
 
Dominant and Discriminated Coexist  1.261**     1.319** 
 
 
   (0.404)     (0.422) 
 
 
Senior Group (powersharing) -0.024 0.263   0.001 0.259 
 
 
  (0.383) (0.343)   (0.361) (0.333) 
 
 
Junior Group (powersharing) -0.032 0.233   -0.017 0.208 
 
 
  (0.201) (0.151)   (0.197) (0.158) 
 
 
Autonomous Group 0.454 0.680   0.567 0.736 
 
 
  (0.755) (0.742)   (0.744) (0.735) 
 
 
Powerless Group -0.163 0.116   -0.099 0.142 
 
 
  (0.313) (0.330)   (0.314) (0.330) 
 
 
Discriminated Group 0.781*** 0.637**   0.696*** 0.591** 
 
 
  (0.208) (0.232)   (0.203) (0.209) 
 
 
Downgrade in Political Power   0.499* 0.110     0.526** 0.174 
    (0.218) (0.177)     (0.201) (0.186) 
Upgrade in Political Power   0.226 -0.112     0.284 -0.059 
    (0.237) (0.184)     (0.201) (0.163) 
Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    1.153**    1.048** 
    (0.392)    (0.389) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.230*  -1.206* -1.213* -1.161* 
 
-1.131* -1.134* 
  (0.539)  (0.534) (0.533) (0.530) 
 
(0.529) (0.529) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.041 0.097 0.021 0.013 0.038 0.103 0.018 0.012 
  (0.100) (0.107) (0.084) (0.078) (0.097) (0.104) (0.081) (0.079) 
Grid Population (log) 0.842*** 0.862*** 0.873*** 0.882*** 0.847*** 0.866*** 0.881*** 0.894*** 
  (0.086) (0.083) (0.094) (0.096) (0.086) (0.083) (0.091) (0.094) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 4.446*** 4.274*** 4.349*** 4.289*** 4.321*** 4.205*** 4.113*** 4.046*** 
  (0.522) (0.519) (0.365) (0.363) (0.587) (0.552) (0.425) (0.385) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.610 0.488 0.575** 0.701** 0.525 0.403 0.540+ 0.686* 
  (0.448) (0.511) (0.222) (0.217) (0.467) (0.507) (0.288) (0.268) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 







  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.056 0.075+ 0.057+ 0.063+ 0.062 0.077+ 0.071* 0.077* 
  (0.042) (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036) 
National Population (log) -0.283* -0.234* -0.287* -0.268* -0.212+ -0.162 -0.232+ -0.201 
  (0.110) (0.107) (0.114) (0.115) (0.121) (0.110) (0.139) (0.142) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.095*** 0.102** 0.081*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.096** 0.076*** 0.082*** 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.022) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) 
National Elections 0.812** 0.843** 0.805** 0.755** 0.797** 0.832** 0.791* 0.727* 
  (0.267) (0.276) (0.296) (0.278) (0.277) (0.289) (0.309) (0.294) 
Number of Peace Years 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010+ 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.012+ 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.560*** -0.560*** -0.545*** -0.591*** -0.577*** -0.577*** -0.564*** -0.632*** 
 (0.126) (0.137) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.129) (0.108) (0.105) 
Spline1 -0.023 -0.028 -0.021 -0.032 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.041 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) 
Spline2 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Spline3 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Resource Rents (% of GDP) 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009     
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)     
Youth Bulges (% of population)     0.074 0.008 0.139* 0.130* 
      (0.081) (0.090) (0.068) (0.062) 
Constant -10.760*** -12.758*** -11.050*** -11.496*** -13.441*** -14.095*** -14.840*** -15.324*** 
  (1.689) (1.836) (1.548) (1.550) (2.439) (2.594) (2.131) (2.110) 
Observations 196852 196852 196852 196854 196852 196852 196852 196854 


















Table 10. Robustness checks IV 


















Undivided Power (dominant group) 
 
0.228   
 




(0.271)      (0.269)    
Dominant and Discriminated Coexist 
 
1.096**      1.295**    
  
 
(0.381)      (0.435)    
Senior Group (powersharing) 0.036 0.297 
 
 -0.009 0.254 
 
 
  (0.376) (0.347) 
 
 (0.366) (0.335) 
 
 
Junior Group (powersharing) -0.021 0.227 
 
 -0.028 0.208 
 
 
  (0.193) (0.148) 
 
 (0.199) (0.156) 
 
 
Autonomous Group 0.704 0.882 
 
 0.480 0.695 
 
 
  (0.796) (0.782) 
 
 (0.746) (0.740) 
 
 
Powerless Group -0.043 0.207 
 
 -0.133 0.135 
 
 
  (0.312) (0.331) 
 
 (0.304) (0.328) 
 
 
Discriminated Group 0.700*** 0.588* 
 
 0.749*** 0.587* 
 
 
  (0.199) (0.238) 
 
 (0.219) (0.229) 
 
 
Downgrade in Political Power 
  
0.496* 0.161     0.535** 0.177 
  
  
(0.197) (0.182)     (0.200) (0.182) 
Upgrade in Political Power 
  
0.221 -0.097     0.319 -0.041 
  
  
(0.218) (0.177)     (0.232) (0.191) 
Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    0.995*    1.065** 
    (0.418)    (0.386) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.241* 
 
-1.266* -1.263* -1.185* 
 
-1.157* -1.166* 
  (0.536) 
 
(0.541) (0.544) (0.534) 
 
(0.532) (0.533) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.052 0.100 0.029 0.023 0.059 0.116 0.045 0.030 
  (0.096) (0.101) (0.081) (0.079) (0.099) (0.109) (0.079) (0.076) 
Grid Population (log) 0.838*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 0.880*** 0.835*** 0.859*** 0.863*** 0.878*** 
  (0.085) (0.083) (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) (0.089) (0.099) (0.102) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 3.996*** 3.912*** 3.862*** 3.836*** 4.301*** 4.165*** 4.122*** 4.105*** 
  (0.508) (0.495) (0.386) (0.363) (0.545) (0.527) (0.399) (0.369) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.180 0.146 0.263 0.391 0.676 0.514 0.705* 0.789** 
  (0.428) (0.480) (0.237) (0.249) (0.488) (0.571) (0.282) (0.281) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 







  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.023 0.046 0.030 0.036 0.061 0.078* 0.064* 0.069+ 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.032) (0.035) 
National Population (log) -0.289* -0.227+ -0.310* -0.278+ -0.241* -0.185+ -0.269* -0.225+ 
  (0.133) (0.124) (0.145) (0.152) (0.113) (0.106) (0.124) (0.128) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.086** 0.092** 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.084** 0.091** 0.068*** 0.076*** 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) 
National Elections 0.829** 0.855** 0.822** 0.769** 0.800** 0.830** 0.795** 0.737* 
  (0.266) (0.280) (0.295) (0.283) (0.276) (0.287) (0.307) (0.294) 
Number of Peace Years 0.013+ 0.012+ 0.015* 0.017** 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.012+ 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.589*** -0.585*** -0.580*** -0.612*** -0.596*** -0.591*** -0.585*** -0.617*** 
 (0.126) (0.135) (0.111) (0.109) (0.119) (0.130) (0.108) (0.107) 
Spline1 -0.029 -0.032 -0.029 -0.037 -0.029 -0.032 -0.028 -0.037 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) 
Spline2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Spline3 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
State Repression (PTS) 0.363** 0.296* 0.355** 0.333**        
  (0.125) (0.119) (0.111) (0.120)        
Year Variable        0.018 0.014 0.026 0.018 
         (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -11.829*** -13.713*** -11.784*** -12.383*** -48.346 -41.379 -63.122* -47.914 
  (1.546) (1.550) (1.719) (1.759) (31.458) (31.986) (30.986) (30.722) 
Observations 196852 196852 196852 196852 196852 196852 196852 196854 
























Table 11. Robustness checks V 






















































Senior Group (powersharing) -0.100 0.231 
 
 -0.029 0.251 
 
 
  (0.412) (0.357) 
 
 (0.342) (0.343) 
 
 
Junior Group (powersharing) -0.116 0.198 
 
 -0.130 0.096 
 
 
  (0.233) (0.163) 
 
 (0.216) (0.179) 
 
 
Autonomous Group 0.350 0.643 
 
 0.792 0.961 
 
 
  (0.743) (0.726) 
 
 (0.938) (0.918) 
 
 
Powerless Group -0.235 0.090 
 
 -0.164 0.097 
 
 
  (0.318) (0.333) 
 
 (0.270) (0.289) 
 
 
Discriminated Group 0.778*** 0.654** 
 
 0.695** 0.343 
 
 
  (0.194) (0.219) 
 
 (0.258) (0.236) 
 
 




















Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    1.214**    1.105* 
    (0.415)    (0.442) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.384* 
 
-1.260* -1.283* -1.437** 
 
-1.381* -1.703** 
  (0.558) 
 
(0.534) (0.534) (0.545) 
 
(0.539) (0.568) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.083 0.117 0.051 0.051 0.018 0.101 0.013 0.017 
  (0.092) (0.097) (0.084) (0.075) (0.079) (0.088) (0.081) (0.084) 
Grid Population (log) 0.858*** 0.873*** 0.884*** 0.895*** 0.838*** 0.864*** 0.868*** 0.889*** 
  (0.084) (0.081) (0.092) (0.094) (0.099) (0.094) (0.101) (0.090) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 4.464*** 4.264*** 4.384*** 4.313*** 5.581*** 5.400*** 5.372*** 5.091*** 
  (0.497) (0.508) (0.357) (0.362) (1.211) (1.174) (1.207) (0.966) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.558 0.424 0.533* 0.647** 0.368 0.340 0.342 0.232 
  (0.441) (0.508) (0.223) (0.224) (0.496) (0.552) (0.312) (0.421) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 







Distance to Capital (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.067 0.083* 0.066* 0.073* 0.043 0.062+ 0.052 0.013 
  (0.043) (0.041) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.047) 
National Population (log) -0.430** -0.329* -0.384** -0.387** -0.146 -0.087 -0.166 -0.031 
  (0.143) (0.139) (0.135) (0.137) (0.129) (0.120) (0.137) (0.148) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.096*** 0.102*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.088** 0.088** 0.072** 0.058* 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) 
National Elections 0.804** 0.836** 0.797* 0.758** 0.806** 0.820** 0.795** 0.661** 
  (0.287) (0.296) (0.309) (0.293) (0.268) (0.273) (0.293) (0.228) 
Number of Peaceyears 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.013* 0.014+ 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.523*** -0.531*** -0.518*** -0.564*** -0.471*** -0.473*** -0.439*** -0.386*** 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.117) (0.116) (0.122) (0.125) (0.115) (0.108) 
Spline1 -0.019 -0.024 -0.018 -0.030 -0.019 -0.025 -0.016 -0.007 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) 
Spline2 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Spline3 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Nigeria 0.692* 0.557+ 0.502+ 0.610*     
 (0.298) (0.312) (0.273) (0.270)                     
Constant -8.767*** -11.420*** -9.777*** -9.916*** -12.734*** -15.121*** -12.975*** -15.587*** 
  
(2.298) (2.330) (1.755) (1.787) (2.052) (2.048) (2.157) (2.359) 
Log n Alpha        2.220*** 2.176*** 2.199*** 2.265*** 
         (0.505) (0.511) (0.524) (0.372) 
Observations 196852 196852 196852 196854 196852 196852 196852 196854 


















Table 12. Robustness checks  
  










Undivided Power (dominant group)  0.694+   
  
 (0.373)   
Dominant and Discriminated Coexist  1.882***   
  
 (0.479)   
Senior Group (powersharing) -0.367 -0.030   
  (0.369) (0.339)   
Junior Group (powersharing) -0.242 0.129   
  (0.211) (0.166)   
Autonomous Group 0.688 1.003   
  (1.068) (1.068)   
Powerless Group -0.236 0.123   
  (0.414) (0.423)   
Discriminated Group 0.360+ 0.342   
  (0.184) (0.208)   
Downgrade in Political Power   0.253+ -0.126 
    (0.230) (0.243) 
Upgrade in Political Power   0.226 -0.119 
    (0.263) (0.262) 
Downgraded and Upgraded Coexist    1.032+ 
    (0.552) 
No EPR Group in Grid -1.410**  -1.201* -1.232* 
  (0.487)  (0.506) (0.493) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.865*** 0.833*** 0.845*** 0.836*** 
  (0.063) (0.079) (0.070) (0.076) 
Grid Population (log) 0.747*** 0.768*** 0.747*** 0.759*** 
  (0.105) (0.101) (0.105) (0.106) 
Riots in Neighbouring Grid 2.845*** 2.694*** 2.917*** 2.992*** 
  (0.595) (0.545) (0.541) (0.531) 
Size of Excluded Group 0.108 0.251 0.084 0.146 
  (0.898) (0.789) (0.888) (0.931) 
Time to Urban Centre (mins) -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* 







Distance to Capital (km) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.140 0.067 0.184 0.204 
  (0.192) (0.194) (0.188) (0.200) 
National Population (log) -3.621 -2.109 -4.434* -4.773* 
  (2.268) (2.492) (1.996) (2.123) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.165*** 0.158** 0.144** 0.160*** 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) 
National Elections 0.837*** 0.853*** 0.852*** 0.832*** 
  (0.207) (0.213) (0.201) (0.197) 
Number of Peaceyears 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.009 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years Since Last Ethnic Riot -0.516** -0.526** -0.524** -0.541*** 
 (0.184) (0.180) (0.186) (0.139) 
Spline1 -0.050 -0.052 -0.051 -0.066+ 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.035) 
Spline2 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.021 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Spline3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Country and Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 130777 130777 130777 130777 
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Nonviolent movements are more successful when mobilising large and diverse numbers of 
participants. A growing literature suggests ethnic divisions undermine the ability of activists to 
engage in mass and diverse nonviolent mobilisation. Yet large and diverse social movements 
have emerged in numerous ethnically divided societies. I argue that mass nonviolent 
mobilisation is made possible in ethnically polarised contexts when broader cross-cutting 
grievances are present as they enable local activists to widen their appeal across social lines. I 
focus on food price spikes as an example of a cross-cutting issue that is likely to affect 
consumers from different ethnic groups. Using new spatially disaggregated data on government 
targeted nonviolent action I analyse grid-cell years across 41 African countries (1990-2008). I 
find strong evidence that food price spikes increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in 




In recent years, mass nonviolent resistance has become an increasingly prevalent form of anti-
government dissent. Movements have been remarkably successful in effecting political change 
using unconventional nonviolent action (i.e. Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), which is broadly 
defined as a combination of persuasive tactics (i.e. protests and demonstrations) and 
noncompliant methods (i.e. strikes and sit-ins) (Sharp, 2005).37 The growing civil resistance 
OLWHUDWXUHUHODWHVWKLVVXFFHVVWRDPRYHPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRPRELOLse large and diverse numbers of 
participants across social lines, which builds legitimacy and draws support away from the 
government (DeNardo, 1985; Schock, 2005; Sharp, 2005; Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; 
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).  
Yet while there has been considerable research on the outcomes of nonviolent 
campaigns, far less is known about the initial emergence of nonviolent action (Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder, 2017), in particular, how movements succeed in mobilising large numbers of people 
across diverse support bases. There are many prominent examples where activists have 
engaged in mass nonviolent action after successfully unifying otherwise disparate social 
groups. This includes activists from divided societies involved in the ³Arab Spring´ DQG
movements that have emerged in countries with a history of ethnic conflict (i.e. Burundi and 
Bosnia). Yet a number of recent studies have shown that ethnic cleavages undermine 
nonviolent mobilisation across group lines, by reducing the ability of activists to attract mass 
numbers of people from different social groups (Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Arriola, 2013; 
                                                          
37
 While nonviolence is a contested concept, this widely used definition of nonviolent action focuses on mass 
and unconventional measures of action, undertaken by individuals and organisations that aim to overthrow a 




Vidovic and Gleditsch, 2015; Thurber, 2017).38 How do nonviolent movements mobilise 
sufficient numbers in societies with ethnic divisions?  
This article seeks to unravel this question and extend our understanding of emergence 
by highlighting a process through which nonviolent activists overcome local ethnic divisions 
to engage in mass and diverse mobilisation. I argue that cross-cutting grievances, which 
transcend local divisions within and between politically relevant ethnic groups, provide 
opportunities for activists to appeal to individuals across ethnic boundaries, thereby greatly 
facilitating mass and diverse nonviolent mobilisation in more challenging ethnically divided 
contexts. I focus on one example of a cross-cutting issue, spikes in domestic food prices, which 
are likely to impact consumers from all social groups, enabling a movement to mobilise 
individuals based on a common economic grievance. 
To test these claims I disaggregate the emergence of nonviolent action to the 
subnational-level, using new geocoded events data. This approach advances existing 
quantitative research that has tended to explore emergence using country-level variables that 
do not reflect subnational realities (i.e. Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017; Butcher and Svensson, 
2016). Ethnic cleavages are a social barrier faced by activists locally and vary considerably 
within countries along with other structural factors that influence the viability of nonviolent 
mobilisation. I explore the emergence of nonviolent action across subnational grid-cells of 41 
peacetime African countries (1990-2008). Specifically I explore the settlement areas of ethnic 
groups included and excluded from power, and diverse locations where excluded ethnic groups 
coexist with other groups. The findings provide strong evidence that the cross-cutting nature 
of food price spikes increase the feasibility of nonviolent action in diverse areas that would 
otherwise be unlikely to observe nonviolent action. 
                                                          
38
 I define ethnicity as a socially constructed ascriptive identity, based on common descent and collective 
cultural affiliations such as: language, tribe, race, and religion (Horowitz, 1985). 
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The article begins by exploring existing research and ways local ethnic cleavages may 
constrain nonviolent action, before theorising food prices as a cross-cutting issue that facilitates 
mass and diverse mobilisation. This is followed by the research design, empirical evidence and 
concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. Ethnic Divisions and Nonviolent Mobilisation 
The goal of mass nonviolent action is WRJHQHUDWHHQRXJKOHYHUDJHWRXQGHUPLQHWKHVWDWH¶V
legitimacy and ability to rule or impose particular policies (Schock, 2005). The civil-resistance 
literature argues that leverage is achieved through greater numbers and the diverse participation 
of various social groups, which provides sufficient popular support to disrupt state functions 
(DeNardo, 1985; Schock, 2005; Sharp, 2005 Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Svensson and 
Lindgren, 2011). Few governments confronting nonviolent action from 5% of the population 
have avoided political change (Lichbach, 1998).  
Studies of civil resistance tend to explain the emergence of nonviolent action through 
forms of political agency, such as the skills and leadership of activists (Sharp, 2005; Schock, 
2005). Yet, mass and diverse mobilisation is also likely to be dependent on existing structural 
contexts that remain outside the control of political activists (Goldstone, 1994; Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder, 2017; Butcher and Svensson, 2016). Nepstad (2015), for example, points to three 
broad determinants of the emergence of nonviolent action: widely held grievances against the 
government, inter-group coalitions, and space or openings to organise nonviolent action. While 
the latter has synergies to opportunity factors and resources that provide µVSDFH¶ IRU
mobilisation, the former largely correspond to two interconnected forms of mobilization unique 
to nonviolent action: vertical mobilisation against the regime (i.e. widespread anti-government 
grievances) and horizontal mobilisation across diverse social groups (coalition building). In 
 127 
 
using mass grievances to mobilise vertically against the regime, nonviolent action seeks to 
dislocate the regime from its so-FDOOHGµSLOODUVRIVXSSRUW¶HJSROLFHPLOLWDU\ZRUNHUVFLYLO 
servants, business, political parties and religious organisations that provide key sources of 
SRZHU ZKLFK LI UHPRYHG OLPLW WKH UHJLPH¶V DELOLW\ WR UXOH 6KDUS   7KLV YHUWLFDO
challenge aims to generate sympathy within these institutions and encourage loyalty switches; 
especially amongst security forces that carry out state repression (Chenoweth and Stephan, 
2011; Nepstad, 2015).  
 Nonviolent mobilisation also occurs horizontally across social lines, as movements 
attempt to appeal to key social groups and win popular support. Nonviolent action is more 
effective when movements appeal to individuals from different social backgrounds, ages, 
occupations and political ideologies that have differing relationships with the state and can hurt 
it in different ways (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Butcher and 
Svensson, 2016). While nonviolent mobilisation has fewer moral and physical barriers to 
participation (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), mobilising thousands of people across social 
lines is extremely challenging, particularly in ethnically polarised societies with high social 
distance within and across ethnic group lines (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; Arriola, 2013; 
Bhavnani and Jha, 2014; Vidovic and Gleditsch, 2015; Thurber, 2017). Existent research 
remains poorly placed to explain the emergence of nonviolent action in divided societies, in 
which ethnic cleavages have rarely featured in explanations of nonviolent action (see Thurber, 
2017). 
 
3.3. Grievances and Nonviolent Action 
Unlike the civil resistance literature, a large literature on grievances has focused on emergence 
of contentious action and its relationship to ethnic grievances. The grievance approach 
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emphasises the importance of ethno-political hierarchies, which generate salient ethnic 
divisions by reinforcing unequal distributions of power and wealth (Stewart, 2008; Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013; Wimmer, 2013). This literature assumes that mass participation 
can be achieved by solely appealing to collective ethnic grievances that derive from political 
inequalities, with empirical evidence suggesting that ethnic grievances motivate engagement 
in nonviolent action (Gurr, 1993; Olzak, 2006; Jazayeri, 2016), as well as armed rebellion 
(Stewart, 2008; Østby, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug).  
By exploring ethnic-mobilisation, the grievance approach has greatly extended our 
understanding of vertical mobilisation or why people are motivated to engage in unrest, but has 
largely ignored horizontal nonviolent mobilisation or how movements mobilise across group 
lines. This relates, in part, to the wider research agenda that has almost exclusively focused on 
civil war and has emerged in isolation to civil resistance literature. This has led many grievance 
scholars to draw on civil war mechanisms that are poorly suited to explain nonviolent action, 
since nonviolent and violent mobilisation are distinct (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). While 
armed opposition only needs to recruit a few hundred fighters, nonviolent movements must 
attract tens of thousands of participants. In other words, while the existence of ethnic cleavages 
aids the vertical mobilisation of armed groups, ethnic-based recruitment is less suited to 
nonviolent resistance because the greater scale of mobilisation often requires horizontal 
mobilisation across group lines. 
Recent research suggests that nonviolent movements may be able to bypass the 
problems of horizontal mobilisation when having the support of a larger ethnic group which 
effectively provides a bigger recruitment pool (White et al., 2015; Dahl et al., 2016). Yet the 
exploration of nonviolent action at the group-level provides distinct methodological; existing 
empirical studies miss the numerous cases where nonviolent actions involve multiple ethnic 
groups (Gurr, 1993; Olzak, 2006; Jazayeri, 2016) and are limited to explaining a subset of 
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nonviolent action involving groups that are sufficiently large enough to mobilise mass 
numbers. This is a significant issue since only 13% of civil resistance campaigns are mobilised 
in pursuit of ethnic goals (Thurber, 2017). This literature also has two key theoretical 
limitations. 
Firstly, by assuming ethnic preferences are consistent within a group, these models do 
not consider differing interests and internal divisions, such as class, language and clans. Ethnic 
movements must overcome these if they wish to mobilise large numbers of co-ethnics 
(Gorenburg, 2000; Goldstone, 2011). For example, although the Oromo represent the largest 
ethnic group in Ethiopia, intra-ethnic divisions have limited the JURXS¶Vability to engage in 
nonviolent action (Arriola, 2013). Existing grievances studies provide little indication of how 
a movement may unify sub-groups. 
Secondly, by focusing on groups, grievance studies cannot explain horizontal 
nonviolent mobilisation that occurs across ethnic lines. Even when movements can draw on 
the support of a larger ethnic base, ethnic movements are rarely able to adequately challenge 
the government or generate wider loyalty-shifts with the backing of a single ethnic group. 
Broad-based support is essential because some ethnic groups are more tied to the state than 
others, and are often clustered in certain occupations, sectors, worker associations and 
settlement types.  
Different ethnic groups therefore have the potential to undermine the government in 
different ways (DeNardo, 1985; Lichbach, 1998; Schock, 2005; Butcher and Svensson, 2016). 
Failing to gain support across ethnic lines alienates potential supporters, increases intergroup 
polarisation, limits wider public support and legitimacy and allows the government to isolate 
such movement with more targeted repression (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Svensson and 
Lindgren 2011; Butcher and Svensson, 2016). This is illustrated by nonviolent struggle against 
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Apartheid in South Africa, where the United Democratic Front also appealed to Asians and 
Coloureds even though Blacks made up 85% of the population. 
 
3.4. Resources, Opportunities and Nonviolent Action 
The alternative structural literatures on revolution and social movements, provide a better 
indication of how movements may engage in mass nonviolent mobilisation, pointing to the 
importance of resources and political opportunities. Resources such as social networks and pre-
existing organisations facilitate meso-mobilisation; temporary coalitions that occur between 
organisations (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992), while information and economic resources, most 
often found in urban locations and industrialised countries, assist mass mobilisation (Goldstone 
1991; Lohmann, 1994; Siegal, 2009; Butcher and Svensson, 2016). Other studies point to 
political opportunities that signal to opposition groups that nonviolent action is feasible, for 
example, state weakness (McAdam, 1999), regime instability and political openness (Tilly, 
1978; Meyer, 2004; Goldstone 1991).  
Here there is some overlap with the case literature on civil resistance, which points to 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHQHWZRUNVVXFKDVUHOLJLRXVRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGWUDGHXQLRQVLQSURYLGLQJ³IUHH
VSDFH´ DQG ³RSHQLQJV´ WKDW SURYLGH RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU SHRSOH WR RUJDQLse (Ackermann and 
DuVall, 2000; Nepstad, 2015). However, studies of revolution and social movements often 
regard ethnic grievances as too common (Tilly, 1978), and therefore, fail to account for the 
importance of ethnic cleavages as a social barrier to horizontal nonviolent mobilisation. While 
important, resources are likely to be distributed along ethnic divisions rather than across them 
and activists may be unable to act on political opportunities if ethnic cleavages divide the wider 
population that activists seek to mobilise.  
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3.5. Local Structures and the Emergence of Nonviolent Action 
The preceding discussion provides the expectation that ethnic cleavages are an important social 
structure that influences the feasibility of nonviolent action. While ethnic cleavages may 
facilitate armed rebellion that can rely solely on vertical mobilisation, such cleavages more 
generally undermine horizontal mobilisation that is unique to the emergence of nonviolent 
action. However, ethnic diversity alone does not generate social divisions, while some 
cleavages are more salient and detrimental to social relations than others. Grievance literature 
has consistently pointed to the role of ethno-political inequalities in hardening group 
boundaries and generating animosities between groups (Stewart, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch 
and Buhaug, 2013; Wimmer, 2013). Ethno-political exclusion has a particularly negative 
impact on the emergence of nonviolent action because it hardens social boundaries and reduces 
the likelihood of having coethnics within the pillars of power. Both reduce the likelihood of 
intergroup coalitions and loyalty switches among politically included groups (Thurber, 2017; 
Svensson and Lindgren, 2011). 
Yet nonviolent mobilisation and activism is often carried out locally, with activists 
drawing on communal and informal networks that loosely bind would-be participants together 
and on occasions draw people into contentious action (Goldstone, 1994; Kuran, 1991). If ethno-
political exclusion impacts the national and movement-level (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011; 
Thurber, 2017), this should also be evident at the subnational-level by hindering localised 
attempts to build coalitions and organise nonviolent action. 
There are two ways ethnic cleavages are likely to undermine localised attempts to 
engage in nonviolent mobilisation. Firstly, ethnic and intra-ethnic identities often form the 
basis of membership in social networks in politically exclusive societies (Wimmer, 2013), 
increasing social distance between groups that live in close proximity, thereby dividing local 
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populations into separate mobilisable groups that undermines the scope of mobilisation. In 
societies where high levels of political inequalities exist between groups, ethnic boundaries 
tend be salient and ethnic networks are more VRFLDOO\ µFORVHG¶ *XUU 6WHZDUW 
Wimmer, 2013). This limits intergroup interaction in everyday life and precludes the formation 
of intergroup ties²a distinct obstacle to horizontal mobilisation across group lines. 
Secondly, ethnic and often intra-ethnic groups, have differing grievances and goals 
against the government, with differing ideas of how to overcome these grievances. Without 
superordinate goals that cut across social lines, it is difficult for groups to cooperate, find 
common ground and build coalitions, even when in close proximity (Tajfel, 1982; Goldstone, 
1994). Political inequalities in particular increase the salience of divisions between ethnic 
groups, thereby reducing the viability of horizontal mobilisation and coalition building 
(Thurber, 2017). Consequently, as seen in Oromia (Ethiopia), the inability to coordinate 
strategy, forge intergroup alliances and engage in horizontal mobilisation is more closely 
connected to oppositional infighting and a switch to violent strategies, rather than the 
engagement in nonviolent action (Cunningham, 2015). The preceding discussion provides the 
expectation that ethnic cleavages do matter and should influence nonviolent mobilisation at the 
local-level. 
H1a:  Mass nonviolent action is less likely to occur in locations with politically 
excluded ethnic groups. 
H1b:  Mass nonviolent action is less likely to occur in diverse locations where 
politically excluded ethnic groups coexist with other groups. 
 
However, existing research provides little indication of how movements overcome these social 
barriers. The next section builds on these research areas, highlighting the importance of cross-




3.6. Food Prices Spikes and Overcoming Ethnic Obstacles to Nonviolent Mobilisation 
The main argument of this article is that the emergence of nonviolent action is greatly 
facilitated by the existence of broader cross-cutting grievances, which enable movements to 
mobilise horizontally across sub-groups of ethnic group and across ethnic lines. Sharp increases 
LQGRPHVWLFIRRGSULFHVNQRZQDVµVSLNHV¶39 are a good example of a cross-cutting issue, as 
when large enough, they generate widespread economic grievances that impact consumers 
from all social groups. Regardless of ethnic or social affiliations, food is a basic need for all 
consumers and is accessed when affordable (Barrett, 2013). Cross-cutting grievances therefore 
provide an opportunity or opening for movements to broaden their appeal and move beyond 
ethno-political divisions, thereby simultaneously increasing their vertical mobilisation 
potential and ability to forge horizontal alliances across group lines.  
Higher spikes in food prices facilitate horizontal mobilisation across intra-ethnic and 
inter-ethnic divides because they DUHZKDW7LOO\ FDOOVD µV\PEROLF LVVXH.¶ ,Q%RVQLD
protests in 2014 over high prices and low wages were framed around the powerful message: 
µ:H are hungry in three languages¶ +RSNLQV,Q(J\SWWKHIDPRXVµEUHDGKHOPHW¶ZDV
a symbol that transcended political ethno-religious lines, and was easily replicated by various 
segments of the population and in different locations.  
The cross-cutting nature of increases in food prices sets this apart from other types of 
issues. For example, while disputed elections often spark unrest (vertical mobilisation), many 
major political parties in Africa gain the majority of their support from one or a few ethnic 
groups (i.e. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), which reduces the likelihood that protests will 
                                                          
39
 On a continuum, more dramatic price spikes, i.e. 24% increases in Egypt in 2008, are more detrimental than 
normal price spikes, i.e. 1% increases in Botswana (Barrett, 2013). 
 134 
 
attract a diverse spectrum of participants across group boundaries (horizontal mobilisation). 
Food price spikes also differ from other economic shocks: climatic disasters and rainfall 
variation (see Buhaug, 2015), negative economic growth (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010), 
downturns in food production (Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014), or shock declines in food prices 
(i.e. Dube and Vargas, 2013). These types of shocks typically impact certain ethnic groups 
residing in specific, often rural, parts of a country, and instead have been related to armed 
conflict due to the likelihood that they reinforce ethnic-based grievances rather than cut across 
them.  
I argue that the unique and symbolic nature of food price spikes provide two types of 
motivation that facilitate the emergence of nonviolent action: common intergroup grievances, 
which eases horizontal mobilisation in ethno-politically exclusive environments, and anti-
government short-term incentives that fosters vertical mobilisation. 
Firstly, the greater the magnitude of price spikes, the more likely a higher number of 
social groups, across and within ethnic groups, will be impacted. Higher prices make economic 
hardship PRUHµYLVLEOH¶, but they also display the hardship of others (Weinberg and Bakker, 
2014), increasing the perception that larger segments of the population share similar grievances 
and have a common interest in addressing them. Between 2007 and 2008, the Egyptian 
opposition was able to mobilise 400,000 people, using record high food prices spikes to unify 
individuals from different classes and across Arab and Coptic Christian communities (Bush, 
2010). Higher spikes encourage the participation of affluent segments and groups that have 
political power (Barrett and Bellemare, 2011; Barrett, 2013), including professionals and 
intellectuals, who tend to purchase more of their food, and are more likely to participate due to 
a higher sense of entitlement (Tilly, 1978). This, in turn, is likely to encourage the participation 
of poorer and often politically marginalised consumers, who are the most vulnerable to price 
spikes (Ivanic et al., 2012), but are less likely to have the coordination or resources required to 
 135 
 
engage in nonviolent action (Gamson, 1990; Tilly, 1978). In other words, food prices facilitate 
horizontal mobilisation by generating superordinate goals for normally divided groups. 
Secondly, high food price spikes create short-term incentives to participate in 
nonviolent action because of their sudden economic impact. Households generally have very 
little warning of the impending economic hardships, placing significant pressure on established 
coping mechanisms. Moreover, attempts to adapt are often constrained by poor government 
social protection; for example, African countries, on average, spend the least on social 
protection programs relative to their GDP (Ortiz et al., 2014), and static wages that are far 
exceeded by high price spikes (Wodon and Zaman, 2010). Faced with significant economic 
pressure and few avenues to redress economic hardships, individuals have extraordinary short-
term participation incentives to force immediate concessions from the government.  
Higher food price spikes provide movements with a unique opportunity to overcome 
ethnic obstacles to horizontal mobilisation by conflating non-ethnic food-related grievances 
with anti-government sentiments that facilitate vertical mobilisation. Grievances are targeted 
against the government, because it is solely to blame for widespread economic hardship 
(Barrett, 2013; Smith, 2014; Weinberg and Bakker, 2014). A movement can link the inability 
of the government to deal with food prices with its broader ineffectiveness and misuse of 
political power, and offer an alternative vision that advance its opposition as a viable alternative 
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), thereby drawing intergroup support away from government. 
This is illustrated in Uganda, where the opposition remains severely weakened by the legacy 
of a 19-year ban on opposition parties. The main leading opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, has 
increasingly used food price spikes to unite the fragmented opposition in demonstrations 
against the government and to appeal across group lines by conflating economic hardships with 
the political issue of government corruption and misuse of political power (Kron, 2011). In 
2008, food price spikes enabled movements in a number of ethno-politically exclusive 
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countries to organise nonviolent action by politicising various issues linked to increasing food 
prices, including high wages, employment, lower tax levels, social protection, subsidies and 
corruption (Bush, 2010; Smith, 2014). Based on the preceding discussion, I offer the final 
hypothesis: 
H2: In ethnically excluded and diverse locations, spikes in domestic food prices 
increase the likelihood of mass nonviolent action. 
 
3.7. Research Design 
To test these hypotheses, I undertake a subnational analysis of all African countries between 
1990 and 2008. The unit of analysis is grid-cell-years, based on the PRIO-GRID data-structure 
which consists of 0.5 X 0.5 degree geographical grid-cells (approximately 55 X 55 kilometres 
near the equator) (Tollefsen et al., 2012). This approach advances existing studies on the 
emergence of nonviolent action that rely on country-level data that assumes that conditions are 
consistent across a given country, which conceals a great deal of variation that is occurring at 
the subnational-level. Not all parts of a country and not all cities experience nonviolent action. 
Moreover, different locations have different types of ethnic groups, varying levels of diversity, 
population and wealth that either facilitate or undermine the feasibility of local nonviolent 
action. This can only be captured by a subnational analysis using subnational data, which 
enables the exploration of spatial variations in the occurrence of nonviolent action and 
subnational variations in mobilisation potential across distinct local ethno-political contexts. 
Compared to administrative units, grid-cells are arbitrarily constructed and do not vary in size 






To capture mass nonviolent action against the government at the grid-level, I use georeferenced 
events data from Social Conflict Analysis Dataset (SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012). SCAD 
events are based on news reports from the Associated Press and Agence France Presse 
newswires; both rely on local news sources.40 SCAD provides the most comprehensive 
collection of georeferenced social conflict events in Africa, and offers detailed information on 
dates, coordinates, numbers of participants and a description of the incident and actors 
involved.41 Using this information, I include SCAD events coded as: (1) targeting the national 
government, (2) involving unconventional nonviolent methods of noncompliance or 
persuasion, i.e. peaceful protests, demonstrations and strikes (Sharp, 2005), (3) being 
organised, not sporadic and (4) involving a minimum of 1,000 participants. The last criteria 
follows the widely used NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) and captures events 
with a high participation threshold that was achieved despite potential barriers to nonviolent 
mobilisation. Since nonviolent action does not use physical violence to resist the government 
(Butcher and Svensson, 2016), this also excludes violent forms of unrest (i.e. communal 
violence and armed conflict) and incidental violence such as riots.42 While it is difficult to 
ascertain whether these nonviolent events are mobilised along ethnic or interethnic lines, the 
cross-cutting mechanism works equally well for ethnic movements attempting to unify intra-
ethnic groups and movements mobilising across ethnic lines. 
The SCAD data has two limitations. Firstly, the number of participants in some events  
is coded as unknown. For events where participation numbers are unknown, I only include 
                                                          
40
 This improves on the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive which is based solely on reports 
from the New York Times.  
41 The SCAD data has much better temporal coverage than the ACLED dataset (starts at 1997), and the 
Afrobarometer (limited to sporadic rounds of surveys). 
42
 While food prices impact protest and riots more broadly (Smith, 2014), the focus of this article is on 
nonviolent action which uniquely involves large, diverse, and nonviolent mobilisation, which is distinct from 
sporadic rioting that does not require cross-cutting issues. This is explored further in the robustness checks. 
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events which have clear evidence of involving at least 1000 persons, using secondary 
information on the event, its geographical scope and the size of the organisations involved. For 
example, many strikes far surpass this threshold, such as the 1994 general strike in Burundi 
against the military regime, which occurred across the capital. 
Secondly, many widespread events are often not accurately georeferenced. For 
example, events coded as nationwide are assigned to the geographical centre of the country, 
while regional events are georeferenced in the centre of the region. These events cannot be 
excluded as they represent one-third of the total events (see Table 1) and are important 
examples of mass nonviolent action, including, for example, numerous anti-Apartheid events 
in South Africa.43 Another concern is that nationwide events exclusively occur in 91 out of the 
340 country years and would wrongly be coded as DµIDOVHV¶GHVSLWHLWEHLQJFOHar nonviolent 
action did occur somewhere in the country. 
To avoid dropping these cases, I generate different specifications to approximate the 
location of the non-geocoded events. These approximations closely resemble the types of 
events that are geocoded, in which 93% occur in major cities (with a population over 
100,000).44 ASSUR[LPDWLRQVDUHDOVREDVHGRQ6&$'¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIHDFKHYHQWDQGits actors; 
in this way, I can ensure the geocoding reflects spatial realities. For example, dockland strikes 
in Algeria are coded as occurring in port cities and tea-producer strikes in Kenya are coded as 
occurring in tea producing areas. 
For the main analysis, I use an estimated dependent variable (DV) that includes all 
geocoded mass nonviolent events and estimates non-geocoded events as occurring in the 
                                                          
43
 These represent one-third of all event locations (see Table 1) but, in reality, are likely to represent a much 
wider number of event locations as they are occurring across the country. 
44
 There is no global definition of an urban area with population thresholds based on various densities and travel 
times (see Uchida and Nelson, 2010). To remain consistent, I follow SCAD coding procedure of coding cities if 
they have a population greater than 100,000, obtained from http://www.geonames.org/countries/ and 
www.worldatlas.com. Coordinates are taken from http://itouchmap.com/latlong.html.  
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capital and the FRXQWU\¶V RU UHJLRQ¶V five largest cities (Top5_est). This is a conservative 
assumption since most nationwide campaigns occur in multiple urban centres (Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011), as illustrated by the January 2018 Iranian protests that occurred in at least 19 
cities amid dramatic spikes in food prices. I generate other DVs that estimate these events as 
occurring more widely across a country as a robustness check. Using the most modest estimated 
DV (Top5_est) in the main analysis balances potential bias induced by not including the non-
geocoded events and bias induced from including too many estimated locations (see Table 1). 
Each event is aggregated to the relevant PRIO-GRID year. Grid-years with at least one 
nonviolent event are coded as 1 (otherwise 0). 













No. SCAD Events 5823 1637  145 298 67* 2080 
(35.7%) 
No. Grids with 
SCAD Events 
1494 802  89 180 56* 992 
(56.2%)** 
*ThHµRWKHU¶category (rural, dockland and areas) overlaps with national, regional and unknown estimates. 




To capture domestic food price spikes, I take the highest percentage change in domestic food 
indices from one month to the next and aggregate this to the year.45 Following Smith (2014), I 
take domestic food price data from indices collected by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) (2014). This is a continuous variable with price spikes ranging from minimal increases 
in price, to very high price spikes that I expect are more likely to increase the risk of nonviolent 
action.46 Most peacetime African countries have monthly indices available from 1990 to 
                                                          
45
 While monthly data is aggregated to the year, this correlates highly with yearly increases in prices. 
46
 I cap price increases at 100% to prevent hyperinflation from biasing the results. To retain data, I recode these 
extreme values to the next highest % increase below 100%. 
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2008,47 based on the price of a basket of the most important foods in the capital or major city.48 
Using the highest percentage changes in food indices captures the short-term nature of spikes 
and provides a comparable indicator across countries. 
I focus on domestic food prices, rather than international prices, as they are less 
distorted by state market interventions (Ivanic et al., 2012; Hendrix and Brinkmann, 2013; 
Smith, 2014) and more closely reflect the price that people pay, with 90% of all food consumed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa being produced domestically (Barrett, 2013). I exclude country-years in 
which civil war is ongoing, because of the clear endogenous relationship between civil war and 
food price spikes (Gates et al., 2012). Unfortunately, these national-level data do not capture 
subnational variations in prices, which may differ within a country.  
However, I remain confident the ILO data are appropriate for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, current disaggregated data remains limited. Recent data from the World Food 
Programme (WFP) only comprehensively cover some African countries and are confined 
largely to the years 2015 and 2016. Secondly, the WFP data shows that price spikes vary little 
across different urban areas, where the vast majority of nonviolent action occurs (see Figure 
2). 
Figure 1 displays two examples of Kenya and Malawi, comparing the monthly price 
changes of urban and rural markets (each line is a local market), for the year 2011 when prices 
achieved record highs and good data is available. This figure shows that price trends in urban 
markets tend to move in the same direction in Kenya (spike in July) and Malawi (dip around 
May and June), while much more price variation occurs across rural markets. 
 
                                                          
47
 When the government artificially alters food indices, these data are excluded from the analysis. The following 
countries have no data: Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan.  
48
 Where two food indices exist within a country, the most complete is chosen. 
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Figure 1. Food Price Variation across Urban and Rural areas of Kenya and Malawi (2011) 
Kenyan City Markets (wholesale prices)                  Kenyan Rural Town Markets (retail prices) 
 
Malawi City Markets (retail prices)      Malawi Rural Town Markets (retail prices) 
 
Source: VAM Food and Commodity Prices Data Store. (http://foodprices.vam.wfp.org/).  
 
To assess the impact that local ethnic cleavages and diversity has on nonviolent action, I create 
two variables at the grid-level: those resided by ethno-politically excluded groups to capture 
ethnic cleavages and grid-cells with excluded groups that coexist with other ethnic groups to 
measure diversity. I first use group-level data from the EPR dataset to gain information on the 
level of group representation in government, coding groups as included or excluded from 
governmental power (EPR data, Version 3.0; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). The EPR 
dataset only includes politically relevant ethnic groups represented by at least one political 
actor in the national political arena, which ensures there are political actors in place to 
potentially engage in unrest. 
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These variables are translated to the grid-level using georeferenced ethnic settlement 
patterns from the Geo-EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). Grids containing no 
politically relevant ethnic groups are used as the reference category. These areas are either 
inhabited by no ethnic groups or by smaller less politically relevant groups ethnicity. Either 
way these areas do not exhibit the same social barriers and salience of ethnic divisions as areas 
with politically relevant groups (Posner, 2004). Locations of politically relevant excluded 
groups, considered oppositional, while areas with included groups, treated as pro-government 
- coded as 1, otherwise 0. Using Kenya in 2000 as an illustrative example, Figure 2 visualises 
the data. In 2000, three Kenyan ethnic groups were excluded from the executive: the Kikuyu, 
Luo and Somali (highlighted). The settlement areas of these groups are proxies for opposition 
areas. The other included groups (shaded and not highlighted) represent pro-government 
areas.49 Politically excluded grids are then interacted with food prices to test the hypothesis 
that food prices increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in excluded areas.  
Figure 2. Included and Excluded Ethnic Group Areas (Geo-EPR data) over the PRIO-Grid 
  
                                                          
49
 Although non-GLYHUVHDUHDVDUHFRGHGDVµKRPHODQG¶UHJLRQVRIFHUWDLQHWKQLFJURXSVLQWKH(35GDWDWKHVH
areas still exhibit levels of heterogeneity not picked up in the EPR data. For example, Nairobi is within the 
Kikuyu homeland but is also an ethnically diverse city. 
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To measure diverse areas, I generate a dummy variable for locations where excluded group 
settlement areas overlap with the settlement area of at least one other ethnic group. To test the 
hypothesis that high food price spikes increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in excluded 
and diverse areas, I generate an additional interaction term - diverse excluded areas X food 
price spikes.50  
 
Control Variables 
At the grid-level I control for poverty, using the grid-level equivalent of national GDP 
(Nordhaus, 2006), as this reduces adaptability to price spikes and reduces the cost of 
participation (Barrett, 2013). I include the grid population (logged) from the Gridded 
Population of the World (Version 3) (CIESEN, 2005), since larger and more concentrated 
populations facilitate the coordination of nonviolent mobilisation (Butcher and Svensson, 
2016; Barrett, 2013). Also included is the size of the largest excluded group within a grid (% 
of population), as larger groups have a mobilisation advantage (Dahl et al., 2016). As 
nonviolent action is largely an urban phenomenon I also control for travel time (minutes) to 
the nearest urban centre and distance to the capital (kilometres) (Tollefsen et al., 2012). To 
account for spatial and temporal dependencies, I include a temporal lag for nonviolent action 
occurring in the previous year (t-1) and a spatial lag for nonviolence in neighbouring grids. 
A range of national-level controls are also included in the model. Firstly, the number 
of excluded groups in a country, as governments are less likely to compromise when facing 
multiple groups (Cunningham, 2015). Secondly, a logged version of national population to 
proxy for the size of the country (World Bank, 2013), the Polity2 measure (Marshall and 
                                                          
50 Although this assumes that multiple groups are participating in nonviolent action in the majority of cases, it is 
unlikely one ethnic group is doing all the mobilisation in excluded and/or diverse areas, since ethnic 




Jaggers, 2010) to control for regime types and the number of peace years to account for 
instability. Finally, I include a dummy variable for national election years which often spark 
unrest (Lindberg, 2009).51 
 
Method 
I run country-fixed-effects logistic regression models to restrict the analysis to the within-
country variance. This allows the models to control for unobserved differences between 
countries and for certain country characteristics that influence food prices and nonviolent 
action, including environmental vulnerabilities, transport networks, food infrastructure, and 
trade policies, such as tariffs, food assistant programs and subsidies (Smith, 2014).52 To aid 
post-estimation, all independent variables are standardised, so each model reports the effect of 
a one-standard-deviation increase in each variable.53 
 
3.8. Results 
In this section, I analyse my hypotheses: local ethno-political exclusion and diversity reduces 
the likelihood of nonviolent action (H1a, H1b) and that higher food price spikes increase the 
feasibility of nonviolent action in these excluded and diverse areas (H2). All models displayed 
in Table 2 explore these propositions using the primary DVZKLFKHVWLPDWHV6&$'¶VQRQ-
JHRFRGHGHYHQWVDVRFFXUULQJLQDFRXQWU\¶VILYHODUJHVWFLties (Top5_est). 
Model 1 (Table 2) explores the baseline effect of local ethnic exclusion and diversity 
on the likelihood of nonviolent action. Model 1 reports no statistically significant effect of 
ethnic exclusion on the emergence of nonviolent action. While it is extremely difficult to 
                                                          
51 A summary of all variables (non-standardised) and data sources are listed in Table 3 (appendix). 
52
 I exclude grids with population less than the minimum required for mass civil resistance (<1000). 
53
 A standardised variable is the variable minus the mean, divided by the standard deviation. 
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separate out ethnic and interethnic nonviolent events, this could relate to simultaneous effects, 
whereby ethnic exclusion generates ethnic protest in some areas (Gurr, 1993; Jazayeri, 2016), 
such as the Berber region of Algeria, but undermines more general intergroup nonviolent 
activism in other areas (Thurber, 2017). In contrast, Model 1 and 4 show that nonviolent action 
is less likely to occur in ethnically excluded areas that are diverse (have at least one more EPR 
group). This provides strong evidence for hypothesis 1b, confirming that diverse environments 
present an obstacle to nonviolent mobilisation and reduces the feasibility of mass and diverse 
nonviolent action (p<0.01 and p<0.05). 
I proceed to explore the mediating impact of food price spikes on ethnic barriers to 
nonviolent resistance. Model 2 explores the general impact of food prices on the incidence of 
nonviolent action. The coefficient is positive and highly significant, providing strong evidence 
that greater rises in food prices increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in diverse locations 
within states (p<0.001). When increasing the percentage increase of food prices by one 
standard deviation (moving food prices from a 5.2% to a 10.5% increase), the risk of nonviolent 
action rises by 12.7%. 
Model 3 then explores the likelihood of nonviolent action in locations resided by 
excluded ethnic groups. The model shows a positive effect for this interaction, suggesting that 
higher food price spikes increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in areas home to these 
groups, even when controlling for other structural factors. In addition, ethnically excluded 
areas, a non-finding in baseline models, becomes significant and negative, suggesting that these 
DUHDVRWKHUZLVHOLNHO\WRFRQVWUDLQDPRYHPHQW¶VHIIRUWVWRHQJDJHLQQRQYLROHQWDFWLRQGXULQJ
times of small or no price spikes (p<0.05). While we cannot be sure who is participating in 
nonviolent action in ethno-excluded areas, regardless of whether movements are attempting to 
mobilise sub-groups within the same ethnicity, or across ethnic divides, food price spikes have 
a general impact on nonviolent action in excluded areas. In these areas, Model 3 reports a 
 146 
 
20.2% increased likelihood of nonviolent action with a one-standard-deviation increase in food 
prices (from 14.7% to 19.1%).  
Table 2. Food Prices, Ethnic Cleavages and Mass Nonviolent Action, 1990-2008. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices  0.127*** -0.034 -0.013 
   (0.037) (0.065) (0.058) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) 0.0750 -0.023 -0.201* -0.087 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.085) (0.075) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.032 -0.080 -0.091 -0.093 
 
(0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.202**  
 
  (0.065)  
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas    0.150** 
 
   (0.048) 
Ethnically Diverse Excluded Areas -0.142**    -0.151** 
 (0.053)      (0.054) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.379**  0.417*** 0.464*** 0.481*** 
  (0.117)    (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) 
Grid Population (log) 1.214*** 1.201*** 1.202*** 1.223*** 
  (0.075)   (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) -0.031 -0.010 0.044 0.037 
  (0.065) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067) 
Travel to Urban Centre (mins) -4.376*** -4.460*** -4.461*** -4.403*** 
 
(0.321)    (0.322) (0.322) (0.322) 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.075 0.081 0.081 0.070 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.065 0.080 0.060 0.003 
  (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) 
National Population (log) -1.128* -1.016* -1.377** -1.375** 
  (0.441) (0.440) (0.456) (0.455) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.020 0.004 0.020 -0.011 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) 
National Elections 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.107** 0.112** 
  (0.035)    (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Number of Peace Years -0.0190 -0.029 -0.036 -0.034 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Country Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.524 0.524 0.525 0.526 
Observations 86203 86203 86203 86203 
Sp<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 Reference category: grids with no ethnic groups 
Lastly, Model 4 explores the initiation of protest within a more challenging diverse local 
environment. The interaction effect of food prices and diverse locations is positive (p<0.01), 
 147 
 
suggesting that while diversity undermines nonviolent action, food prices mediate this effect, 
as higher price spikes increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in these areas. When food 
prices increase by one standard deviation (from 8.8% to 12.7%), the likelihood of nonviolent 
action in diverse locations increases by 15%. Overall, Table 1 provides supports my second 
hypothesis and suggests that food price spikes increase the feasibility of mass and diverse 
nonviolent mobilisation, even in the most difficult multi-ethnic environments. 
The control variables suggest there are other important drivers of nonviolent action. 
Grids that are more wealthy, have larger populations and that are closest to urban centres are 
more likely to witness nonviolent resistance. This gives support to claims that urban-based 
resources and related networks facilitate nonviolent action (Butcher and Svensson, 2016; 
Ackermann and DuVall, 2000; Nepstad, 2015). Several control variables ± distance to the 
capital, number of peace years, regime type and the number of excluded groups residing within 
a state ± have no significant effects on nonviolence. Furthermore, while other studies argue that 
larger ethnic groups have a greater potential for mobilisation (Dahl et al., 2016), I find little 
evidence of this at the subnational level. While large groups facilitate ethnic-based protest, this 
is unlikely to facilitate mobilisation across ethnic lines to engage in intergroup action. Finally, 
nonviolent action is less likely to occur in larger countries (proxied by population size) which 
increases coordination costs.  
Moving beyond the impact of one-standard-deviation increases in food prices, I explore 
simulated predictions using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003).54 Unfortunately, 
the post-estimations of fixed-effects models are limited and are not supported by CLARIFY.55 
I therefore generate predictions based on logistic regression models clustered around country 
                                                          
54
 CLARIFY produces a mean percentage prediction of an outcome based on 1000 random simulations. 
55 The Margins package in STATA shares the same problem and provides similar simulations. 
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standard errors.56 The simulations show the likelihood of nonviolent action is very low (at 
0.0052%) as nonviolent action is very rare and that the effect exponentially increases with 
higher rises in food prices and when holding other variables at their mean. When food prices 
rise by 15%, the probability of nonviolent action increases to 0.0071%, an increase of 38.1%. 
When moving to a 30% rise in food prices, the likelihood of nonviolent resistance is increased 
to 0.0114%, making a jump of 60.2%. The same occurs in ethnically excluded areas, where a 
1-15% rise in food prices increases the risk of nonviolent action by 51.1%. Finally, in more 
complex and ethnically diverse environments, the probability of nonviolent action increases by 
31.4% when prices move from a 1% increase to a 15% increase and a further 37.8%.when 
prices go up by 30%.  
 
Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of my results I run additional analyses. The first issue I explore is 
whether food prices are indeed a unique cross-cutting issue and are not driven by the coding 
scheme. I suggested theoretically that elections should have a positive effect on protest 
(Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015), but not necessarily cross-cut ethnic divides, since electoral 
support in African countries is often drawn along specific ethnic lines. While I find elections 
do have a direct effect, I find no evidence that elections have a cross-cutting effect, since 
excluded and diverse areas are not more likely to experience nonviolent action during election 
years.57 I explore this further by looking at riot outcomes. Rioting is directly impacted by food 
prices (see Barrett, 2013; Smith, 2015), but should not be dependent on a cross-cutting issue 
as the scope of mobilisation is lower and sporadic. While price spikes have a direct effect, they 
do not mediate the likelihood of rioting in diverse areas. This suggests that the cross-cutting 
                                                          
56
 This produces results similar to rare-events logistic regression. 
57 Models 5-6, Table 4 (appendix). 
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mechanism linking ethnic grievances to nonviolent action is unique to nonviolent action. I then 
move on to other types of economic shocks that may cause nonviolent action or mediate the 
impact of food prices: deviations in average rainfall, economic growth and international food 
prices. The results do not impact the main findings.58 
 Moving beyond the theoretical mechanism itself, the results could be driven by model 
choice. I rerun my results using other methods that address unit effects: random-effects and 
logistic regression with country corrected standards errors (Beck & Katz, 1995). For the latter, 
I employ rare-events logistical regression to better estimate rare outcomes, as nonviolence only 
occurs in 1.7% of all grid-years (King & Zeng, 2001). For both models the results are identical. 
However, when using Rare-Events Logistic regression, the interaction of food prices with 
diversity remains positive, but falls just outside statistical significance.59 
 The next concern is the possible impact of time trends. Following Beck, Katz & Tucker 
(1998) I introduce time trend dummies and cubic splines (time since the last nonviolent event) 
using country fixed-effects.60 The results remain the same. Another method is to add further 
fixed effects, although there are suggestions this can produce unstable results with binary 
outcomes (Beck & Katz, 2001). Nevertheless, I introduce more restrictive models with year-
fixed effects and then grid-year fixed effects61 where the results largely hold (p<0.10). 
 I then turn to three alternative DVs, as the results may be driven by the primary DV - 
Top5_est. The first two extend my geocoded estimations to include the ten largest cities with 
100,000 people (Top10_est) and then includes all other cities with a population over 300,000 
(Full_est). The results actually strengthen, which suggests that the more conservative Top5_est 
DV may underestimate the location of many nationwide events. The results are less stable with 
                                                          
58 Models 7-12, Table 4 (appendix). 
59
 Models 13-20 (Table 5). A more detailed discussion of these results can be found in the appendix. 
60
 I use time dummies for 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-08 (reference category). See Table 6 (appendix). 
61
 Table 7 (appendix). 
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the last DV, which removes the non-geocoded nation/regionwide events (No_est). However, 
as previously argued, removing the geo-HVWLPDWHVOHDGVWRWKHFRGLQJRIµIDOVH]HURV¶LQRQH-
quarter of country years witnessing nonviolent action and removes key examples of widespread 
nonviolent action most likely related to price spikes.62  
 Next, I explore urban-only nonviolent action, where I can be more confident that the 
food price data more closely reflects what people are actually paying. I rerun the analyses with 
an urban-only sample (within five hours of an urban centre) and the full sample using a urban-
only DV. I then explore the results further by removing agricultural areas, which are less likely 
to be consumers and are less vulnerable to food prices than those in less agricultural areas (i.e. 
urban areas) (Barrett, 2013). While agricultural areas are associated with less nonviolent 
resistance (p<0.05),63 the results do not change. 
 In the penultimate series of robustness checks I account for possible reverse causality 
and other omitted variable bias, where nonviolent action could be causing the higher prices.64 
I re-run my analysis with lagged independent variables. Next I run additional models that 
account for other explanations of variations in the emergence of nonviolent resistance, 
including the CIRI Index to account for highly repressive states that may deter nonviolent 
action (Lichbach, 1998) and control for relatively richer and poor groups within a grid, as richer 
ethnic groups may have a higher mobilisation potential. The findings remain the same.  
 
3.9. Conclusion 
Across various specifications, food price spikes as a cross-cutting issue, have been shown to 
facilitate mass mobilisation, both vertically against the government and horizontally in forging 
                                                          
62
 Tables 8-10 (appendix) which also discusses the results and merits of the geo-estimates in more detail. 
63
 Table 11 (appendix) 
64
 Table 12 (appendix) 
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intergroup participation and coalitions. These results provide strong evidence that the existence 
of cross-cutting grievances increases the emergence of nonviolent action in ethnically excluded 
and diverse locations, which are otherwise constrained by social divisions.  
These findings extend our understanding of how and when nonviolent action is likely 
to emerge, particularly when activists are facing difficult barriers to horizontal mobilisation 
across group lines. In doing so, this article contributes to two broader bodies of literature that 
have grown in isolation to one another; existing studies of civil resistance that have focused on 
the outcomes of nonviolent action and structural approaches that largely neglected the 
horizontal dimension of nonviolent mobilisation when exploring its emergence. This study also 
builds on country and movement-level quantitative studies, by exploring nonviolent action at 
the subnational level, thereby accounting for the variation of nonviolent action within 
countries, using new geocoded events data. 
Beyond academic contributions, this article also provides important policy 
implications. African regimes that deploy ethno-exclusive policies as a means to maintain 
political power are not immune from nonviolent action. Such regimes need to develop more 
fair and inclusive institutions to reduce the likelihood of nonviolent action and other forms of 
unrest. Moreover, food price spikes are clearly important for political stability. While African 
governments have various options to implement stabilisation mechanisms that alleviate the 
impact of rising food prices, safety net measures are either rare or ineffective. Only nine 
African countries implemented food-access programs during record high prices in 2007 and 
2008 (Berazneva and Lee, 2013). In many cases, governments are limited in how they can act, 
as was the case in Egypt where subsidies became simply unaffordable, accounting for 8% of 
WKHFRXQWU\¶V*'3LQ 2011 (Hendrix and Brinkman, 2013). However, governments need to 
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diversify their policies to implement creative long-term solutions that provide adequate social 
protection.65  
)XWXUHUHVHDUFKFRXOGORRNDWRWKHUµXQLI\LQJ¶IDFWRUVWKDWFXWDFURVVHWKQLFDQG class 
boundaries and enable opposition groups to engage in nonviolent action, for example, currency 
devaluation, religious or language cleavages that cross-cuts ethnic divides and other 
commodities such as fuel prices. The paper is better placed to capture the grievances of 
consumers, but other research could consider decreases in food prices, particularly cash crops, 
which may trigger rural-based civil resistance which has its own unique mobilisation 
challenges. More research is also needed to understand how subnational variations in food 
prices impact where unrest are likely to occur, but is dependent on the availability of new data. 
Finally, future research could explore other obstacles to nonviolent action, such as violence 
which may alienate would-be participants. 
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Appendix   
Table 3. Summary of Variables (non-standardised) and Data Sources 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Data Source 
Grid-Level Variables 
DV - Nonviolent Action 
(including estimates for 
Top-5 Cities) 




Excluded Group Area 
(opposition area) 
89,801 .2562 .4365 0 1 Ethnic Power 




Included Group Area 
(government area) 
89,801 .6634 .4726 0 1 
Ethnically Diverse Grid 89,801 .3685 .4824 0 1 Same as above 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 89,801 7.3218 1.0458 4.621 14.213 G-Econ Database 
Grid Population (log) 89,801 10.2406 1.7085 6.908 16.319 The Gridded 
Population of the 
World (Version 3) 
now available at 
Size of Excluded Group 
(%) 
89,801 .0538 .1486 0 .85 Geo-EPR dataset 
above 
Travel to Urban Centre 
(mins) 
89,801 532.7946 560.3409 0 5614  
 
PRIO-Grid Version 2 
Distance to Capital (km) 89,801 487.8273 330.6641 4 1948 
Unrest in Neighbouring 
Grid 
89,801 .1115 .4059 0 8 Based on the SCAD 
protest events and 
calculated by myself 
Unrest the Previous Year 89,801 .0156 .1240 0 1 
 Country-Level Variables 
Percentage Increase in 
Food Prices 
89,801 .0539 .05067 0 .41005 International Labour 
Office (ILO) 
Food Prices X Excluded 
Areas (at the Grid-level) 
89,801 .0147 .0441 0 .41005  
 
 
Same as above and 
combine with EPR 
dataset 
Food Prices X Diverse 
Excluded Areas (Grid) 
89,801 .0088 .0385 0 .41005 
No. Excluded Groups 89,801 1.5389 1.6644 0 5 EPR dataset above 
National Population(log) 89,801 16.5049 1.1435 13.668 18.834 World Bank 
Regime Type (Polity2) 89,801 1.2977 5.4604 -10 10 Polity Project 
National Elections 89,801 .2452 .4302 0 1 Elections and 
Democracy in Africa 




The fourth set of robustness checks ± model choice (see Table 5): 
In table 5 below, I explore the impact that model choice has on my results. I rerun all the 
analyses using country random-effects and less restrictive logistic regression with country 
corrected standards errors. Models 13-20 provide largely identical findings. In regards to the 
baseline models (13 and 17), ethnic exclusion has no effect on nonviolent action across both 
model types and remains far from statistical significance. Areas that are resided by a politically 
excluded ethnic group and that are diverse have  a negative relationship on the likelihood of 
nonviolent action when using a country random-effects model (model 13). However, this result 
falls just outside of statistical significance when using a less restrictive rare-events logit model 
(model 17). However, the more basic logit model does not take into account unobserved 
country differences, which appear to be important. 
 When moving onto the general impact of food prices on the incidence of nonviolent 
protest, the results remain the same and actually strengthen across alternative models (models 
14 and 18). When increasing food prices by one standard deviation (moving food prices from 
a 5.2% to a 10.5% increase), the risk of nonviolent action rises by 13.3-15.9% (compared to 
12.7% when introducing country fixed-effects). 
 When exploring the mediating effect food prices have on ethnically excluded areas, the 
results also remain the same across model choice. In these excluded areas, a one-standard-
deviation increase in food prices represents an rise in prices from 14.7% to 19.1%. Using 
country random-effects, food prices increase the likelihood of nonviolent action in excluded 
areas by 14.7% (model 15). The rare-events logit model reports a 11.3% increased chance of 
protest in these areas (model 19). Ethnic exclusion otherwise has a negative effect on the 
incidence of nonviolent action. 
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 Lastly, when exploring the more challenge areas that are both inhabited by an politically 
excluded group and are ethnically diverse, only the country random-effects report identical 
findings. In model 16, the likelihood of nonviolent action is increased by 10.6% when prices 
move from 8.8-12.7% (one standard deviation). However, when running a rare-events logit 
model (model 20), this effect remains positive but becomes weaker and falls outside statistical 
significant. Overall, Table 5 largely supports my hypotheses, with a few results only falling 
outside statistical significance with less restrictive models. 
 
Seventh set of robustness checks ± other DVs and a discussion of removing geocoded 
estimated events (see Tables 8-10): 
I rerun all the analyses using three other types of DV. The first two extend my geocoded 
estimations to include the ten largest cities and cities outside the top 10 with a population of 
at least 300,000 (Full est) and to the 10 largest cities (Top10 est). The last DV removes all 
geocoded estimates (No est). Across all models, the explanatory variables become stronger 
and more statistically significant with the larger estimated DVs (Tables 8-10). When I 
remove non-geocoded estimates from the analysis, high prices retain a strong effect on the 
incidence of civil resistance. However, while the subnational explanatory variables (diversity 
and excluded areas) maintain a positive impact on nonviolent resistance, the effect falls 
outside conventional levels of statistical significance when excluding geo-coded estimates. 
Removing the estimates effectively removes very key incidents of nonviolent action across 
various different dimensions. Firstly, removing non-geocoded events actually removes 
protest locations that we can be more sure about. Nonviolent action almost always occurs in 
the capital and major urban centres (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Moreover, SCAD 
provides key information on some events where we can be even more certain about the 
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location of these events. For example, dock worker strikes in Algeria, and strikes in the 
.HQ\D¶VWHDSURGXFLQJDUHDVDQG=LPEDEZH¶VWREDFFRDUHDVSURYLGHDFOHDUHULQGLFDWLRQRI
where they strikes are occurring. In these instances GIS is used to process maps of production 
areas, the location of key port cities and of course major cities in order to locate where these 
events are highly likely to be occurring.  
Secondly, because there is little information on who participates in strikes, many strikes are 
listed as nationwide or unknown, and without geo-codes within the SCAD data. Effectively 
the majority of strikes within the SCAD data are removed when excluded non-geocoded 
events. Strikes are very difficult to organise and most often are not possible without 
intergroup support, meaning these are exactly the type of events that my theory is trying to 
capture. Assuming that most mass strikes occur in the top-5 cities (with a population of at 
least 100,000 people), is likely to be an understatement in the majority of cases. The fact that 
the results improve when introducing more estimated locations is highly encouraging. 
Thirdly, by removing geocoded estimated events also removes protests that we know 
occurred during the year. For example, Madagascar would be wrongly coded as having no 
events in 2002, when in fact there where nationwide demonstrations and a general strike 
which overthrew President Ratsiraka, but which is not geocoded in the data. Thirdly, by 
removing non-geocoded regional events removes ongoing regional struggles, such as the 
Berbers struggle for language rights in Algeria. Lastly, removing non-geocoded events 
removes the majority of protest events that occur in Benin which has a history of nationwide 
nonviolent action. In Benin, many SCAD events are described as general strikes and 
nationwide demonstrations, but are geo-coded as unknown locations, and therefore are 







Table 4. Robustness Checks I-III: Other Interactions with Ethno-Political Exclusion, Riot as an Outcome and Controlling for Other Economic Shocks 
  












Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.130*** 0.117** 0.091* 0.029 0.033 0.109** -0.041 -0.016 
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.043) (0.068) (0.059) (0.041) (0.067) (0.059) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) -0.021 0.020 0.124 0.051 0.096 -0.049 -0.222** -0.107 
 
(0.064) (0.067) (0.069) (0.091) (0.082) (0.064) (0.086) (0.076) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.081 -0.050 0.011 0.006 0.005 -0.079 -0.089 -0.090 
 
(0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) 





  (0.066)   
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas    0.087      0.143**  
    (0.070)      (0.048) 
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas     0.076     -0.150**  
     (0.052)     (0.054) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.416*** 0.431*** 0.628*** 0.639*** 0.646*** 0.482*** 0.526*** 0.542*** 
  (0.118) (0.118) (0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) 
Grid Population (log) 1.202*** 1.221*** 1.459*** 1.459*** 1.464*** 1.213*** 1.214*** 1.235*** 
  (0.074) (0.075) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) -0.010 0.007 -0.014 0.004 0.002 0.019 0.072 0.064 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -4.461*** -4.390*** -0.380* -0.378* -0.374* -4.465*** -4.468*** -4.408*** 
 
(0.322) (0.322) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.323) (0.322) (0.322) 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.081 0.074 -0.160* -0.161* -0.166* 0.080 0.080 0.069 
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Number of Excluded Groups 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.127 0.125 0.097 0.025 0.007 -0.049 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) 
National Population (log) 0.446*** 0.446*** -1.195* -1.333** -1.357** -0.568 -0.926 -0.907 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.499) (0.511) (0.509) (0.484) (0.500) (0.498) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.003 0.002 0.498*** 0.510*** 0.495*** -0.015 -0.002 -0.033 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
National Elections 0.079 0.043 0.107** 0.101** 0.103** 0.0974** 0.0873* 0.0919*   
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Number of Peace Years -0.029 -0.013 0.272*** 0.269*** 0.272*** -0.019 -0.026 -0.025 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Excluded X Elections -0.020        
  (0.034)        








GDP Growth (%)      -0.159*** -0.144*** -0.142**  
      (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
International Food Price Increases      -0.078 -0.082 -0.084*   
(% Real Increases)      (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Deviations in Average Rainfall      0.131*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 
(GPCP mm)      (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.524 0.525 0.234 0.233 0.234 0.527 0.527 0.528 
Observations 86,203 86,203 89571 89571 89571 86203 86203 86203 







Table 5. Robustness Checks IV: Alternative Models - Random Effects and Rare-Events Logistic Regression 
  
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
  w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE Relogit Relogit Relogit Relogit 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices  0.133*** 0.019 0.035  0.159*** 0.066  
   (0.037) (0.062) (0.056)  (0.045) (0.069) (0.061) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) 0.052 -0.045 -0.175* -0.080 0.034 -0.031 -0.130 -0.072 
 
(0.063) (0.062) (0.082) (0.073) (0.097) (0.071) (0.109) (0.097) 
Included Group Area (government area) 0.002 -0.046 -0.050 -0.044 0.082 0.063 0.064 0.055 
 
(0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.089) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.146*      
 
  (0.061)    (0.065)  
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas    0.106*    0.057 
 
   (0.045)    (0.057) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas -0.129*   -0.130* 0.018   -0.011 
 (0.052)   (0.053) (0.060)   (0.065) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.152 0.202* 0.214* 0.224* -0.034 0.074 0.068 0.072 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.092) (0.086) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086) 
Grid Population (log) 1.205*** 1.195*** 1.195*** 1.212*** 1.161*** 1.186*** 1.195*** 1.192*** 
  (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.169) (0.170) (0.173) (0.173) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) 0.005 0.028 0.065 0.058 -0.021 0.020 0.042 0.030 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.085) (0.077) (0.078) (0.075) 
Travel to Urban Centre (mins) -4.279*** -4.338*** -4.350*** -4.303*** -3.698*** -3.633*** -3.588*** -3.601*** 
 
(0.316) (0.317) (0.318) (0.318) (0.705) (0.701) (0.715) (0.713) 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.085   0.084 0.143+    
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.084) (0.079) (0.077) (0.078) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.033 0.044 0.047 0.009 0.124 0.129 0.154 0.142 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.104) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) 
National Population (log) -0.475*** -0.459*** -0.475*** -0.477*** -0.492*** -0.497*** -0.508*** -0.501*** 
  (0.121) (0.117) (0.120) (0.122) (0.092) (0.091) (0.089) (0.089) 
Regime Type (Polity2) -0.072 -0.077 -0.080 -0.095 -0.048 -0.032 -0.028 -0.030 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.070) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086) (0.085) 
National Elections 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.116** 0.119*** 0.131*    
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) 
Number of Peace Years 0.006 -0.002 -0.009 -0.012 0.056 0.046 0.050 0.047 
  (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
Constant -8.173*** -8.189*** -8.208*** -8.217*** -7.622*** -7.611*** -7.593*** -7.597*** 
 0.226 0.225 0.228 0.230 0.388 0.383 0.385 0.385 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 . . . . 0.553 0.553 0.553 0.553 
Observations 89801 89801 89801 89801 89801 89801 89801 89801 







Table 6. Robustness Checks V: Time Trends: Time Period Dummies and Splines 
  
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
  
Time Trends Time Trends Time Trends Splines Splines Splines 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.095* -0.005 0.008 0.129*** -0.050 -0.024 
  (0.040) (0.065) (0.058) (0.037) (0.066) (0.058) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) -0.060 -0.173* -0.085 -0.017 -0.216* -0.097 
 
(0.064) (0.086) (0.075) (0.064) (0.086) (0.075) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.091 -0.096 -0.090 -0.075 -0.087 -0.095 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas  0.133*   0.225***  
 
 (0.067)   (0.065)  
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas   0.101*   0.167*** 
 
  (0.049)   (0.048) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas   -0.140**   -0.141** 
   (0.054)   (0.054) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.473*** 0.500*** 0.517*** 0.441*** 0.492*** 0.507*** 
  (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) 
Grid Population (log) 1.204*** 1.204*** 1.224*** 1.243*** 1.245*** 1.264*** 
  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) 0.025 0.058 0.058 -0.030 0.029 0.019 
  (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -4.455*** -4.457*** -4.396*** -4.537*** -4.539*** -4.487*** 
 
(0.323) (0.322) (0.322) (0.325) (0.325) (0.325) 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.078 0.078 0.069 0.065 0.065 0.054 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
National Population (log) -4.832*** -4.549*** -4.489*** -0.977* -1.358** -1.346** 
  (0.984) (0.992) (0.994) (0.444) (0.460) (0.458) 
National Elections 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.109** 0.114** 
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Years 1990-94 (Dummy) -1.327*** -1.152*** -1.131***    
 (0.302) (0.314) (0.314)    
Years 1995-99 (Dummy) -0.728*** -0.611** -0.592**    
 (0.209) (0.217) (0.217)    
Years 2000-04 (Dummy) -0.311* -0.259 -0.254    
 (0.134) (0.137) (0.137)    
Years Since Last Protest Event    -0.802*** -0.811*** -0.807*** 
    (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.526 0.526 0.527 0.533 0.534 0.534 
Observations 86,203 86,203 86,203 86,203 86,203 86,203 







Table 7. Robustness Checks VI: Country-Year and Grid-Year Fixed Effects. 
  
Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 
  
Country-Year Fe Country-Year Fe Country-Year Fe Grid-Year Fe Grid-Year Fe Grid-Year Fe 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.113 0.027 0.049 0.126* 0.024 0.064 
  (0.063) (0.097) (0.077) (0.059) (0.086) (0.077) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) -0.070 -0.169 -0.080 -0.221 -0.398* -0.312 
 
(0.082) (0.095) (0.086) (0.146) (0.183) (0.173) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.098 -0.103 -0.090 -0.083 -0.122 -0.121 
 
(0.084) (0.082) (0.087) (0.149) (0.152) (0.161) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas  0.119   0.172  
 
 (0.073)   (0.105)  
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas   0.075   0.105 
 
  (0.046)   (0.087) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas   -0.132   -0.261 
   (0.091)   (0.376) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.468* 0.491* 0.504* -1.245*** -1.087** -1.120** 
  (0.223) (0.228) (0.230) (0.376) (0.388) (0.387) 
Grid Population (log) 1.237*** 1.238*** 1.256*** 3.808* 3.602* 3.606* 
  (0.194) (0.194) (0.196) (1.506) (1.513) (1.516) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) 0.032 0.061 0.061 0.524*** 0.567*** 0.546*** 
  (0.096) (0.093) (0.089) (0.128) (0.131) (0.129) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -4.515*** -4.515*** -4.451*** . . . 
 
(0.932) (0.930) (0.931) . . . 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.073 0.074 0.065 0.669 0.709 0.696 
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.621) (0.624) (0.622) 
Number of Excluded Groups 0.083 0.065 0.023 -0.300 -0.315 -0.321* 
  (0.159) (0.155) (0.149) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) 
National Population (log) -5.271** -4.734* -4.731* -0.264 -0.452 -0.353 
  (1.837) (1.913) (1.879) (1.117) (1.124) (1.120) 
National Elections 0.044 0.053 0.033 0.157 0.176 0.162 
  (0.152) (0.157) (0.157) (0.115) (0.117) (0.116) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.575 0.575 0.576 0.275 0.276 0.276 









Table 8. Robustness Checks VII: Different Geocoded Estimates of the Dependent Variable (Nonviolent Action) with Fixed Effects.   
  Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 
  All est. DV All est. DV All est. DV Top10 City Top10 City Top10 City No est. DV No est. DV No est. DV 
 w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE w/FE 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.151*** -0.042 0.022 0.170*** -0.036 -0.001 0.065 -0.060 -0.006 
  (0.031) (0.054) (0.047) (0.036) (0.066) (0.058) (0.056) (0.099) (0.087) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) 0.093 -0.116 0.026 0.082 -0.134 -0.017 -0.036 -0.183 -0.009 
 
(0.051) (0.069) (0.060) (0.060) (0.082) (0.072) (0.103) (0.140) (0.133) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.081 -0.0955* -0.101* -0.084 -0.095 -0.113 0.085 0.075 0.115 
 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.100) (0.100) (0.106) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.243***                  0.250***                  0.155   
 
  (0.054)                  (0.064)                  (0.098)   
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas     0.144***     0.183***     0.067 
 
    (0.039)     (0.047)     (0.074) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas     -0.122**      -0.106*       -0.202* 
     (0.045)     (0.054)     (0.092) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.516*** 0.570*** 0.566*** 0.479*** 0.523*** 0.532*** 0.801*** 0.844*** 0.851*** 
  (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.184) (0.186) (0.188) 
Grid Population (log) 1.849*** 1.851*** 1.861*** 1.296*** 1.292*** 1.305*** 1.663*** 1.658*** 1.669*** 
  (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) -0.034 0.027 0.005 0.013 0.076 0.058 0.047 0.092 0.072 
  (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.092) (0.097) (0.095) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -6.565*** -6.542*** -6.502*** -4.619*** -4.612*** -4.583*** -4.836*** -4.807*** -4.755*** 
 
(0.299) (0.299) (0.301) (0.313) (0.313) (0.314) (0.554) (0.553) (0.550) 
Distance to Capital (km) -0.056 -0.056 -0.066 -0.040 -0.041 -0.049 -0.184* -0.183* -0.203*   
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.043 0.020 -0.026 -0.009 -0.035 -0.084 0.127 0.105 0.056 
  (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.131) (0.132) (0.135) 
National Population (log) -0.778* -1.194** -1.112**  - -1.292** -1.262**  -1.306* -1.536* -1.443*   
  (0.356) (0.369) (0.367) (0.431) (0.449) (0.446) (0.617) (0.636) (0.639) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.088 0.106 0.070 -0.027 -0.007 -0.041 0.018 0.032 0.008 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) 
National Elections 0.070* 0.058* 0.066*   0.140*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.127* 0.117* 0.122*   
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Number of Peace Years -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 -0.023 -0.022 0.073 0.060 0.067 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.375 0.377 0.377 0.528 0.529 0.529 0.410 0.411 0.411 
Observations 86203 86203 86203 86203 86203 86203 85973  85973  85973  







Table 9. Robustness Checks VII (cont): Different Geocoded Estimates of the Dependent Variable (Nonviolent Action) with Random Effects.   
  Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 Model 46 Model 47 Model 48 Model 49 Model 50 
  All est. DV All est. DV All est. DV Top10 City Top10 City Top10 City No est. DV No est. DV No est. DV 
 w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE w/RE 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.139*** 0.0281 0.0346 0.136*** 0.0376 0.0444 0.077 -0.002 0.042 
  (0.037) (0.063) (0.056) (0.037) (0.063) (0.056) (0.056) (0.092) (0.082) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) 0.004 -0.116 -0.0406 0.0136 -0.0925 -0.0284 -0.115 -0.211 -0.061 
 
(0.060) (0.080) (0.071) (0.060) (0.080) (0.071) (0.101) (0.134) (0.129) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.046 -0.049 -0.051 -0.049 -0.052 -0.055 0.121 0.121 0.166 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.092) (0.092) (0.099) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.139*                  0.123*                  0.100   
 
  (0.062)                  (0.061)                  (0.091)   
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas     0.112*     0.099*     0.028 
 
    (0.045)     (0.045)     (0.069) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas     -0.0984     -0.0792     -0.171 
     (0.053)     (0.052)     (0.089) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.220* 0.229** 0.238**  0.231** 0.239** 0.247**  0.338* 0.347* 0.357*   
  (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.138) (0.139) (0.140) 
Grid Population (log) 1.136*** 1.136*** 1.148*** 1.154*** 1.154*** 1.163*** 1.651*** 1.648*** 1.660*** 
  (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) 0.028 0.061 0.054   0.029 0.059 0.051  0.119  0.131 
  (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.084) (0.088) (0.086) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -4.256*** -4.267*** -4.234*** -4.194*** -4.204*** -4.180*** -4.642*** -4.633*** -4.593*** 
 
(0.310) (0.310) (0.310) (0.307) (0.308) (0.308) (0.538) (0.538) (0.536) 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.012 0.012 0.006    0.019 0.019 0.014  -0.171* -0.170* -0.187*   
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.033 0.036 0.002   0.016 0.017 -0.011  0.057 0.055 0.015 
  (0.080) (0.081) (0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (0.082) (0.114) (0.114) (0.117) 
National Population (log) -0.397*** -0.413*** -0.413*** -0.403*** -0.416*** -0.415*** -0.708*** -0.716*** -0.724*** 
  (0.119) (0.121) (0.124) (0.118) (0.120) (0.122) (0.162) (0.163) (0.166) 
Regime Type (Polity2) -0.085 -0.089 -0.106    -0.086 -0.088 -0.102    -0.089 -0.087 -0.094 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) 
National Elections 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.135* 0.129* 0.133*   
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Number of Peace Years 0.001 -0.005 -0.007   -0.003 -0.009 -0.011    0.097 0.088 0.091 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) 
Constant -8.132*** -8.150*** -8.161*** -8.101*** -8.116*** -8.125*** -9.957*** -9.956*** -9.966*** 
 (0.224) (0.226) (0.228) (0.222) (0.224) (0.226) (0.368) (0.369) (0.369) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 10. Robustness Checks VII (cont): Different Geocoded Estimates of the DV (Nonviolent Action) using Rare-Events Logit Clustered on Country Errors. 
  
Model 51 Model 52 Model 53 Model 54 Model 55 Model 56 Model 57 Model 58 Model 59 
  All est. DV All est. DV All est. DV Top10 City Top10 City Top10 City No est. DV No est. DV No est. DV 
 (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) (Re-Logit) 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.187*** 0.069 0.113 0.183*** 0.077 0.122* 0.181** 0.076 0.129 
  (0.050) (0.069) (0.062) (0.049) (0.068) (0.060) (0.057) (0.097) (0.078) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) -0.006 -0.124 -0.087 0.003 -0.102 -0.074 -0.180 -0.312* -0.287 
 
(0.076) (0.103) (0.097) (0.079) (0.108) (0.101) (0.123) (0.154) (0.154) 
Included Group Area (government area) 0.052 0.053 0.017 0.053 0.055 0.016 0.168 0.176 0.124 
 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.093) (0.085) (0.085) (0.092) (0.112) (0.114) (0.120) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.140*                  0.125*                  0.137   
 
  (0.065)                  (0.060)                  (0.076)   
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas     0.072     0.059     0.056 
 
    (0.055)     (0.050)     (0.056) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas     0.055     0.066     0.095 
     (0.069)     (0.066)     (0.123) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.138 0.132 0.127 0.146 0.139 0.133 0.120 0.113 0.107 
  (0.092) (0.094) (0.090) (0.092) (0.094) (0.088) (0.141) (0.145) (0.132) 
Grid Population (log) 1.088*** 1.101*** 1.096*** 1.111*** 1.123*** 1.119*** 1.517*** 1.523*** 1.522*** 
  (0.149) (0.153) (0.150) (0.154) (0.158) (0.155) (0.247) (0.247) (0.246) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) 0.043 0.067 0.046 0.048 0.070 0.048 0.135 0.167 0.146 
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.077) (0.078) (0.074) (0.113) (0.117) (0.113) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -3.621*** -3.566*** -3.608*** -3.562*** -3.512*** -3.558*** -3.853*** -3.776*** -3.834*** 
 
(0.660) (0.675) (0.673) (0.668) (0.683) (0.679) (1.140) (1.140) (1.140) 
Distance to Capital (km) 0.084 0.083 0.084 0.097 0.096 0.098 -0.032 -0.034 -0.035 
  (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.184) (0.181) (0.176) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.134 0.166 0.165 0.105 0.132 0.134 0.070 0.096 0.105 
  (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) (0.126) (0.121) (0.114) 
National Population (log) -0.403*** -0.416*** -0.404*** -0.424*** -0.436*** -0.425*** -0.736*** -0.749*** -0.732*** 
  (0.092) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.087) (0.088) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.027 0.031 0.018 0.025 0.029 0.015 0.003 0.009 -0.006 
  (0.099) (0.097) (0.091) (0.098) (0.097) (0.090) (0.117) (0.115) (0.113) 
National Elections 0.132* 0.125 0.131 0.120 0.114 0.119 0.125* 0.119* 0.126*   
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.058) (0.057) (0.060) 
Number of Peace Years 0.032 0.036 0.039 0.028 0.032 0.036 0.042 0.045 0.053 
  (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.120) (0.122) (0.124) 
Constant -7.505*** -7.486*** -7.506*** -7.484*** -7.466*** -7.490*** -8.986*** -8.952*** -8.985*** 
 (0.373) (0.374) (0.382) (0.358) (0.360) (0.368) (0.516) (0.512) (0.517) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 















Table 11. Robustness Checks VIII: Urban Nonviolent Action (as a DV), and Consumer/Producer Areas  
  Model 60 Model 61 Model 62 Model 63 Model 64 Model 65 







Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.148*** -0.052 0.016 0.127*** -0.034 -0.013 
  (0.031) (0.055) (0.048) (0.037) (0.065) (0.058) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) 0.094 -0.123 0.023 -0.025 -0.203* -0.089 
 
(0.052) (0.070) (0.061) (0.064) (0.086) (0.075) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.080 -0.0953* -0.102* -0.079 -0.090 -0.092 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.253***                  0.201**                
 
  (0.055)                  (0.065)                
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas     0.149***     0.150**  
 
    (0.040)     (0.048) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas     -0.121**      -0.151**  
     (0.046)     (0.054) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.494*** 0.551*** 0.546*** 0.411*** 0.458*** 0.475*** 
  (0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) 
Grid Population (log) 1.876*** 1.878*** 1.888*** 1.204*** 1.205*** 1.225*** 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) -0.047 0.016 -0.007 -0.009 0.044 0.037 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -7.019*** -6.997*** -6.958*** -4.457*** -4.458*** -4.401*** 
 
(0.313) (0.313) (0.315) (0.322) (0.322) (0.322) 
Distance to Capital (km) -0.058 -0.058 -0.068 0.081 0.081 0.070 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) 
No. Excluded Groups 0.047 0.024 -0.022 0.082 0.061 0.005 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) 
National Population (log) -0.754* -1.183** -1.094**  -1.011* -1.372** -1.371**  
  (0.363) (0.376) (0.373) (0.440) (0.457) (0.455) 
Regime Type (Polity2) 0.075 0.093 0.056 0.003 0.020 -0.011 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) 
National Elections 0.0689* 0.056 0.0646*   0.118*** 0.107** 0.112**  
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Number of Peace Years -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.029 -0.036 -0.034 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Majority Agricultural Areas    -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 
(Producer Areas)    (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.386 0.387 0.387 0.524 0.525 0.526 
Observations 86203 86203 86203 86203 86203 86203 







Table 12. Robustness Checks IX-X: Lagged Independent Variables, Repression and Relative Ethnic Group Wealth with Fixed Effects. 
  
Model 66 Model 67 Model 68 Model 69 Model 70 Model 71 Model 72 Model 73 Model 74 
  
Lagged IV Lagged IV Lagged IV Repression Repression Repression Grp Wealth Grp Wealth Grp Wealth 
Standardised Increase in Food Prices 0.0891* -0.052 -0.019 0.109** -0.064 -0.029 0.0833* -0.052 -0.015 
  (0.040) (0.073) (0.064) (0.041) (0.073) (0.065) (0.040) (0.072) (0.063) 
Excluded Group Area (opposition area) 0.067 -0.078 0.041 0.065 -0.118 0.016 0.103 -0.040 0.061 
 
(0.068) (0.091) (0.080) (0.069) (0.093) (0.081) (0.073) (0.096) (0.083) 
Included Group Area (government area) -0.039 -0.049 -0.036 -0.033 -0.044 -0.037 0.027 0.013 0.006 
 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069) (0.072) 
Food Price Increases X Excluded Areas   0.168*                  0.213**                  0.163*   
 
  (0.071)                  (0.073)                  (0.071)   
Food Prices X Diverse Excluded Areas     0.108*       0.145**      0.100* 
 
    (0.052)     (0.054)     (0.051) 
Ethnically Diverse Areas     -0.166**      -0.178**      -0.180**  
     (0.059)     (0.059)     (0.062) 
Grid Wealth (GCP) (log) 0.320* 0.352** 0.368**  0.311* 0.349** 0.365**  0.315* 0.343* 0.329*   
  (0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) 
Grid Population (log) 1.265*** 1.267*** 1.290*** 1.263*** 1.266*** 1.289*** 1.265*** 1.267*** 1.285*** 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) 
Size of Excluded Group (%) -0.179* -0.133 -0.133 -0.162* -0.099 -0.100 -0.158* -0.114 -0.112 
  (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.076) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) 
Travel to Urban Centre  (mins) -4.132*** -4.142*** -4.065*** -4.127*** -4.138*** -4.062*** -4.183*** -4.193*** -4.123*** 
 
(0.338) (0.338) (0.337) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.337) 
Distance to Capital (km)    0.098 0.096 0.084 0.139* 0.137* 0.122*   
  (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Number of Excluded Groups 0.246* 0.223*  0.267** 0.243* 0.176 0.240* 0.219* 0.160 
  (0.100) (0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) (0.100) (0.101) (0.103) 
National Population (log) -1.147* -1.462** -1.404**  -1.079* -1.465** -1.398**  -1.166* -1.463** -1.359*   
  (0.516) (0.533) (0.529) (0.518) (0.536) (0.531) (0.519) (0.535) (0.531) 
National Elections -0.022 -0.027 -0.022 -0.023 -0.030 -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 -0.022 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Repression (CIRI Index)    0.141* 0.183** 0.189**     
     (0.063) (0.065) (0.065)    
Relatively Richer Group       -0.006 0.000 0.050 
(Cederman et al, 2011)       (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) 
Relatively Poorer Groups       -0.222** -0.216** -0.184* 
(Cederman et al, 2011)       (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) 
Temporal and Spatial Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 
Observations 73706 73706 73706 73706 73706 73706 73706 73706 73706 
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Why do some civil wars terminate within a few days, while others continue for decades? We 
extend debates on the relationship between ethnic violence and conflict duration to incorporate 
pro-government militia. We argue that coethnic militia (i.e. those recruited from the same 
ethnic group as the ruling elite) address internal security threats when states require a cheap 
and loyal armed force, and often increase the duration of the conflict by strengthening the 
VWDWH¶V FDSDFLW\ WR UHVLVW FRQFHVVLRQV DQG DGRSting hard-line positions that undermine 
negotiations. We test these arguments on a global sample of cases from 1981-2007, using Cox 
SURSRUWLRQDOKD]DUGPRGHOV:HVXSSOHPHQWWKHVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLVZLWKD³PRGHOWHVWLQJ´FDVH
analysis of ethnic militias in the Sudanese civil wars. The results provide strong support for our 
claims that coethnic militia increase the duration of civil war, but in contrast to our 





Why do some civil wars terminate within a few days, while others continue for decades? How 
does the ethnic make-up of warring parties impact conflict duration?  The salience of ethnicity 
within a dispute is one of the prominent explanations for this variation. Conflicts fought over 
ethnic motivations often last longer than ideological or opportunistic disputes. While the 
mechanisms driving this finding remain contested, most accounts associate intractable ethnic 
violence with ethnic-based grievances deriving from group inequalities, the greater capacity of 
ethnic groups to overcome problems of collective action, and the greater intensity in which 
ethnic violence can politicise entire communities. At the same time, an opposing body of work 
questions the distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, suggesting that the conflict-
enhancing effect of ethnic motivations is exaggerated, and that private economic interests offer 
a better lens through which to understand what seem on the surface to be ethnic disputes. As 
such, it remains unclear if and through which mechanisms ethnic differences influence the 
duration of civil war.  
We develop existing theoretical accounts by incorporating irregular state forces. 
Existing studies tend to define ethnic conflict monadically (i.e. conflict as a whole) or 
dyadically (i.e. relationship between the state and a rebel organisation). The former approach 
offers a useful indication as to how conflicts with an ethnic dimension differ from those 
without, yet are poorly suited to distinguish between the different mechanisms that might 
produce this effect. Dyadic approaches offer greater potential to uncover support for a specific 
relationship, yet to date, the focus has been solely on the ethnic characteristics and grievances 
of ethno-politically excluded insurgents vis-à-vis to a government dominated by rival ethnic 
groups  (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013;  Wucherpfennig et al., 2012).66 This 
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approach, whilst valuable, essentially assumes the state to be a unitary actor (see Sundberg, 
Eck and Kreutz, 2012).  
This is problematic in light of the burgeoning collection of work now demonstrating 
the independent effect of irregular state forces. For pro-government militias²that is organised 
armed forces aligned with the incumbent government but not identified as being part of the 
³RIILFLDO´VWDWHDUPHGIRUFHV&DUH\0LWFKHOODQG/RZH² influence a range of 
conflict conditions, including: regime survival; coups d¶!?etat; human rights violations; one-
sided violence; civil-war intensity; and insurgent fragmentation (e.g., Carey, Colaresi and 
Mitchell, 2016; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; 
Powell, 2012; Roessler, 2011; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). Yet to 
date, existing studies of grievances and ethnic conflict have overlooked the possible role of 
militias, meaning it remains unclear the extent to which PGMs influence the duration of civil 
FRQIOLFWDQGPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\LIWKLVHIIHFWLVFRQGLWLRQHGRQWKHH[LVWHQFHRID3*0¶VHWKQLF
ties. As such, we make two primary contributions, (i) extending debates on the relationship 
between ethnic violence and conflict duration to incorporate PGMs, and (ii) developing studies 
of PGMs to assess their effect on conflict duration.  
We define ethnic pro-government militia (EPGMs) as an armed force that is clearly 
pro-government, not identified as a part of the regular security force, recruited specifically 
along ethnic lines to undertake tasks in support an ethnic group (or a coalition of groups). 
EPGMs can be either coethnic (i.e. composed of the same ethnic group as the ruling elite) or 
defectors (i.e. composed of groups that are excluded from power). We argue that coethnic 
EPGMs address internal security threats when states require a cheap and loyal armed force, 
DQGRIWHQLQFUHDVHWKHGXUDWLRQRIWKHFRQIOLFWE\VWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRUHVLVW
concessions, and by adopting hard-line positions that undermine the bargaining process. In 
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contrast, we argue that defector groups fragment the insurgency, complicating the bargaining 
process and increasing the duration of conflict.  
We test these arguments on a global sample of cases from 1981-2007, using Cox 
SURSRUWLRQDOKD]DUGPRGHOV:HVXSSOHPHQWWKHVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLVZLWKD³PRGHOWHVWLQJ´FDVH
analysis of coethnic militias in the Sudanese civil war (1983-2005). The results provide strong 
support for our claims that coethnic militia increase the duration of civil war, but offer little 
evidence of the influence of defector PGMs.  
 
4.2. The Drivers of Conflict Duration  
The duration of civil conflict is determined by conditions that increase (or decrease) the 
EHOOLJHUHQWV¶SURSHQVLW\WRWHUPLQDWHWKHLUGLVSXWH(DFKFRQIOLFWLQYROYHVVHTXHQWLDOURXQGVRI
bargaining and fighting (see, Wucherpfennig et al, 2012). Within each round, there exists three 
possible outcomes, (1) the belligerents reach a mutually acceptable agreement that terminates 
the fighting, (2) one side capitulates and accepts defeat, or (3) the fighting continues. The total 
defeat of an opponent is rare during civil war. Even when one side militarily dominants their 
opponent, an agreement of some kind is normally required to end a war. Thus, both political 
(i.e. 1) and military (i.e. 2) termination require a settlement between the parties, DQGWKHSDUW\¶V
propensity to come to such a deal shapes the duration of the dispute.  
5HVHDUFKKDVUHYHDOHGDQXPEHURINH\FRQGLWLRQVWKDWVKDSHEHOOLJHUHQWV¶SURSHQVLW\
to terminate violence. One major school of thought posits that private economic interests 
provide incentives to warring factions to continue fighting, which in turn, prolongs conflict. 
The presence of lootable resources, and valuable commodities, such as oil, drugs, precious 
stones, timber, etc. and the (potential) economic gain garnered from them limits the incentives 
to lay down arms or engage in negotiations (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004; Fearon 
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2004). Similarly, conditions that favour insurgency are associated with longer periods of 
conflict including state weakness, inaccessible terrain, forest cover, and foreign patrons. Each 
provides greater opportunity for rebels to sustain the fighting, lowering the incentives to settle 
and prolonging war (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009; Cunningham, 2010).  
The salience of ethnicity within a dispute is another prominent explanation for variation 
in conflict duration. Conflicts fought over ethnic motivations often last longer than ideological 
or opportunistic disputes. Yet the mechanisms through which ethnic elements influence 
conflict duration remain contested (Lyall 2010; Kalyvas 2008; Seymour 2014; Warren and 
Troy, 2015). Most accounts associate intractable ethnic violence with the greater capacity of 
ethnic groups to overcome problems of collective action, and the greater intensity in which 
ethnic violence can polarise and politicise entire communities. Ethnic-based grievances often 
hold greater salience, and offer a mobilisation advantage for rebels recruiting from ethnic 
groups that are excluded from political power (Weinstein, 2007; Wucherpfennig, et al, 2012; 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). The ascriptive nature of ethnicity also means that 
disputes can quickly escalate, further undermining a bargaining process (e.g. Eck 2009; 
Kaufmann 1996). However, existing accounts have focused solely on the ethnic characteristics 
of the rebels, or the ruling regime, and overlooked the influence that ethnically motivated pro-
government militia might produce within the context of unequal ethnic hierarchies. 
Existing studies have addressed how actor fragmentation complicates the resolution 
process (Cunningham, 2006; Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). Rebel fragmentation creates 
additional veto players and shifting alliances, which often undermine bargaining attempts.67 
Fragmentation also encourages outbidding and infighting between factions, which in turn, can 
reduce the likelihood of termination (Bloom, 2004).  However, it is less clear how the number 
                                                          
67 There is some contrary evidence that fragmentation can facilitate settlements (Findley and Rudloff, 2012; 
Driscoll, 2012).   
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of belligerents on the government side influence this process (Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 
2015). For counter-insurgent struggles at least, the evidence suggests that the use of pro-
government militias can increase the duration of a dispute (Aliyev 2017, 2018a, 2018b; Carey, 
Mitchell and Scharpf, 2018). It is not yet clear if this extends to other forms of civil violence, 
or if the relationship is dependent on the type of militia force (beyond the link to the 
government).   
 
4.3. Pro-Government Militias  
PGMs are organised armed groups aligned with the incumbent government, but not identified 
DVEHLQJSDUWRIWKH³RIILFLDO´VWDWHDUPHGIRUFHV&DUH\0LWFKHOODQG/RZH3*0V
include a heterogeneous collection of non-state actors that often differ in their recruitment base, 
composition, activities, and targets. For example, death squads, warlords, and civilian defence 
forces differ in terms of their link with the state (e.g. semi-official or informal), theatre of 
operations (e.g. local or national), and whether they operate within or outside of armed conflict 
(see, Carey and Mitchell, 2017; Böhmelt and Clayton 2017).  
Previous research demonstrates that PGMs are likely to emerge in weak states facing 
acute security threats, including, but not limited to, insurgency and civil war (Böhmelt and 
Clayton 2017; Carey and Mitchell, 2017; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015). Under such 
conditions PGMs can emerge from civil society as local security providers in response to 
insurgent violence (Barter 2013; Aliyev 2016). However, governments also often mobilise or 
co-opt PGMs as an efficient force multiplier in pursuit of various short-term advantages.  For 
example, PGMs are cost-effective in comparison to conventional forces as they are cheaper 
and easier to recruit (Staniland 2015a; Eck 2015; Jentzsch et al, 2015; Carey, Colaresi and 
Mitchell, 2016). Some types of PGMs also enable the government to evade accountability and 
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plausibly deny involvement in human rights abuses (Kirschke, 2000; Carey, Colaresi and 
Mitchell, 2015; Stanton, 2015). Other forms of PGMs, such as civilian defence forces, can 
provide local knowledge that enables the government to better identify insurgents (Clayton and 
Thomson 2016; Kalyvas, 2006; Peic, 2014; Eck, 2015; Lyall, 2010; Staniland, 2012). This is 
particularly effective when the state incorporates defected members of the insurgency into a 
militia (Kalyvas, 2006; Staniland, 2012). Finally, parallel-military PGMs can counterbalance 
conventional forces and mitigate internal threats, such as coups (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; 
Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2016). 
However, recent research has shown that these short-term advantages for the state can 
have long-term negative consequences, arguing that the presence of PGMs (generally)  can 
exacerbate and prolong conflict.  The mobilisation or co-option of militias requires the state to 
concede their monopoly over the legitimate use of force in their territory (see also Mann, 1988; 
Weber, 2013; Carey and Mitchell, 2016). This often leads to increased violence against 
civilians, both by PGMs and insurgents responding to them (Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014; 
Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Clayton and Thomson, 2016; Kirschke 2000; Stanton, 
2015). However, once the genie is out the bottle, there is no guarantee that a PGM will remain 
loyal. States must often choose between maintaining a force monopoly that can be crucial for 
stability, economic development and the establishment of the rule of law, and a reduction in 
control over violent actors in return for the benefits associated with PGMs (Böhmelt and 
Clayton 2017).  
Recent research has focused on various mechanisms through which the presence of 
PGMs can prolong violent conflict.  Some scholars have examined how multiple armed actors 
DQG WKH QXPEHU RI ³YHWR SOD\HUV´ RIWHQ VHUYHV WR UHGXFH WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI D QHJRWLDWHG




actors in civil conflict, their presence can complicate bargaining attempts by increasing the 
QXPEHURI³YHWRSOD\HUV´DQGWKHQXPEHURIGHPDQGVWKDWQHHGDGGUHVVLQJWRZDUGVIRUJLQJ
peace (Aliyev 2017, 2018b).  According to a separate line of reasoning, PGM interactions with 
UHEHOV PD\ VHUYH WR SURORQJ YLROHQFH DQG FRQIOLFW 3KLOOLSV  DUJXHV WKDW ³LQWHUILHOG´
rivDOULHV ZKHUH JURXSV¶ JRDOV GLIIHU JUHDWO\ KHOS WR SURGXFH F\FOHV RI FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ
competing groups that are difficult to break. PGMs are usually anti-insurgent in nature and they 
often continue to target rebels even during state-rebel peace talks, increasing the chances of 
spoiler activity (Aliyev 2018b; Ferguson 2017).   
Finally, peace often threatens the existence of PGMs by undermining their relationship 
with their state benefactors and endangering their access to lucrative sources of income. During 
conflict, PGMs materially benefit from state links and, in many cases, from illicit commercial 
activity. Ending a conflict, whether through victory, defeat, or negotiation, poses an existential 
WKUHDWWR3*0VDQGWKHLUPHPEHUV¶DFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHVWKHUHIore increasing the likelihood that 
these actors will be opposed to ending the conflict. Consequently, Aliyev (2017) finds that 
conflicts in which PGMs are present tend to last around 3 times as long as conflicts in which 
PGMs are not present. Aliyev (2018a) also finds that the presence of a PGM can prolong civil 
conflicts by making a negotiated settlement less likely and by reducing the possibility of one 
side winning, re-producing low-intensity conflict. 
 
4.4. Ethnic Pro-Government Militias 
The extent to which the ethnic make-up of militias determines their costs and benefits is largely 
missing from existent research.  Thus, while we know that ethnic dimensions can significantly 
colour the nature of organised violence, and equally, that PGMs have a number of impacts on 
the character of civil conflict and its duration, it is not yet clear the extent to which ethnically 
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motivated militias differ in their influence on conflict. During times of state weakness and 
insecurity, ethnicity often provides a convenient way of organizing armed recruitment, which 
LVRIWHQPRUHVDOLHQWDQGµVWLFN\¶WKDQRWKHUUHFUXLWPHQWFDWHJRULHVHJLGHRORJ\(FN
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013; Jentzsch, 2014). Due to its salience, recruitment along 
ethnic identity lowers coordination costs and makes potential recruits more identifiable 
(Lichback, 1995; Eck, 2009). 
Ethnicity can be associated with PGMs in a number of ways. However, we consider a 
militia group to be an ethnic pro-government militia (EPGM) when a militia is clearly pro-
government, not identified as a part of the regular security force, and are recruited specifically 
along ethnic lines, in order to uphold ethnic goals. EPGMs can be composed of individuals 
from a single ethnic group, or occasionally, a coalition of ethnic groups. In this context, shared 
ethnic identity (whether real or imagined) forms the basis for militia recruitment, and thus 
inclusion or exclusion within the militia. This is a common recruitment practice, for example 
the Uzbek Junbesh-e-Milli in Afghanistan, which recruit exclusively from the Uzbek 
community. Militia might also include non-native groups recruited from transnational ethnic 
kin. For example, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda operates in the DRC alongside their 
Congolese Hutu kin. In addition, EPGMs are formed (or co-opted) to uphold ethnic goals, such 
as the maintenance of a favourable political or economic distribution, or the protection of a 
specific part of the civilian population.  
Notably, we also distingXLVK(3*0VIURP³HWKQLFPLOLWLDV´PRUHJHQHUDOO\$ZLGHU
OLWHUDWXUHH[LVWVRQ³HWKQLFPLOLWLDV´UHIHUULQJWRVXE-state warring factions that are organised 
along ethnic lines or mobilised according to tribal affiliations that engage in violent activities, 
but which are not necessarily pro-state (e.g. Raleigh 2016; Alden, Thakur and Arnold 2011). 
In fact, such actors are commonly either anti-state or have no affiliations with the state at all 
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HJ5DOHLJK7KHUHIRUH ³HWKQLFPLOLWLDV´ UHIHUV WR DEURader category, distinct from 
EPGMs, in that the latter are distinctly pro-government.  
Rather than seeing ethnic linkages as purely demographic, we place ethnic goals and 
civil war within the context of ethno-exclusive politics and contestation between ethnic groups 
that are included and excluded from political power (Wucherpfennig et al, 2012; Cederman, 
Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013). The government is not only active in the conflict but can also 
be ethnically biased. Ethnic incumbents often openly deploy ethno-exclusive policies as a 
strategy to consolidate the power and security of their own ethnic group and distribute state 
resources (i.e. patronage) to coethnics in exchange for political support (Posner, 2005; Roessler, 
2011; Wimmer, 2013).68  
Ethno-political power imbalances provide incentives for governments to maintain 
ethnically exclusionary power, and often co-opt EPGMs as part of a strategy to achieve this 
goal. Incumbent incentives to co-opt or recruit EPGMs differ depending on whether they 
recruit from those groups that are excluded from the governing regime (defectors) or recruit an 
EPGM from their own ethnic constituency (coethnics). In turn, these types of EPGMs will also 
have different incentives to fight on behalf of the government. Because EPGMs may have 
YDU\LQJ UHODWLRQVKLSV WR WKH VWDWH ZH IXUWKHU GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ ³GHIHFWRU 3*0V´ DQG
³FRHWKQLF3*0V´DQGODWHUH[SORUHWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHLPSDFWVRQFRQIOLFWGXUDWLRQ 
In a common counterinsurgent strategy, incumbents often mobilise or co-opt defected 
members of an insurgency to serve as informers and fighters against their previous insurgent 
brethren. In some occasions this occurs across ethnic divisions. Defector PGMs are composed 
of members of an ethnic group who are not included within the governing regime.  Ethnic 
GHIHFWRUV DUH RIWHQ ³H[SOLFLWO\ RSSRVHG WR WKH QDWLRQDO DVSLUDWLRQV RI WKH HWKQLF JURXS ZLWK
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1045). This includes the Kadyrovsky in Chechnya, ethnic Chechens used by Russian 
counterinsurgents, and former Tamil rebel groups that joined forces with the Sinhalese 
GRPLQDWHG JRYHUQPHQW VXFK DV WKH (HODP 3HRSOH¶V 'HPRFUDWLF 3DUW\ WR WDUJHW 7DPLO
separatists. Defector PGM have tactical incentives to switch sides in order to gain token 
patronage and power from the state or seek state support in order achieve predominance within 
their own ethnic consistency and gain security from rival factions.  
On the other hand, many EPGMs are composed of members that share the same 
ethnicity as the government (i.e. are coethnic). Ruling ethnic factions often seek the 
PRELOLVDWLRQRUFRRSHUDWLRQRIPRUHOR\DOµFRHWKQLF¶JURXSVWKDWKDYHDFRPPRQLQWHUHVWLQ
upholding the status quo. For example, various administrations in the Philippines have relied 
upon co-Christian PGMs to target Muslim separatists in Mindanao, and similarly with the Anti-
Terrorist Unit in Liberia where Charles Taylor specifically recruited from Gio and Mano 
members of his former NPFL rebel group to supress a collection of excluded ethnic opposition 
forces.  We expect defector and coethnic PGMs to impact civil conflict dynamics in different 
ways. 
 
4.5. Ethnic Pro-Government Militia and the Duration of Civil War 
 
Defector Pro-Government Militias 
Existing literature on counterinsurgency points to the strategic value of recruiting PGMs 
composed of ethnic defectors (i.e. members of [an] excluded ethnic group[s]), which enables 
incumbents to better undermine an insurgency by disrupting insurgents and their constituent 
communities, and improving the effectiveness and selectivity of state targeting (Lyall 2010; 
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Staniland 2012; Clayton and Thomson 2016; Galula 2006). Recruiting defector PGMs offers 
the state a set of tactical advantages. 
Defector PGMs offer unique local knowledge of who the insurgents are, possess 
relevant local language skills, have access to intra-ethnic informational networks, and cultural 
DGYDQWDJHV WKDW KHOS WR RYHUFRPH WKH ³LGHQWLILFDWLRQ SUREOHP´ 3HLF  Lyall 2010; 
Staniland 2012; Kalyvas 2008). This enables the state to weaken rebel forces and lowers the 
risk of collective ethnic targeting, which occurs when the government is unable to identify 
insurgents (Fjelde and Hultman, 2014). Collective ethnic targeting not only leads to more 
FLYLOLDQ GHDWKV GLUHFWO\ DW WKH KDQGV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW EXW DOVR LQFUHDVHV WKH UHEHO¶V
recruitment pool by creating collective grievances within the targeted population (Mason and 
Krane, 1989). Defector EPGMs therefore simultDQHRXVO\LQFUHDVHWKHVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRWDUJHW
insurgents and reduce violence that can lead to rebel recruitment.  
'HIHFWRU 3*0V DOVR KHOS WR ³OHJLWLPLVH´ WKH DFWLRQV RI WKH UHJLPH E\ FKDOOHQJLQJ
insurgent claims to be the sole representative of the excluded ethnic group (Lyall, 2010). This 
can be a top-down process, in which the state encourages leaders of an excluded group to 
realign with the regime against rebellious groups (e.g. Chechnya). On other occasions lower 
coordination costs can facilitate bottom-up mobilisation in which communities themselves 
mobilise defector PGMs in response to insecurity (e.g. Sunni Awakening in Iraq), which 
governments can then co-opt (Ahram, 2011; Driscoll, 2012; Jentzch, 2014). In either case, 
states gain an advantage by GLPLQLVKLQJWKHDSSHDORI³HWKQLF´LQVXUJHQWPRELOLVDWLRQEDVHGRQ
shared identity group grievances and undermine intra-ethnic cohesion.  
The existing literature points to two competing outcomes that might result from 
harnessing defector EPGMs. According to the conventional counterinsurgency wisdom, 
defectors might offer new opportunities for conflict termination. Identifying insurgents is often 
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the key impediment to counterinsurgency. The information-revealing role of defectors can 
improve the likelihood of military victory and increasing pressure on insurgents to seek out 
SROLWLFDO VROXWLRQV 7KLV LV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH FDVH ZKHUH WKHUH DUH ³PDVV GHIHFWLRQV´ DQG
significant numbers of insurgent members switch sides (see Lyall 2010; Clayton and Thomson 
2016).  
A fractionalised context also creates incentives for weaker rebel organisations to enter 
into agreement with the state (c.f. Nilsson 2010), which allows the government to deploy a 
µZLQ DZD\ SLHFHV¶ VWUDWHJ\ PDNLQJ VHSDUDWH SHDFH GHDOV ZLWK LQGLYLGXDO UHEHl factions 
(Zartman, 1995). This might increase the incentives for rebels to bargain in order to maintain 
representative legitimacy. The process also lowers commitment as it creates institutions for 
side-switching where rebel factions can join the government without necessarily disarming, 
slowly bringing the wider rebellion to a halt (Driscoll, 2012, Findley and Rudloff, 2012). For 
example, in the DRC the government gained momentum by gradually bargaining with different 
CNDP factions and eventually integrating them into the army.  
However, mass defectors are very rare, and while fragmentation might create 
opportunity for some groups to enter into agreement with the state, ethnic defection can extend 
conflicts by producing long-lasting low-intensity forms of violence within the defected ethnic 
group. Insurgents often undertake retaliatory acts against their own ethnic kin to dissuade 
GHIHFWLRQ WR SXQLVK ³EHWUD\DO´ DIWHUZDUGV DQG WR HQKDQFH WKHLU LPDJH DV WKH PDLQ
representatives of their ethnic group (Kalyvas, 2006: 107-9; Clayton and Thomson 2016; 
0DVRQDQG.UDQH7KLVFDQSURGXFHD³ORJLFRIUHWDOLDWLRQ´DQGLQWUD-ethnic violence 
which is difficult to overcome in the long-run.  For members from defected groups, ending the 
conflict means they will have to coexist with former (coethnic) enemies. Out of fear of 




opposition to the PKK. Subsequently, many members of the village guards worked against 
efforts to terminate the conflict in fear of continued reprisals and a post-conflict inferior social 
standing (Gurkan 2015).  
 In multi-ethnic conflict settings, similar logics can produce continued inter-ethnic 
tensions that sustain low-intensity conflict. For instance, in the Sudan the SPLM/A insurgent 
group was composed of various ethnic tribal factions. Khartoum managed to provoke and/or 
harness internal rifts in non-0XVOLP³$IULFDQ´LQVXUJHQWJURXSVDQGIRUPHGYDULRXVGHIHFWRU
PGMs, such as some of those in the umbrella South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). This 
heightened multiple inter-ethnic feuds and fragmentations of armed groups that proved difficult 
to abate. It also complicated the bargaining process between the government and the main rebel 
groups, as various factions continued to fight one another during negotiations, making a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict less likely (see Young 2003; Seymour 2014; Johnson 2003). 
In addition to this, ethnic defection and the parallel rise of defector PGMs can 
complicate the bargaining process by increasing the number veto powers, lowering the 
likelihood of termination (Cunningham, 2006; 2013). Defectors increase the likelihood of 
insurgent fragmentation by eroding the links between the insurgents and their constituent 
communities (Seymour, Bakke and Cunningham, 2016; Lyall, 2010). This often results in a 
larger number of armed actors (multiple rebel factions). In turn, multiple weaker rebel groups 
are less likely to force concessions from the incumbent (Clayton 2013). Similarly, defector 
PGMs often have limited allegiance to the incumbent government they have sided with (they 
are defected members of ethnic group excluded from power), but simultaneously have broken 
ties with their co-ethnic insurgent groups. Defector PGMs are extra-dyadic or third actors in 
civil wars. This adds to the number of veto players as well as the number of demands that have 
to be met, making a negotiated settlement less likely.   
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 Finally, ethnic defection can produce more complex conflict environments. 
Incumbents using defector EPGMs is likely to create a fractionalised context in which the 
loyalty of armed groups is hard to predict (Cunningham, Bakke, Seymour, 2012; Otto 2017; 
Souleimanov et al., 2016). Defector EPGMs are prone to side switching, as they lack the 
µOR\DOW\¶ DVVRFLDWHGZLWK FRHWKQLF3*0V 6H\PRXU $VD UHVXOW ZHH[SHFWGHIHFWRU
PGMs to complicate bargaining and increase the likelihood of sustained violence. This leads 
to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of defector PGMs increase the duration of civil conflict.  
 
Coethnic Pro-Government Militia 
Incumbents, however, often co-opt or mobilise coethnic militias. Coethnic militia increase the 
duration of civil war by strengthening the military resilience of the ruling regime, impeding 
political bargaining and intensifying issues of commitment.   
Coethnic PGMs can increase the capacity of the state to endure the costs of war, 
reducing incentives for an agreement. Coethnic militia attract additional recruits that help to 
insulate the government from the costs of conflict (Ahram, 2011; Carey and Mitchell, 2017; 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Coethnic militia are particularly adept for this process, as 
they draw on a common sense of ethnic belonging and heritage (Eck, 2009; Jentzsch, 2014). 
Recruiting along ethnic lines also creates a clear obligation for group members to act in 
SURWHFWLRQ RI WKHLU JURXS¶V FROOHFWLYH FRPPRQ LQWHUHVWV &Rleman, 1990), whilst making 
potential recruits more easily identifiable (Eck, 2009). This recruitment advantage can be 
pivotal in helping the state to sustain armed conflict over long periods. 
&RHWKQLFV¶VWURQJVHQVHRIOR\DOW\WRWKHLUNLQLQSRZHUDQGVtrong incentives to fight 
on increases the resilience of a regime and ability to continue fighting. Irregular forces are 
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prone to defection and side-switching during civil conflict, and according to a principle-agent 
logic, PGMs (i.e. agents) that operate RXWVLGHRIWKHVWDWH¶VLHSULQFLSOH¶VFRQWURODUHRIWHQ
likely to engage in hidden actions to improve their position.  This is less of a problem for 
coethnic actors, as they share in the spoils of ethno-political power, and are more likely to 
remain loyal to the regime even during the most challenging phases of armed struggle 
(Kirschke, 2000; McLaughlin, 2010). The H[LVWHQW V\VWHP RI SDWURQDJH DQG JRYHUQPHQW¶V
promises of future benefits cement this loyalty (Eck, 2009). Conversely, if defeated, coethnic 
groups (and their kin) are at serious risk of deadly reprisals further increasing their loyalty and 
commitment (Eck, 2009; Kirschner, 2010).  
Yet despite the recruitment and loyalty gains associated with coethnic PGMs, these 
initial advantages are likely to have long-term consequences on the durability of civil war. In 
comparison to state forces, they tend to be poorly trained, equipped and lacking in 
specialisation (Böhmelt and Clayton 2017). Instead, they offer a notable defensive advantage, 
reducing the likelihood of defeat and the need to make significant concessions. For example, 
in Angola the Civil Defence Organisation, comprised from the governing Mbundu group, 
helped provide state protection by creating an additional protective zone around the capital. 
Similarly, the creation of coethnic militias was pivotal to sustaining Bashar al-$VVDG¶VUHJLPH
in Syria, and, in turn, sustaining conflict. Assad was able to resist growing rebel threats largely 
due loyal Alawite force of 60,000 men, quickly recruited under the banner of the National 
Defense Force (Carter Center, 2013), but which has merely allowed the Assad regime to sustain 
fighting on multiple fronts. 
While defector PGMs tend to intensify intra-group tensions and violence, coethnic 
PGM  influence the duration of conflict by further entrenching inter-ethnic divisions and 




2011: 37-39; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2010). This prevents effective bargaining prior to 
violence (Roessler, 2011), and hinders peacemaking during war. While this might help the state 
to recruit from its own population, as the process that exacerbates interethnic competition also 
produces intra-JURXS FRKHVLRQ .DXIPDQQ  LW VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ HQKDQFHV WKH UHEHO¶V
ability to recruit and gain support among their ethnically excluded constituency. This reduces 
the likelihood of peaceful resolution and the prospect of a conflict petering out. For example, 
in Indonesia heavy-handed tactics, including the use of Javanese militias, helped to boost 
support for Acehnese separatists. 
Thirdly, coethnic PGMs influence the duration of conflict by impeding the bargaining 
process. Recruiting along ethnically exclusionary lines, coethnic PGMs are more prone to 
extreme ethnic views, and view ethno-political dominance as legitimate and justified. Coethnic 
PGMs are likely to be resistant to any process that compromises their political power 
(Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Coethnic PGMs are therefore likely to resist or 
³VSRLO´SROLFLHVWKDWMHRSDUGLse their prominent position (Pearlman, 2009; Staniland 2015).  In 
this context, the loyalty of a coethnic PGM pivots from the ethno-political regime to the broader 
group they claim to represent (Carey and Mitchell, 2017). For example, in Ukraine, EPGMs 
have constantly undermined the government, which they now accuse of betraying the 
Ukrainian people in seeking negotiations with the rebels (Aliyev, 2016).  
Finally, coethnic PGMs complicate the bargaining process by intensifying issues of 
commitment. Insurgents will only demobilise and transfer full power back to the state when 
they believe that the state will DELGHE\WKHWHUPVRID³GHDO´&RHWKQLF3*0VRSHUDWHRXWVLGH
of the central command structures, making it harder for states to disarm and demobilise them. 
Atrocities attributed to coethnic militia exacerbate commitment problems, since they signal to 
the rebels that the state is unwilling or unable to control these groups, and that the militia are 
unlikely to be committed to peaceful coexistence in the future (Kirschner, 2010).  For example, 
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the Janjaweed consistently undermined settlements in Darfur by engaging in violence that the 
Sudanese government seemed unable (or unwilling) to prevent (see below). From this 
discussion, we derive our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The presence of coethnic pro-government militia increase the duration 
of civil conflict.  
 
4.6. Research Design 
To test our hypotheses, we apply a mixed-method research design. We first assess our 
DUJXPHQWVXVLQJDVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLV:HWKHQIROORZ/LHEHUPDQ¶VPRGHO-testing 
approach and assess the case of ethnic PGMs in Sudan. Here we focus on the statistical 
design, and justify the case selection below.  
 
Measuring Ethnic PGMs 
Coethnic and defector pro-government militia are the key independent variables in our 
analysis. We operationalise EPGMs using the Pro-Government Militia (PGM) dataset (Carey, 
Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013). The PGM dataset includes 331 PGMs active between 1981 and 
2007, and offers the original news sources used to code each militia group. We use this online 
database, and where necessary evidence from other academic sources, policy papers, and 
reports from non-government organisations to apply our coding criteria for EPGMs. In most 
cases, the clear criteria made coding the groups relatively straightforward, but on occasions, 
additional information was required. In total, we coded 186 of the 331 pro-government militia 
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as EPGM.69 Using these sources, we code ethnic pro-government militia groups that meet both 
of the following criteria: 
1. Recruitment: PGM Membership is restricted to a specific politically relevant ethnic 
group (or groups).70 Thus, there needs to be clear evidence of an ethnic criterion 
associated with group membership.71 For example, the Uzbek Junbesh-e-Milli in 
Afghanistan clearly recruit exclusively from the Uzbek community. Importantly, 
recruitment does not need to be limited to one ethnic group, as sometimes EPGMs are 
composed of different ethnic constituencies.72  
2. Role: the actions clearly support a particular ethnic group (or a coalition of groups), 
or target other groups based on ethnic characteristics.  To ensure that ethnic 
mobilisation is not a strategy of convenience, we also require evidence that the group 
seeks to support or threaten a particular group based on ethnicity.  This also ensures 
that exclude mercenary groups operating for economic rather than ethno-political 
motivation, such as Chadian groups operating in the Central African Republic. 
 
Having coded each EPGM, we then link these militias to their respective ethno-political 
power status using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR). Our approach develops the 
method previously used to capture the ethnic characteristics of insurgents (e.g. Wucherpfennig 
et al. 2012; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). We first identify the politically relevant ethnic 
                                                          
69
 For a full list of cases, see appendix (table 2). 
70
  The requirement of political relevance excludes groups whose membership is on localised group ties rather 
than a clear ethnic identity. This excludes regionally defined groups that do not meet the threshold of an ethnic 
identity such as the post-independence death squads in East-Timor and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in India.  
71
 We provide evidence and sources for each PGM that we code. 
72
 Our approach here is akin to that used in the ACD2EPR dataset, thus some PGMs have linkages with multiple 
ethnic groups, and some ethnic constituencies link to multiple PGMs.   
For example, we code the Kebele militia in Ethiopia as EPGM as it is composed of a coalition ethnic groups that 
each share power, whereas the Basij militia in Iran is not coded as an EPGM, as while it is formed mainly of 
members of the dominant ethnic group, it recruits on ideological rather than ethnic lines. In Sudan, many Arab 
militias (i.e. the Janjaweed) are mainly recruited from a different Arab tribe to those in power. However,  we 
code such groups as co-ethnic because they are share a broader Arab identity. 
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group(s) that the EPGM represents, then match this to the EPR data to determine if that group(s) 
linked to that militia are included or excluded from political power.73 EPGMs recruited from a 
ruling group (or coalition) are coded as coethnic PGM. For example, the Special Security 
Service in Liberia was set up by Charles Taylor to uphold government power, and recruited 
specifically from his former Gio and Mano rebel forces.  
Figure 1. Countries with Ethnic PGMs ± by type 
 
 
EPGMs representing an excluded group are coded as defector PGMs. Defector PGMs most 
often shared the ethnic identity with insurgents or operate in areas where insurgents are active. 
For instance, the Kadyrovtsy militia was made up of former Chechen rebels to support Russian 
troops. We adjust our coding to changes in ethno-political power. This is illustrated by the 
Uzbek Junbesh-e-Milli are classified as coethnic between 1993 and 1996, as Uzbek 
representatives had posts in the executive. We create dummy variable for each type of EPGM, 
and for non-ethnic PGMs. Of the 186 EPGMs, on average we classify 136 as coethnic PGMs, 
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and 67 as defector PGMs (see figure 1). EPGMs are a global phenomenon, and unsurprisingly 
both co-ethnic and defector PGMs are common in regions where ethnicity is particularly 
salient, most notably Africa, the Middle East and Asia (see appendix). Finally, defectors PGMs 
are rarely active in countries without coethnic PGMs (Mexico and Myanmar). Nevertheless, 
both types of EPGMs do not correlate strongly (0.20).  
 
Data Structure and Modeling Approach  
To assess the influence of EPGMs on conflict duration we construct a dataset based on conflict 
years as included in the UCDP armed conflict dataset (1981-2007) (Gleditsch et al, 2002).  In 
order to capture the potential effects that the different forms of PGMs may have on conflict 
duration, we use a series of Cox proportional hazard models to estimate how coethnic and 
defector PGMs shape the hazard rate of conflict termination.  
For this analysis, our dependent variable is conflict termination (hazard). This is 
measured using the start and end date of a conflict in the UCDP data ± calculating the number 
of days from when a conflict meets the criteria to enter into the UCDP data, until the day it 
meets the criteria for termination (i.e. the number of battle-related fatalities drops below 25 for 
at least a year) (Kreutz, 2010). Our data consists of 501518 conflict days (unit of analysis) 
within 1,214 conflict years, of which there are 233 conflict terminations in total.74  
 
Controls 
To account for omitted variable bias, we include a number of control variables that relate to 
conflict duration and the emergence of pro-government militias. In particular, we account for 
key state characteristics, including regime type from the Polity IV measure (Marshall and 
                                                          
74
 Introducing the control variables reduces the number of observations to 903 country years and 173 failures. 73 




Jaggers 2006), since instability and the proliferation of militias has been long associated with 
states transitioning into democracy (Raleigh, 2016). We also include GDP per capita (Gleditsch 
2002), which has long been associated with instability and state weakness (Buhaug, Gates and 
Lujala, 2009; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004) and PGMs are most likely to feature in 
weak states (Böhmelt and Clayton 2017; Carey and Mitchell, 2017; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and 
Schubiger, 2015). Next we control for third party influence, in the form of mediation attempts 
(DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011), and peacekeeping (Hegre, Hultman and Nygard, 
2015). Such interventions tend to reduce the duration of conflict, but also provide incentives 
for the government to outsource violence to PGMs while appearing to comply with conflict 
reduction strategies (Otto, 2017). This outsourcing may increase the duration of conflict. We 
divide peacekeepers according to the type of mandate, looking independently at traditional 
observer missions and robust missions operating under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.  
Thirdly, ethnic conflicts are generally likely to last longer, therefore it is important to 
explore if the conflict enhancing effect of EPGMs are independent from that of ethnic conflict. 
0RUHRYHUHWKQLFFRQIOLFWVPD\SURGXFHPRUH(3*06DQGQHFHVVLWDWHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VXVH
of ethnic militias. We therefore introduce conflict-level controls accounting for ethnic rebels 
groups recruited along ethnic lines and specifically make ethnic claims (Wucherpfennig et al, 
2012). Moreover, we control for the number of active rebel groups within a conflict. A high 
number of rebel groups and fragmentation is associated with longer civil wars (Cunningham, 
2006; Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012) and is often the consequence of state strategies to co-
opt defectors from the rebel-side (Warren and Troy, 2015). Fourthly, we control for the Cold 
War period to account for the systematic shift that occurred with the end of the Cold War which 
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has coincided with the rise of PGMs. Finally, we control for conflict intensity (battlefield 
deaths) and whether the conflict is over territory (Gleditsch et al, 2002).75 
 
4.7. Results 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that coethnic pro-government militia are associated with longer civil 
conflicts. States drawing on coethnic groups are expected to be more resilient to rebel threats, 
and are thus likely to endure longer periods of conflict. Hypothesis 2 argued that the 
fractionalisation triggered by defector groups complicates the bargaining environment and 
lowers the likelihood of resolution.  
We assess these claims using Cox proportional hazard modules in which conflict 
termination is the baseline hazard. We include time-variant and invariant variables within our 
panel data. To account for potential problems of simultaneous causality we lag time-varying 
covariates by one year (t-1), and cluster the standard errors by conflict to address possible 
dependency in conflict episodes. For ease of interpretation we report coefficient estimates 
rather than the hazard ratios. Negative coefficients in a Cox proportional hazard model indicate 
a lower likelihood of termination, and thus longer expected duration, while positive signs 
indicate a higher probability of termination and thus shorter conflicts. Table 1 presents the 
results. Model 1 presents only the independent variables and a control for non-ethnic PGMs. 
Model 2 includes a series of controls to account for the conflict characteristics. Finally, Model 
3 introduces a number of key state characteristics and conflict management techniques.  
The results offer strong initial support for hypothesis 2. In all three models the coethnic 
militia variable shows the expected negative sign, indicating a reduction in the likelihood of 
                                                          
75 A summary of these variables is included in the appendix (table 3). 
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termination, and thus a longer duration, when coethnic PGMs are present. In all models the 
effect is strongly significant. Substantively, coethnic PGMs have a notable effect, reducing the 
baseline hazard (likelihood of termination) by between 42% and 51% across the different 
specifications. 
Table 1. Cox Proportional Hazard Models: EPGMs, and Conflict Duration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Coethnic PGMs -0.491** -0.771** -0.770** 
 (0.150) (0.180) (0.188) 
Defector PGMs 0.000 -0.104 0.101 
 (0.188) (0.211) (0.237) 
Non Coethnic PGMs -0.254+ -0.192 -0.181 
 (0.147) (0.192) (0.207) 
Ethnic Rebels (Claims/Recruit)  0.042 -0.056 
  (0.228) (0.243) 
Number of Rebels (Veto Players)  -0.102 -0.169 
  (0.208) (0.221) 
Incompatibility (type)  -0.117 0.078 
  (0.178) (0.197) 
Post-Cold War  1.722** 1.554** 
  (0.354) (0.375) 
Intensity (log Battle Deaths t-1)  -0.206** -0.269** 
  (0.067) (0.081) 
Regime Type (Polity)   0.002 
   (0.004) 
GDP per capita (t-1)   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1)   0.507* 
   (0.213) 
Traditional PKO (t-1)   0.692 
   (0.601) 
Transformative PKO (t-1)   0.891* 
   (0.450) 
Number of Obvs.  1212 879 789 
Conflict Terminations 235 165 149 
Days at Risk of Termination 501518 383261 347585 
















The results are not so favourable for hypothesis 1. The defector variable has an inconsistent 
effect across the different models, and is a long way from significance in all specifications., 
Model 1 initially report a negative effect of non-ethnic PGMs on conflict duration and is almost 
significant, but this result then consistently drops out when introduces control variables. 
The control variables behave largely as expected. Conflict interventions in the form of 
mediation and transformative peacebuilding increase the likelihood of conflict termination, 
while conflicts are also shorter in the post-Cold War period. Conflicts are also most likely to 
be longer when reaching a higher intensity, which is often associated with ethnic actors (Eck, 
2009). We find no relationship between state characteristics, namely regime type and GDP, 
and conflict duration. Finally, and most surprisingly, we find little evidence that an higher 
number of rebel groups increases the duration of civil war or that ethnic rebels increase the 
durability of conflict, despite fragmentation and associations between a rebel group and a 
specific ethnic community being theorised to increase conflict duration.   
To visualise these effects, figure 2 presents the Kaplan-Meier predicted survivor 
function (y-axis) for different forms of ethnic PGMs across conflict years (x-axis). The three 
lines grouped closely together represent cases in which no PGMs, non-ethnic PGMs and 
defector PGMs were present in a conflict. As is clear from the close proximity of the three 
lines, there is no substantive or significant difference between each of the groups. In contrast, 
coethnic PGMs, which are represented as a navy-dashed line on the graph, stand out from the 
other categories. As was evident from the earlier analysis, coethnic PGMs are associated with 
quite significantly longer conflicts. The likelihood of survival is 12% higher when coethnic 
PGMs are present in the first year (or 365 days) of a dispute compared to conflicts with non-
ethnic PGMs, increasing to 20% more likely to continue after 3650 days (or 10 years). In the 
same period coethnic PGMs are nearly 20% more likely to continue after the first year than 
civil wars with no active PGMs -  a rate of different that is maintained at the 10-year mark. 
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To assess the validity of these findings we changed a number of specifications and reran the 
estimates. Firstly, we include a number of additional controls to ensure our results are not 
driven by omitted variable bias. One challenge to our analysis might be that the coethnic 
variable is simply capturing weak state capacity, which is likely to be related both to the use of 
coethnic PGM and longer conflicts. We included GDP per capita in our original models to 
account for this. Yet as a further check we include two additional variables to measure state 
and military capacity (Table 4 ± appendix). To capture state capacity we include a variable 
generated using a factor analysis of two International Country Risk Guide variables: 
bureaucracy quality, and law and order. Military capacity is also derived from a factor analysis 
and combines three measures: number of military personnel, military expenditures, and 
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The results remain consistent, offering further evidence that coethnics have an effect 
independent of the weak contexts from which they are also likely to emerge in.  
  We then explore the possible mediating effect of foreign aid which may hold dependent 
host states accountable to democracies and authoritarian states that supply the aid (Carey, 
Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015). States have the incentive to delegate violence to pro-government 
militias in order to avoid accountability and sanctioning by donor states, but this delegation 
increases the risk of longer duration as suggested by this study. We use two measures from 
&DUH\&RODUHVLDQG0LWFKHOO¶VGDWDRQWKHWRWDOVXPRIDLGUHFHLYHGIURPGHPRFUDFLHV
DQGDXWRFUDFLHVDVDSURSRUWLRQRIWKHUHFLSLHQW¶V*'3)RUHLJQDLGGHSHQGHQF\KDVQRHIIHFW
on conflict duration and our results do not change. 
An additional alternative explanation might be that our coethnic PGM variable is 
picking up the effects of the ethnic-political context that are related to the emergence of ethnic 
PGMs and durable civil war. To control for this we include a number of additional variables, 
including the size of the population that is ethnically excluded and discriminated, the size of 
WKHODUJHVWH[FOXGHGJURXS:XFKHUSIHQQLJHWDODQGLIWKHFRQIOLFWZDV³HWKQLF´YHU\
EURDGO\GHILQHG%DUWXVHYLþLXV,QDOOPRdels our results remain consistent (Table 4 ± 
appendix). Surprisingly, across all of our analysis the only two indicators of ethnicity that 
DSSHDUWRKDYHDFRQIOLFWHQKDQFLQJHIIHFWDUHFRHWKQLFPLOLWLDDQG%DUWXVHYLþLXV¶VYHU\EURDG
measure of ethnic conflict. It therefore seems that whilst political exclusion appear to increase 
the likelihood of civil conflict, we find little evidence of the conflict enhancing effect. We 
return to this point in the conclusion.  
Thirdly, whilst EPGMs operate across a number of continents, identity is often argued 
to be of particular significance to African conflicts. To ensure that our results are not limited 
to a specific region we include a series of regional controls, and conduct jackknife estimations 
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to ensure any other particular subset of cases is not driving our findings (Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). Moreover, we change the specification to cluster standard 
errors by conflict episodes, and then by country (instead of by conflict). In all cases the results 
remain consistent (Table 5 ± appendix).  
Fourthly, the existence of opportunity factors including resources and favourable 
geographic conditions have previously been shown to influence the likelihood of armed rebels 
forming. It is possible that conditions that favour insurgency might also help to sustain conflict 
(Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009), whilst also motivating the creation of a PGM force. To 
account for this we include additional controls for the presence of lootable gemstones, oil, 
forests and mountainous terrain in the conflict zone. To further account for the opportunity 
factors we also include a measure of the distance from the conflict zone to the capital and 
nearest border. In all model specification the results remain significant (Table 6 ±appendix). 
Moreover, only lootable resources have a conflict sustaining effect, implying that it is the 
funding for rebellion, rather than ability to elude the state, that has the an effect on conflict 
duration.   
Next, more capable rebel organisations have previously been shown to influence the 
duration of the conflict as they are better able to sustain armed conflict (Cunningham, 
*OHGLWVFKDQG6DOHK\DQ6WURQJUHEHOVPD\DOVRQHFHVVLWDWHWKHVWDWH¶VXVHRIFRHWKQLF
PGMs to counter the greater threat. We therefore add controls for the relative rebel strength in 
relation to the government, taken from Cunningham (2006). The results further confirm our 
key findings (Table 6 ± appendix). 
To ensure that our modelling assumptions were not responsible for the results, we 
undertake a number of additional checks. Firstly, in our primary analysis we adopt a Cox model 
as it allows the inclusion of covariates of survival times but has less restrictive assumptions 
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that the other commonly used Weibull model. To ensure that this choice does not influence our 
findings, we rerun the analysis with a Weibull model, and the results remain the same. Next, 
we explore the possibility that our measure of conflict duration is driving the results, since 
Gates and Strand (2004) show that different measures may produce different results. We run 
the analysis again with an alternative calculation of duration - the number of civil war years 
since the conflict initiated. The results are consistent regardless of how we calculate duration 
(Table 7 ±appendix).   
To ensure that the results are not the product of the duration analysis we adopted, we 
use a logit model to assess the influence of EPGMs on conflict termination. Both EPGM 
variables perform consistently (Table 7 ± appendix). The coethnic variable produces a 50% 
reduction in the likelihood of termination when all other variables are held at their mean or 
modal value (i.e. 0.195 to 0.10 probability of termination). In-sample analysis reveals that 
removing the coethnic variable significantly reduces the predictive power (figure 4 ± 
appendix).  
Next, it could be that co-ethnic PGMS are endogenous with conflict duration. For 
example, states might turn to EPGMs when reinforcements are needed in long drawn-out 
conflicts. Moreover, Kalyvas (2008) argues that defection to the government-side is more 
common the later stages of armed rebellion. We therefore explore the use of all PGMs over the 
timespan of a civil war to test whether all PGMs are consistently active throughout a conflict. 
Firstly, we look at descriptive statistics and the activity of coethnic PGMs across conflict years 
(Figure 3). Their activity is consistent, moving from 36% of activity in all initial conflict years 
to a peak of 60% conflicts after 8 years. Overall they are typically active in between 40-50% 
of conflicts years and are less active after 20 years. The trend is similar for defector PGMs 
which do not appear to be more active and conflict duration increases. 
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Figure 3. PGM activity over conflict timespan ± by type 
 
Building on descriptive statistics we then explore the influence of EPGMs on conflict 
terminations at five-year intervals, using logit models. Across all periods a conflict timespan 
coethnic PGMs are consistently related to a reduced likelihood of conflict termination (Table 
8 ± appendix). Moreover, we find that co-ethnic PGMs are relatively common in the early 
stages of a dispute, featuring in about 40% of conflict episodes in their second year. The relative 
share of co-HWKQLFJURXS¶VLQFUHDVHVZLWKORQJHUFRQIOLFWVPDLQO\DVRWKHUFRQIOLFWVZLWKRXWFR-
ethnic PGMs tend to drop out of conflict, rather than new states turning to a PGM. This further 
supports our findings.   
Lastly, we further explore different types of conflict terminations. Interestingly, the 
effect of coethnic militias on conflict termination appears to be across the board, rather than 
limited to a specific outcome. For when we limit the focus to only those cases that did 
terminate, the negative effect of coethnic PGMs is not significantly stronger for one outcome 
over another. However, this analysis did reveal that defector PGMs have a significant and 
negative influence on the likelihood of a peace agreement terminating the conflict. Therefore 
whilst the influence of defectors might not be enough to influence the duration of the dispute, 
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for hypothesis 2, yet the effect is only marginally significant (p<0.10) lowering the confidence 
we can have in this finding. We discuss the reasons for this in the conclusion.  
 
4.8. Results II: Coethnic Pro-Government Militias in Sudan  
For a deeper assessment of how coethnic groups influence conflict duration, we undertake a 
³PRGHOWHVWLQJ´FDVHDQDO\VLV/LHEHUPDQ:HIRFXVRQ6XGDQLQZKLFKFRHWKQLF3*0V
featured heavily in the overlapping counterinsurgency campaigns in the second Sudanese civil 
war (1983-2005) and the Darfur conflict (2003-present).  
 
Coethnic Pro-Government Militias in Sudan 
Sudan is ethnically diverse with more than 85 tribal groups and over 14 languages.76 It is 
common to categorise four principle groups: the politically dominant Muslim Arabs; the 
nomadic Muslim Arabs; Non-$UDE³$IULFDQ´0XVOLPVDQGWKHQRQ-$UDE³$IULFDQ´QRQ-
Muslims (Rosselier 2016, p. 109). In practice all conflicts in Sudan have revolved around the 
³PDVWHU FOHDYDJH´ ZKLFK LQYROYHG FRQWHVWV EHWZHHQ WKH 1RUWKHUQ 0XVOLP $UDEV WKDW KROG
power and various non-$UDE³$IULFDQ´H[FOXGHGSRSXODWLRQV77  
                                                          
76
 According to the Ethnic Power Relations database, Sudan had over thirteen distinct ethnic groupings that are 
politically relevant, comprising of various tribal groups. This has changed now with the secession of South 
Sudan. 
77
 This is of course an overgeneralisation and simplistic categorization, but most scholars tend 
to agree that at least as the conflicts progressed, ethnic and identity divisions have hardened 
along these lines (e.g. Idris 2005).  
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Arab-Muslim PGMs were common, such as the Muraheleen and Popular Defense 
Forces (PDF) in the second Sudanese Civil War, and the Janjaweed in Darfur. The ruling 
1DWLRQDO ,VODPLF)URQW 1,)UHFUXLWHGWKHVHJURXSVIURP³$UDE´SHRSOHVE\DSSHDOLQJWRD
common Arab-Muslim identity and religious motivations like Jihad (Idris 2005).  Coethnic 
JURXSV KDYH EHHQ WKH *RYHUQPHQW RI 6XGDQ¶V *R6 SULQFLSDO FRXQWHU-insurgent force. 
Operating along exclusionary ethnic lines, they were tasked with (or at least allowed to) attack 
³$IULFDQ´FLYLOLDQVDQGWKRVHEHOLHYHGWREHV\PSDWKHWLFWRWKHLQVXUJHnts.   
 
Mobilisation of Coethnic Pro-Government Militias 
Coethnic militias served a number of important roles for the Sudanese state, but notably 
were an effective defensive force. For example, when insurgents made gains into the northern 
territories, the Muraheleen were instrumental in maintaining state control of the border areas 
between Northern and Southern Sudan, ensuring the state retained access to contested resources 
(Johnson 2003, 44-49, 83). In a context of relative state weakness, the ability of the state to 
quickly mobilise a significant militia force composed of coethnic groups was a distinct 
DGYDQWDJH 7DU  'H :DDO  7KH VWDWH¶V SROLFLHV RI $UDEL]DWLRQ DQG ,VODPL]DWLRQ
facilitated the mass mobilisation of coethnic militias, politicising ethnic identity and 
developing a small army of willing recruits (Martin 2002, 120; Idris 2005, 53-56). 
Coethnic PGMs appear to have offered the state a more loyal and committed force, with 
an interest in sustaining the unequal system of power. The official Armed Forces were 
composed of conscripts from a variety of ethnic groups, meaning they were reluctant to commit 
violence against their ethnic kin (Idris 2005, 88; Martin 2002, 117; Tar 2005, 150). In 
comparison, the coethnic Muslim Arab Militia were willing to exercise violence against 
perceived ethnic enemies. Thus, the motivation to recruit coethnics also arose from the ethno-
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political power imbalance and subsequent need for an irregular ethno-centralised group to 
repress rebellious excluded groups (Idris 2005).  
 
Coethnic PGMs and Conflict Termination 
The Sudanese case offers support for hypothesis 2, and provides a more in-depth understanding 
of the mechanisms behind how coethnic PGMs can increase the duration of civil conflict. The 
XVHRI³$UDE´(3*0VUHGXFHGWKHVWDWH¶VFRQIOLFWFRVWVDQGDOORZHGWKHPWRVXVWDLQFRQIOLFW
over long periods across multiple fronts. For example, during the second civil war, the 
0XUDKHOHHQDQG3')VWUHQJWKHQHGWKHVWDWH¶VGHIHQVLYHFDSDFLW\5RHVVOHUZULtes 
WKDWD³NH\LPSOLFDWLRQRI.KDUWRXP¶VGHYDVWDWLQJO\HIIHFWLYHXVHRI$UDEPLOLWLDVLVWKDWDV
*DUDQJ DQG WKH 63/$ SXVKHG QRUWK WKH\ IDLOHG WR EULGJH WKH FRXQWU\¶V $UDE-African 
HWKQRSROLWLFDOFOHDYDJH´7KHPRELOLVDWLRQRIOR\DOORFDOFRHWKQLFIRUFHV allowed the GoS to 
LQVXODWH LWVHOI IURP LQVXUJHQW LQFXUVLRQV HPDQDWLQJ IURP WKH ODUJHO\ ³$IULFDQ´ VRXWK DQG
SUHYHQWUHFUXLWPHQWLQWRLQVXUJHQWIRUFHVDPRQJ³$UDE´SRSXODWLRQVLQWKHQRUWK6LPLODUO\LQ
response to mounting opposition in Darfur, the GoS was able to quickly mobilise a significant 
military offensive using the Janjaweed. In both cases, the militias were largely successful in 
halting the advances of insurgent groups. Thus by insulating the regime from significant costs 
associated with conflict and the use of the official Armed Forces, coethnic militias bolstered 
WKH*R6¶VUHVLOLHQFHDQGDVDUHVXOWUHGXFHGWKHLPSHUDWLYHVWRQHJRWLDWHDQGRUVWUHQJWKHQHG
the GoS hand at the bargaining table. 
Secondly, mobilisation of PGMs along exclusionary ethnic lines intensified the shared 
HWKQLFLGHQWLW\DQG³$UDEQHVV´DPRQJUHFUXLWVEXWSRODULsHG³$UDE´FRPPXQLWLHVDZD\IURP
WKHLU³$IULFDQ´QHLJKERXUV,GULV7KLVLQWXUQHQKDQFHGWKHDELOLW\RILQVXUJHQWIDFWLRQV
to mobilise among ethnic groups citing shared group grievances. Over time, this has entrenched 
ethnic divisions between the north and the south.   
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Thirdly, coethnic militias became a hindrance to political peace processes, by serving 
as spoilers and intensifying issues of commitment. Many PGMs continued fighting their 
opponents, jeopardizing plans for peace.  For example, in 2002, a Civilian Protection 
Monitoring Team in southern Sudan reported that Arab militia attacks on civilians and rival 
groups contributed to the collapse of a recently signed ceasefire agreement between the GoS 
and the SPLA/M (Barltrop 2011, 55). Similarly, in 2006, the SPLA/M decried a GoS violation 
of the 2005 CPA by allowing it to continually target their communities with violence (Sudan 
Tribune 2007).  EPGMs performed a similar role in the Darfur conflict. For example, on 8 
April 2004, continued violence by the Janjaweed undermined a Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement, which led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564 reprimanding the 
Sudanese government for non-compliance to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, continued 
EPGM violence and human rights violations threatened the ability of the GoS to commit to the 
terms of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (known as the Abuja Agreement) which specifically 
required the demobilisation of the Janjaweed and other Arab coethnic PGMs (Kumar and 
Ismail 2014).  
In summary, EPGMs have therefore played a pivotal role in the continuation of conflict 
LQ6XGDQE\HQKDQFLQJWKH*R6¶VDELOLW\WRGHIHQGLWVHOIDQGWKHQultimately by undermining 
negotiations and peace-making attempts.  In the first instance, the efficient and loyal nature of 
coethnic PGMs allowed the GoS to sustain conflict over long periods of time and across various 
fronts (Johnson 2003, 127-140).  Yet, these ethnically exclusionary methods also served to 
harden ethnic identities. Instead, coethnic PGMs strengthened the capacity of the state to resist 
insurgent threats. 
In the second instance, the direct actions of the militia were often central in undermining 
ceasefires and agreements. Continued militia violence effectively extended the conflict, by both 
undermining peace initiatives, and by making it more challenging for the government to 
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commit credibly to future deals once the state had previously shown to be unwilling or unable 
to demobilise the militia force.  These findings complement our statistical results, and offer 
more fine-grained support for our first hypothesis. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
In this article, we argue that pro-government militias recruited along ethnic lines have a unique 
and previously overlooked influence on conflict dynamics. We show that states facing an 
internal challenge often turn to relatively cheap and loyal coethnic militia, and that the presence 
of these groups is often associatHGZLWKORQJHUFLYLOZDUV7KLVZHDUJXHLVDUHVXOWRIWKHVWDWH¶V
greater capacity to resist insurgent challenges and the incentives that coethnic groups have to 
undermine peacemaking attempts. We find support for these arguments in a statistical analysis 
of a global sample of cases from 1981-2007, and in case analyses of coethnic PGMs in Sudan. 
We do not, however, find evidence that defectors significantly influence conflict 
dynamics, with the exception of a relatively weak negative association with the likelihood of 
peace agreements. There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. Firstly, it might 
be that defectors influence is limited to a specific ethno-political environment (e.g. Chechnya), 
or a specific region within a state (e.g. Anbar, Iraq) and thus missed by our cross-sectional 
design. Alternatively there might be some additional measure required to distinguish between 
influential (i.e. mass defection, information rich,) defectors, and more general force multipliers. 
In any case, our analysis challenges previous work that stressed advantages of defector PGMs, 
and speaks to the need for more specified data. We also do not find any evidence that non-
HWKQLF3*0VKDYHDQ LPSDFWRQFRQIOLFWG\QDPLFV7KLVSRLQWV WR WKHµVWLFNLQHVV¶RIHWKnic 
identity and the importance of ethnic linkages, and suggests that specific ethnic actors do have 
stronger incentives to likely to fight on for longer. 
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More generally, our study makes a contribution to our understanding of how state-
military relations influence conflict dynamics, in particular concerning PGMs. A burgeoning 
collection of work has recently begun to explore the effects that PGMs have inside and outside 
of civil war, but has until now overlooked the role of ethnicity. Similarly, while the civil war 
literature has taken huge strides in showing how conflict intensity and duration are shaped by 
the ethnic character of insurgents, and the distribution of power across ethnic groups, this work 
has until now missed the important effect of EPGMs (Eck 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch, and 
Buhaug, 2013; Wucherpfennig et al 2012).  
Our findings also have important implications for the policy community. In Iraq, for 
example, our findings suggest that the Shia-dominated militias used to repel the ISIS advance 
are likely to act as a serious impediment to peace. A challenge for the Iraqi government will be 
to find ways to reign in Shia militia or incorporate them into official military structures. Future 
research could support this process, for example by uncovering the conditions in which 
coethnic PGMs are more likely to disarm. Similarly, our analysis suggests that the EPGMs 
operating in the Philippines might undermine the bargaining process between Muslim rebels 
and Christian PGMs in Mindanao. Determining how to incorporate EPGMs into a peace 
process would be another important and timely extension of this research.   
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Table 2. List of Ethnic PGMs (EPGMs) in the Analysis 
Country PGM Name Co-
ethnic 
Defector Notes  

















Burundi Guardians of Peace 1 1 Militia includes former rebels (Hutu) and 
recruited local Tutsi. Hutu gained power 






ALiR (Army for 
the Liberation of 
Rwanda)  
1 1 Rwandan Hutu Group - but share coethnicity 
with local Hutu and they recruit from the 
local population due to their exile. Listed as 
'other Kivu groups' (EPR), such groups 





FDD (Forces for 
the Defence of 
Democracy) 
1 1 Burundi Hutu Group - but share coethnicity 
with local Hutu and they recruit from the 
local population due to their exile. Listed as 
'other Kivu groups' (EPR), such groups 





FDLR 1 1 Rwandan Hutu Group - but share coethnicity 
with local Hutu and they recruit from the 
local population due to their exile. Listed as 
'other Kivu groups' (EPR), such groups 







1 1 Burundi Hutu Group - but share coethnicity 
with local Hutu and they recruit from the 
local population due to their exile. Listed as 
'other Kivu groups' (EPR), such groups 







Mai Mai (Mayi 
Mayi) 
1 1 Mai Mai are a combination of 'native' groups 
operating in the Kivus. Listed as 'other Kivu 
groups' (EPR), such groups gained political 
power after 1998. Specifically recruit along 





Indonesia Satgas Merah Putih 1 1 Recruited specifically from indigenous 
Papuan population. Source:  Braithwaite, 
John; Valerie Braithwaite, Michael 
Cookson, and Leah Dunn (2011) Anomie 
and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation 
in Indonesian Peacebuilding. Canberra: 
ANU E Press. Papuans brought into the 








Israel Civil Guard 1 1 Largely Jewish Militia at first- but force also 
includes 5000 Israeli arabs by 2003. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/308/evidence/ 
Pakistan Mohajir Quami 
Movement 
1 1 Mohajir militia. Mohajir have moved in and 
out of government (EPR). Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/183/evidence/ 
South Africa Black Cats 1 1 White government paid them to attack anti-
apartheid activists. Gang with Zulu 
membership and later joined Inkatha (armed 
wing of IFK Zulu party) to attack the ANC. 
Coded as Zulu and pro-government in 1994 
- prior to 1994 the Zulu are encompassed 
within the Black group and this group were 










1 1 Trained by White government to cause intra-
Black fighting - armed wing of IFK. Post 




Sri Lanka Home Guard 1 1 Singalese and Muslim self-defence force. 
The level of political representation of the 






Afghanistan Achekvai tribal 
militia 
1  Achekvai are a Pashtun tribe in the 
Kandahar region and known as the 
protectors of Pashtuns. Source: Giustozzi, 
Antonio (2009). Empires of mud Wars and 
warlords in Afghanistan. London: Hurst and 
Company. 
Afghanistan Ittehad Islami 1  Pashtun Militia. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/209/evidence/ 
Afghanistan Sherzai 1  Militia of Politician Sherzai, leader of one 




Afghanistan Southern tribal 
militia 
1  Majority of recruits are Hazara - pushing 
for more Pashtun recruits 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124994313
594220571 
Algeria Communal Guards  1   Maybe case. Ideological recruitment? Target 
Islamists - but still likely an Arab militia - 
EPR-ACR lists Islamists as Arab. Evidence 
that does not include Berbers. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/64/evidence/ 
Algeria Groups for 
Legitimate Defense 
(aka Patriots) 
1   Maybe case. Ideological recruitment? 
Operate in Arabs areas in the north. Target 
Islamists - but still likely an Arab militia - 
EPR-ACR lists Islamists as Arab. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/63/evidence/ 
Algeria Ninjas 1   Target Islamists - but still likely an Arab 
militia - EPR-ACR lists Islamists as Arab. 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/62/evidence/ 
Algeria Organization of 
free young 
Algerians 
1   Target Islamists - but still likely an Arab 




Angola Civil Defence 
Organization 
(ODC) 
1  MPLA is an ideological party, but still 
derives support from the Mbundu ethnic 
group. There is also evidence 'communist' 
militias set up were in fact Mbundu militias 
set up to maintain a ethno-political zone 
around the capital. Source: 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?id=112334 
Angola People's Defence 
Organization 
(ODP) 
1  MPLA is an ideological party, but still 
derives support from the Mbundu ethnic 
group. There is also evidence 'communist' 
militias set up were in fact Mbundu militias 
set up to maintain a ethno-political zone 





Angola Peoples Vigilante 
Brigades 
1  MPLA is an ideological party, but still 
derives support from the Mbundu ethnic 
group. There is also evidence 'communist' 
militias set up were in fact Mbundu militias 
set up to maintain a ethno-political zone 
around the capital. Source:  
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?id=112334 
Armenia Yerkrapah Union of 
Volunteers 
1  They are an Armenian ethnic militia made 
up of war veterans from the Nagorno-

















Liberators 1  New President Bozize established a militia 
made up of his former rebels. These rebels 






1  Vast Majority of the XPCC is Han despite 
being 40% of the Xinjiang population. The 
organisation (economic and poltical) 
employs some Uighur but it is very likely the 
armed element of this Corp is almost 
completely Han recruited from Han enclaves 
- when the XPCC was set up it included 








Aubevillois 1  Recruited from Nibolek (Bembe) and 





Cobras 1  Militia made up of northern Mbochi who 
support Denis Sassou Nguesso. Source: 


































Cote d'Ivoire Death Squads 1  Recruited from President's ethnic group Bete 
(Kru). Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/46/evidence/ 
Cote d'Ivoire Front for the 
Liberation of the 
Greater West 




Cote d'Ivoire Student Federation 
of Cote d'Ivoire 
(FESCI) 
1  Since 2000 war - student group split with 
northern factions, as of 2002 consisted of 
from southern groups. Key source of 




Cote d'Ivoire Young Patriots 1  Ultra ethno-nationalist group. Only recruit 
from southern 'Ivorian' groups and explicitly 
exclude northern groups. Source: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/05/21/bes
t-school/student-violence-impunity-and-




Croatia HOS 1  Ethno-national Croat militia. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/397/evidence/ 
Ethiopia Kebele Militia 1  At the beginning there is strong evidence 
this group was largely Amhara 'settlers' sent 
to quash ethnic rebellions and maintain 
Amhara dominance. However, post 1991 the 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (a coalition of four ethnic 
parties) took power. The  EPRD continued 
this militia and membership was diversified 
to the Oromo and Tigray (part of coalition). 
This militia is organised across local 
Kebeles to maintain EPRD power. The 








Ethiopia Peoples' Militia 1  Similar to Kebele militia. At the beginning 
there is strong evidence this group was 
largely Amhara 'settlers' sent to quash ethnic 
rebellions and maintain Amhara dominance. 
However, post 1991 the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (a coalition 
of four ethnic parties) took power. The  
EPRD continued this militia and 
membership was diversified to the Oromo 
and Tigray (part of coalition). This militia is 
organised across local Kebeles to maintain 
EPRD power. The militia is coded as mixed 







Ethiopia Tigray Militia 1  Tigray recruited group formed to protect 
Tigray on border and within Eritrea. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/190/evidence/ 
Georgia Forest Brothers 1  Georgian group made up of Georgians that 
have fled Abkhazia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/165/evidence/ 
Georgia The Horsemen aka 
Mkhedrioni 
1  Ethno-nationalist militia formed in response 
to Ossetian militias. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/160/evidence/ 








Guatemala Eye for an Eye 1  Evidence recruits are solely White Ladinos. 
Also specifically target Maya and Maya 
rebels. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/295/evidence/ 
Guatemala The White Hand 1  Evidence recruits are solely White Ladinos. 
Also specifically target Maya and Maya 






1  Ethno-nationalist Hindu group closely 






India Village Defence 
Committee 
Kashmir 
1  Armed Hindi minority against Muslim 




Separatist Front  
1  Local community and formed near Banda 
Aceh. Evidence of ethnic recruitment of 
Javaese trans-migrants. Source: Hedman, 
Eva-Lotta E., ed. (2008) Conflict, violence, 
and displacement in Indonesia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University, and  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/322/evidence/ 
Indonesia Anti Free Aceh 
Movement Front 
1  Local community and formed near Banda 
Aceh. Evidence of ethnic recruitment of 
Javaese trans-migrants. Source: Hedman, 
Eva-Lotta E., ed. (2008) Conflict, violence, 
and displacement in Indonesia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University, and  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/322/evidence/ 
Indonesia Banser 1   Linked to religious organisation with a 
stronghold in East Java which is 
predominately Javanese. There is evidence 







1  Local community and formed near Banda 
Aceh. Evidence of ethnic recruitment of 
Javaese trans-migrants. Source: Hedman, 
Eva-Lotta E., ed. (2008) Conflict, violence, 
and displacement in Indonesia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University, and  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/322/evidence/ 
Indonesia Diponegoro Youth 1   Party activists for Javanese dominated party 
and from Javanese dominated army. Very 




Indonesia Pemuda Panca 
Marga 
1   Party activists for Javanese dominated party 
and from Javanese dominated army. Very 




Indonesia Siliwangi Youth  1   Party activists for Javanese dominated party 
and from Javanese dominated army. Very 






Iraq Badr Brigade 1  Shia militia linked to Shia party. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/235/evidence/ 
Iraq Fedayeen Saddam 1  Most recruits from Hussein's Central Iraq 
Sunni stronghold. Source:  
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-fedayeen-
saddam/p7698 
Iraq Peshmerga Kurdish 
Militia 
1  Kurdish militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/233/evidence/ 
Israel Settlers 1  Settlers are Jewish. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/304/evidence/ 
Israel Village Leagues 1  Failed attempt to create a long-term pro-
Israeli Palestinian militia. Source. 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/315/evidence/ 
Kenya Chinkororo  1  Kisii militia originally set up to protect the 





Kenya Jeshi la Mzee 1  Militia recruited from ethnic groups that 
support the KANU party. EPR lists these 
groups together. Sources:  
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya/K
enya0502-04.htm and Kagwanja, Peter; and 
Roger Southall (2013). Kenya's Uncertain 
Democracy: The Electoral Crisis of 2008. 
London: Routledge. 
Liberia Anti-Terrorist Unit 1  Former NPFL rebels that derive from Mano 
and Gio groups. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/35/evidence/. ACD2EPR 
also lists the NPFL as a Gio and Mano rebel 
group. During Doe's rule he set up a similar 
Krahn militia called the Special Anti-
Terrorist Force. 
Liberia Government of 
Liberia (GOL) 
militias 
1  Children, former rebels from Liberia. 




Liberia Jungle Fire 
Militia/Unit 
1  Children, former rebels from Liberia. 




Liberia National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia 
1  Former rebels recruited from Gio and Mano 
groups. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/14/ 
Liberia Small Boys' Unit 1  Children, former rebels from Liberia. 
Evidence of ethnic recruitment and ethnic 
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score-settling. Part of National Patriotic 
Front. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/42/evidence/ 
Liberia Special Security 
Services 
1  SSS was used by former President. Taylor 
reactivated the SSS but filled it with former 
rebel members recruited from Gio and Mano 
groups. Source:  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worl
d/liberia/sss.htm 






















Liberia Wild Geese 1  Former NPFL rebels that derive from Mano 
and Gio groups. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/48/evidence/ 




Malawi Young Pioneers 
(Malawi Congress 
Party) 
1   MCP party gained its support almost 
exclusively from central groups. Very likely 




Malawi Youth League 
(Malawi Congress 
Party) 
1   MCP party gained its support almost 
exclusively from central groups. Very likely 




Nigeria Abia State 
Vigilante Group 
aka Bakassi Boys 
1  This group is the same as the Anambra State 
Vigilantes. The group has an Igbo 
membership. Source:  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f1478b2.
html 




aka Bakassi Boys 
1  This group is the same group as the Abia 
State Vigilantes. The group has a Igbo 






1  Most likely a Yoruba group and may be 
linked to prominent Oodua People's 
Congress that operates in the same areas and 
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have been used by elities. But difficult to 








Nigeria Onitsha Traders 
Association 
Vigilante Group 
1  Very likely to be Igbo membership in a 
predominately Igbo area. Also many of these 
group members joined the Bakassi Boys 
(Igbo). Source:  
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria2/
nigeria0502-02.htm 
Nigeria Zamfara State 
Vigilante (umbrella 
org. for various 
Sharia enforcement 
vigilantes) 
1  Very likely membership is based on Hausa-
Fulani who are Muslim and constitute 
majority in the north. Source: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-
violence-idUSBREA360HT20140407 
Pakistan MQM Haqiqi 1  Mohajir militia - Mohajir were not in 
government at the time (EPR). Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/184/evidence/ 
Pakistan Tribal Militia 1  Militia consisting of Pashtun tribes. Sources: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-




Peru Colina Group 1  Rebels are mainly from large indigenous 
groups (ACR2EPR) and death squads are 
members of the Peruvian dominated 
government and army. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/303/evidence/ 
Philippines "Alsa Masa/225 
anti-Communist 
vigilante groups" 
1  Christian militia. Mainly formed to target 
Muslim separatists in Mindanao. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/149/evidence/ 
Philippines Greenans  1  Solely Christian membership based on 
hardline cults. Source: http://www.sowi.uni-
mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/147/evidence/ 
Philippines Ilagas 1  Christian militia formed to target Muslim 
separatists in Mindanao. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/175/evidence/ 
Philippines Manticao Village 
Defence Force  
1  Christian militia formed to fight communist 
rebels in Mindanao. Possibly also counter 
Muslim rebels. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/145/evidence/ 
Philippines Pulahan 1  Christian militia formed to target Muslim 





Philippines Sagrados Corazon   1  Christian militia formed to target Muslim 
separatists in Mindanao. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/157/evidence/ 
Philippines Tadtads 1  Christian militia formed to target Muslim 
separatists in Mindanao. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/151/evidence/ 
Russia Chechen Death 
Squads 
1  Made up of Russian soldiers and local 
Russian groups. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/119/evidence/ 
Russia Cossacks 1  Cossacks militia is based on ethno-






1  Hutu-nationalist. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/307/ 
Rwanda Local Defence 
Force 
1  Formed as security against Hutu extremists 
from the Congo. Many LDF are armed by 
relatives in Tutsi dominated RDF. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/306/evidence/ 
Saudi Arabia Committee for the 
Promotion of 
Virtue and the 
Prevention of Vice  




Sierra Leone Civil Defense 
Forces/Kamajor/Do
nso/Gbethis/Kapras 
1  Umbrella group of self-defence forces, 
predominately made up of Kamajors 
(Mende). Was no functioning government 
between 1999-2002 (EPR). 
Source: Hoffman, Danny (2007) The 
meaning of a militia: Understanding the civil 
defence forces of Sierra Leone. African 
Affairs 106 (425): pp639-662. 




Sierra Leone West Side Boys 1  Was no functioning government between 





1  No EPR - population less than 500,000. 
However, Malaitan is a language group from 
the Island of Malaita who dominant the 
government, therefore are politically 
relevant. The Malaita Eagles has a Malaitan 
membership used against the Guadalcanal 










Seagulls 1  No EPR - population less than 500,000. 
However, Malaitan is a language group from 
the Island of Malaita who dominant the 
government, therefore are politically 
relevant. The Seaguls has a Malaitan 
membership specifically recruited from the 
President's own community. Sources: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worl
d/para/solomons.htm and  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/128/evidence/ 
Sudan Ambororo 1   Ambororo are nomadic Arab tribe in NW 
S.Sudan and government supported. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/279/evidence/ 
Sudan Arab Pastoralists 1   Arab only militia made up of Nomadic Arab 
groups (Baggara) which are not in 







Sudan Fertit Militiamen 
(Peace Army) 
1   Fertit are a sub-Arab group in South Sudan 
which sided with the government. Linked to 
government by Arab descent. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/276/evidence/ 
Sudan Janjaweed 1   Umbrella group including nomads and 
criminals, but specifically recruited from 






Sudan Murahaleen 1   Arab only militia made up of two Nomadic 
Arab groups (the Missiriya and Southern 
Rizeigat) in South Sudan and Kordofan. 
Blueprint for the later Janjaweed militia. 
Classified as other Arab groups which are 
not in government but linked by Arab 




Sudan People's Police 1   Islamist Arab recruitment. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/258/evidence/ 
Sudan Popular Defence 
Forces (PDF) 
1   Umbrella organisation of Arab militias 





Tajikistan Popular Front 1  Recruited from a Tajik sub-group the Kulabi 
from southwestern Tajikistan to fight the 
opposition in support of the communist 
government. Source: http://www.sowi.uni-
mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/187/evidence/ and  
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Tajik.ht
m 
Tanzania Sungu Sungu 1  Means policing arm in Kurian. This militia 
is a local Kuria policing unit incorporated by 
the Tanzanian government but also used 
against the opposition. Source: 
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/264512/378
259_en.html 
Thailand Anti-Muslim death 
squad 
1  Very likely a Buddhist militia made up of 




Thailand Rangers 1  Group references to Buddhist religion (not 




Thailand Village Defence 
Volunteers 










Turkey Anti-Kurd Death 
Squads 
1  This is an umbrella term for various criminal 
organisations. Although criminal, there is 
evidence these groups (i.e. the Grey Wolves) 
were part of an ultra-nationalist network 
against Kurdish rebels. See also the Susurluk 







Uganda Kalangala Action 
Plan 
1   It is difficult to obtain information about this 
group. It is highly likely recruitment is based 
on dominant groups (Southern groups) and 
Baganda due to close ties to the NRM party 
and security forces comprising mainly of 
former NRA rebels from Southern groups 
and Baganda. The militia is also led by the 
President's close ally Kakooza Mutale. 
Furthermore, they operate largely and 
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Uganda Kiboko Squad 1   Again information on this group is limited. 
Likely recruitment is mainly from Western 
groups (dominant). The ideology of the 
group is staunchly pro-NRM and their aim is 
to ensure NRM dominance. The group is 
also linked to top police officials with 
Western group backgrounds (including 
police chief) and there is some indication of 
links to Western regions such as the 








Uganda 'Ragged' Militia 1  Recruited from party members from the 
Northern communities to fight alongside the 
former ruling UNLA. Northerners were in 
power at the time. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/99/evidence/ 
Uganda Special Force 
Vigilante 
1  Recruited from party members from the 
Northern communities to fight alongside the 
former ruling UNLA. Northerners were in 
power at the time. Due to the ethno-political 




Yugoslavia Beli Orlovi (White 
Eagles) 
1  Serbian militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/385/evidence/ 
Yugoslavia Chetniks 1  Ethno-nationalist Serb militia. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/386/evidence/ 
Yugoslavia Krajina Militia 
AKA Marticevci 
1  Serbian militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/379/evidence/ 
Yugoslavia Red Berets AKA 
Frenki's Boys AKA 
Grey Wolves 
1  Serbian militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/357/evidence/ 
Yugoslavia Serb Volunteer 
Army AKA 
Arkan's Tigers 
1  Serbian militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/360/evidence/ 





Yugoslavia Special Operations 
Unit (JSO) 
1  Serbian militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/381/evidence/ 
Zimbabwe Chipangano 1  Same as below. 
Zimbabwe People's Militia 1  Specially recruited in Shona (pro-Mugabe at 
the time) areas and specifically not recruited 
in opposition Matabeleland areas (other 
ethnic group). Source: http://www.sowi.uni-
mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/93/evidence/ 
Zimbabwe Top Six vigilante 
unit 
1  A pro ZANU-PR militia which is 
specifically recruited from Mugabe's home 





Zimbabwe War Vets 1  War veterans from the Shona dominated 
ZANU-PF party. Very likely recruits are at 
least predominately Shona linked to the 
party by patronage. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/104/evidence/ 
Zimbabwe Youth Service 
Brigade/Green 
Bombers 
1  Youth wing of ZANU-PR militia. Very 
likely Shona dominated like other militias 




Zimbabwe ZANU-PF militia 1  Shona members who attacked Ndebele 
speakers in the 1980s and Ndebele MDC 
voters. Is the umbrella group of other groups 






 1 Former Muslim rebels (defectors). Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/220/evidence/ 
Indonesia Mahidi (Live or 
Die for Indonesia) 
 1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source: Coppel, Charles, 
A eds. (2011) Violent Conflicts in 
Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, 
Resolution London: Routledge. 
Indonesia Ahi  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
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and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Aitarak  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Besi Merah Putih  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Dadurus Merah 
Putih 
 1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Halilintar  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Laksaur  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source: Coppel, Charles 
(eds.). (2011) Violent Conflicts in 
Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, 
Resolution London: Routledge. 
Indonesia Makikit  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Naga Merah  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 










 1 Pro-Integration Forces (PPI) militia is an 
umbrella of various sub groups also listed in 
the dataset. Source: 
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Sakunar  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Sera  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Team Alfa  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 
Indonesian army. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/354/evidence/ 
Indonesia Team Saka  1 Sub group of the Pro-Integration Forces 
(PPI) militia. Source:  
http://fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/militia.ht
m. Made up predominately of East Timorese 
and defect Timorese soldiers from the 









Iraq Saddam Kurdish 
Militia-Jash 
 1 Kurdish militia formed because of the threat 














 1 PRI-ista is a series of groups that 








 1 Former Buddist Karen rebels split from 
Christian cominated Karen rebels. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/280/evidence/ 
Nigeria Icelanders a.k.a 
Niger Delta 
Vigilante 
            
1 
Ijaw group supported by the government 
against the rebels (MEND). Source: 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigerias-oil-war-
who-are-niger-delta-militants-1520580 





 1 A local Chechen militia formed to support 
Russian soldiers. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/117/evidence/ 
South Africa Kabasa  1 White government paid them to attack anti-
apartheid activists. Mixed raced criminal 




South Africa Witdoeke  1 White government paid them to attack anti-
apartheid activists. Mixed raced criminal 




Sri Lanka Eelam People's 
Democratic Party 
(EPDP) 
 1 Tamil group that has defected to the 
government side. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/275/evidence/ 




Sri Lanka People's Liberation 
Organization of 
Tamil Eelam 
 1 Tamil group that has defected to the 
government side. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/273/evidence/ 




 1 Tamil group that has defected to the 





Sudan Anyanya II  1 Recruited from Nuer ethnic group. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/161/evidence/ 
Sudan Equatoria Defence 
Force 
(EDF/Khartoum) 
 1 Recruit from Acholi (other groups). Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/167/evidence/ 
Sudan Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) 
  1 Foreign force but also recruit from Sudanese 





 1 Local tribe in South Sudan supported by the 
government against the rebels. Classified as 
other southern tribe with position above Bari 
and below the Dinka. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/281/evidence/ 
Sudan Murle Forces  1 Murle group is a small ethnic group that is 
hostile to the rebellion and supported by the 
government. Classified as other southern 
group.  
Sudan South Sudan 
Defence Forces - 
Tanginya Faction 
(SSDF Tanginya) 
 1 Former Neur rebel faction. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/286/ 
Sudan South Sudan 
Defence Forces 
(SSDF) 
 1 Umbrella group of ethnic militias and former 
Nuer rebels aligned with the government due 
to tactical reasons - i.e. they did not want a 
united Sudan. Includes SPLA United, South 
Sudan Independence Movement, and 
Equatoria Defence Force. Note Machar 









 1 Machar (Nuer) re-joins pro-government 




Sudan South Sudan Unity 
Movement/Army 
(SSUM/A) 
 1 Faction of Anyanya II (Nuer) that defects to 
pro-government side. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/266/evidence/ 





 1 Zaghawa faction that signs the peace 




Sudan Sudan People's 
Liberation Army - 
Bahr el Ghazal 
Group (SPLA Bahr 
el Ghazal) 
 1 The SPLM Bahr El Ghazal Group (faction of 
the Dinka) briefly joined the South Sudan 











 1 Nuer and Shilluk defecting factions that left 









 1 Nuer and Shilluk defecting factions that left 




Sudan Toposa Tribesmen  1 Another local and smaller pro-government 
tribe in the south. Classified as other 
southern group. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/282/evidence/ 
Turkey Hizbullah  1 Kurdish militia tolerated by the government 
in order to foster Kurdish infighting. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/248/evidence/ 
Turkey village guards  1 Kurdish militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/226/evidence/ 






 1 Karamong not seen as politically relevant 
after 1986 (EPR), however, still play an 
active role in the north and are listed as non 
co-ethnic militia. Government specifically 
has armed the restive Karamojong based 
militia. Source:  
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/392/evidence/ 
Uganda Local Defence 
Units 
 1 Evidence that all northern groups are 
specifically armed to counter the LRA. Teso 
and Karamojong recruitment is specifically 






 1 Armed tribal district based militias that 
bordered the Karamajong in order to counter 
certain predatory Karamajong militias - 
Both Teso and Acholi recruitment. Source: 
http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-
public/data/pgag/193/evidence/ 
Uganda Rhino (Amuka) 
Defence Force 
 1 Modelled on the Teso Arrow Militia. 








Table 3. Summary of Main Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coethnic PGMs 4840 0.225 .4177615 0 1 
Defector PGMs (t-1) 4840 0.125 .3302839 0 1 
Non Coethnic PGMs 4840 0.233 .4229529 0 1 
Ethnic Rebels 4572 0.610 .4876011 0 1 
Incompatibility (type) 4839 1.518 .4997094 1 2 
Post Cold War 4839 0.844 .3629156 0 1 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) 1088 2558.888 6892.534 25 100500 
Defector PGMs x Intensity 1088 646.530 3927.843 0 100500 
Regime Type (Polity) 4000 44.647 27.74974 0 100 
GDP per capita (t-1) 4126 4147.981 5333.087 110.46 47769.7 
Mediation (t-1) 4761 0.086 .2799444 0 1 
Traditional PKO (t-1) 4761 0.024 .1522368 0 1 


















































Coethnic PGMs -0.978** -0.831* -0.293+ -0.779** -0.789** -0.781** 
 (0.252) (0.378) (0.233) (0.188) (0.188) (0.187) 
Defector PGMs -0.115 -0.502 0.269 0.050 0.032 0.059 
 (0.247) (0.409) (0.281) (0.249) (0.246) (0.243) 
Non Coethnic PGMs -0.035 -0.196 0.253 -0.156 -0.150 -0.158 
 (0.320) (0.389) (0.252) (0.210) (0.208) (0.212) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) -0.292 0.311 -0.105 -0.016 -0.015 -0.011 
 
(0.326) (0.410) (0.299) (0.239) (0.242) (0.240) 
Number of Rebels (Veto 0.197 -0.089 -0.131 -0.150 -0.166 -0.152 
Players) (0.214) (0.212) (0.273) (0.222) (0.217) (0.222) 
Incompatibility (type) -0.431+ -0.443 -0.154 0.053 0.059 0.057 
 
(0.253) (0.338) (0.239) (0.209) (0.199) (0.205) 
Post Cold War 1.156* 1.493* 1.650** 1.669** 1.684** 1.662** 
 
(0.509) (0.595) (0.400) (0.397) (0.397) (0.393) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) -0.292** -0.267** -0.142 -0.270** -0.268** -0.268** 
 
(0.105) (0.093) (0.090) (0.084) (0.080) (0.086) 
Regime Type (Polity) -0.000 -0.000 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1) 0.856* 0.421 0.338+ 0.486* 0.487* 0.482* 
 
(0.345) (0.309) (0.199) (0.216) (0.214) (0.217) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) -0.459 0.921 0.762 0.693 0.648 0.707 
 
(1.131) (0.650) (0.582) (0.642) (0.681) (0.620) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) 2.180** 1.443+ 1.026* 0.896+ 0.927* 0.911* 
 
(0.576) (0.744) (0.426) (0.474) (0.457) (0.460) 
State Weakness ICRG (t-1) -0.678**      
 (0.236)      
Military Strength ICRG (t-1) 0.559*      
 (0.271)      
Democratic Aid (t-1)  0.000     
  (0.000)     
Autocratic Aid (t-1)  -0.000     
  (0.000)     
Ethnic Conflict   -1.754**    
   (0.278)    
Excluded Ethnic Population     0.125   
(% of pop - EPR)    (0.468)   
Discriminated Ethnic      0.331  
Population (EPR)     (0.559)  
Size of Largest Excluded       0.119 
Group (% pop ± EPR)      (0.619) 
No. of Observations 582 612 787 778 787 787 
Conflict Terminations 109 82 149 144 144 144 
Days at Risk 184125 190809 347585 346251 346251 346251 
Log likelihood -340.641 -213.228 -528.847 -534.485 -534.372 -534.502 
6WDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVS0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Coethnic PGMs -0.639** -0.770** -0.770** -0.770** 
 (0.193) (0.207) (0.218) (0.232) 
Defector PGMs 0.271 0.101 0.101 0.101 
 (0.264) (0.253) (0.223) (0.261) 
Non Coethnic PGMs -0.106 -0.181 -0.181 -0.181 
 (0.249) (0.209) (0.220) (0.262) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) -0.154 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 
 (0.232) (0.235) (0.246) (0.323) 
Number of Rebels (Veto Players) -0.164 -0.169 -0.169 -0.169 
 (0.232) (0.199) (0.234) (0.298) 
Incompatibility (type) 0.053 0.078 0.078 0.078 
 (0.203) (0.197) (0.200) (0.257) 
Post-Cold War 1.535** 1.554** 1.554** 1.554** 
 (0.387) (0.364) (0.448) (0.414) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) -0.357** -0.269** -0.269** -0.269** 
 
(0.097) (0.078) (0.087) (0.094) 
Defector PGMs x Intensity 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Regime Type (Polity) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.418+ 0.507* 0.507* 0.507* 
 
(0.217) (0.201) (0.222) (0.246) 
Mediation (t-1) 0.631 0.692 0.692 0.692 
 (0.633) (0.562) (0.567) (0.782) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) 0.842+ 0.891 0.891* 0.891 
 (0.458) (0.553) (0.440) (0.666) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) -0.736+    




 (0.490)    
Asia -0.745    
 (0.458)    
Middle East -0.979    
 (0.682)    
Americas -0.639**    
 (0.193)    
No. of Observations 787 787 787 787 
Conflict Terminations 149 149 149 149 
Days at Risk 347585 347585 347585 347585 


















Coethnic PGMs -0.775** -0.698** -0.795** -0.731** -0.682** 
 (0.191) (0.198) (0.193) (0.196) (0.202) 
Defector PGMs 0.106 0.217 0.073 0.122 0.177 
 (0.233) (0.267) (0.235) (0.246) (0.263) 
Non Coethnic PGMs -0.130 -0.107 -0.147 -0.186 -0.216 
 (0.212) (0.231) (0.196) (0.211) (0.214) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) -0.137 -0.066 -0.075 -0.052 -0.132 
 
(0.248) (0.252) (0.242) (0.238) (0.244) 
Number of Rebels (Veto Players) -0.150 -0.140 -0.166 -0.157 -0.160 
 
(0.213) (0.208) (0.216) (0.222) (0.223) 
Incompatibility (type) -0.052 0.139 0.180 -0.029 0.013 
 
(0.211) (0.214) (0.218) (0.217) (0.204) 
Post-Cold War 1.559** 1.537** 1.575** 1.544** 1.659** 
 
(0.374) (0.372) (0.378) (0.378) (0.413) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) -0.290** -0.275** -0.270** -0.276** -0.301** 
 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.081) (0.083) (0.093) 
Regime Type (Polity) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1) 0.527* 0.460* 0.525* 0.477* 0.555* 
 
(0.215) (0.213) (0.211) (0.221) (0.239) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) 0.833 0.841 0.601 0.748 0.342 
 
(0.605) (0.663) (0.611) (0.620) (0.577) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) 1.059* 0.848+ 0.903* 0.937* 0.809 
 
(0.452) (0.452) (0.459) (0.452) (0.522) 
Mountains (% of Conflict 0.003     
Zone) (0.003)     
Forest (% of Conflict Zone) -0.005     
 (0.003)     
Narcotics in Conflict Zone  0.150    
  (0.279)    
Hydrocarbon in Conflict Zone  -0.254    
  (0.246)    
Gemstones in Conflict Zone  -0.240    
  (0.217)    
Conflict-Border Distance   0.160   
   (0.120)   
Logged Conflict-Capital    -0.080  
Distance    (0.093)  
Rebels Stronger than the     0.829* 
Government     (0.404) 
Rebels at Parity with the     -0.303 
Government     (0.360) 
No. of Observations 787 787 787 787 709 
Conflict Terminations 149 149 149 149 136 
Days at Risk 347585 347585 347585 347585 322731 
Log likelihood -557.427 -557.639 -557.614 -558.191 -493.874 
Standard errors in parentheses  p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Coethnic PGMs -0.823** -0.418** -0.683** -0.709** -1.209** 
 (0.193) (0.132) (0.148) (0.163) (0.248) 
Defector PGMs 0.014 0.043 -0.123 0.030 -0.201 
 (0.242) (0.166) (0.185) (0.205) (0.289) 
Non Coethnic PGMs -0.171 -0.175 -0.084 -0.043 -0.165 
 (0.209) (0.129) (0.140) (0.153) (0.289) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) -0.026  0.049 -0.031 -0.242 
 
(0.249)  (0.162) (0.179) (0.381) 
Number of Rebels (Veto Players) -0.169  -0.073 -0.117 -0.203 
 
(0.240)  (0.185) (0.192) (0.204) 
Incompatibility (type) 0.069  -0.101 -0.043 -0.362 
 
(0.204)  (0.137) (0.161) (0.323) 
Post-Cold War 1.660**  1.641** 1.506** 1.180** 
 
(0.410)  (0.315) (0.334) (0.344) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) -0.262**  -0.192** -0.238** -0.368** 
 
(0.083)  (0.055) (0.065) (0.092) 
Regime Type (Polity) 0.003   0.001 0.002 
 
(0.004)   (0.003) (0.005) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1) 0.464*   0.299+ 0.392 
 
(0.228)   (0.176) (0.281) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) 0.641   0.708+ 0.911 
 
(0.578)   (0.411) (0.816) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) 1.050*   0.810* 1.377+ 
 
(0.492)   (0.328) (0.748) 
Conflict Years      -0.055 
     (0.045) 
Conflict Years2     -0.005+ 
     (0.003) 
Conflict Years3     0.000** 
     (0.000) 
Constant -3.997**    1.958+ 
 (0.936)    (1.151) 
Ln_p Constant -0.485**     
 (0.076)     
No. of Observations 787 1213 879 789 789 
Conflict Terminations 149 235 166 150 - 
Days (Years) at Risk 347585 (1526) (1170) (1061) - 








Figure 4. Logit In-sample Prediction for Conflict Termination  
 
Full model (blue), is compared against a sample in which coethnic PGMs are removed from 
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Table 8. Robustness Checks V ± Coethnic PGMs and Conflict Termination across 
















Coethnic PGMs -0.985* -0.717* -0.759** -0.680** -0.712** 
 (0.392) (0.321) (0.284) (0.262) (0.249) 
Defector PGMs 0.150 0.091 -0.030 -0.072 -0.073 
 (0.287) (0.282) (0.276) (0.266) (0.266) 
Non Coethnic PGMs 0.037 -0.070 0.039 0.001 -0.026 
 (0.286) (0.254) (0.250) (0.237) (0.237) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) -0.503 -0.277 -0.193 -0.115 -0.255 
 
(0.413) (0.340) (0.334) (0.317) (0.313) 
Incompatibility (type) -0.122 0.028 -0.067 -0.118 -0.223 
 
(0.399) (0.330) (0.316) (0.293) (0.292) 
Post-Cold War 0.209 0.426 0.634* 0.692* 0.773** 
 
(0.331) (0.284) (0.292) (0.285) (0.281) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) -0.271* -0.287** -0.309** -0.303** -0.295** 
 
(0.105) (0.093) (0.090) (0.085) (0.080) 
Regime Type (Polity) -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1) 0.617   0.505* 0.548* 
 
(0.385) (0.310) (0.270) (0.252) (0.238) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) -0.009 0.350 0.400 0.340 0.473 
 
(1.001) (0.818) (0.703) (0.653) (0.641) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) 2.237  1.978* 1.599* 1.332* 
 
(1.466) (1.146) (0.831) (0.718) (0.624) 
Conflict Years  4.224** -0.370 -0.744** -0.529** -0.424** 
 (1.593) (0.499) (0.278) (0.185) (0.105) 
Conflict Years2 -2.222** -0.009  0.044 0.026* 
 (0.798) (0.133) (0.052) (0.028) (0.011) 
Conflict Years3 0.307** 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 - 
 (0.114) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -0.424 1.690 2.051*  1.857* 
 (1.639) (1.114) (1.027) (0.950) (0.944) 
No. of Observations 369 551 665 751 838 










In addition to the negative impact that defector PGMs have upon politically negotiated 
settlements (p<0.10), a few other interesting finds emerge from Tables 9-10. Firstly, there is 
some evidence defector PGMs make conflicts more likely to drop below 25 battlefield deaths. 
This result is only significant when compared with other outcomes, but not in comparison to 
all outcomes including situations in which conflict continues. This finding could be related to 
fragmentation, where violence occurs between rebel factions and defectors, detracting violence 
against the state and therefore dropping below civil war thresholds of 25 battle-related deaths. 
This could also relate to high levels of defection and fragmentation, which weaken the 
insurgency, but do not defeat it. Such fragmented environments are likely to relate to later 
conflict recurrence or an intensifying of ongoing conflict that temporarily fall below 25 battle-
related deaths. Rudloff and Findley (2016) call this the downstream effect of actor 
fragmentation. 
 Secondly, some evidence here shows coethnic PGMs may reduce the likelihood of 
conflict falling below 25 battlefield deaths. This falls in line with expectations that coethnic 
PGMs increase ethnic polarisation, stop the government from losing, and also have strong 
motivations to carry on fighting in order to uphold the favorable ethno-political status-quo, 
thereby preventing conflicts from ending through de-escalation. Finally, these results show that 
ethnic rebels actually have the opposite effect, but a similar effect to defector PGMs on the 
likelihood of conflict falling below the 25-deaths threshold. Again this can relate to 
fragmentation, infighting or inter-rebel violence between ethnic factions, which usually 
facilitates defection and the rise of defector PGMs. Conflicts involving ethnic rebels also 
appear to be persistent (related to low activity) while being difficult to resolve, with evidence 
that such conflicts are less likely to result in victory (either by the rebels or the government), 
but are also not linked to peace agreements. 
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Table 9. Robustness Checks VI ± EPGMs and Conflict Outcomes (including ongoing      









Coethnic PGMs -0.172 -0.113 -0.597 - 
 (0.304) (0.572) (0.893) (0.285) 
Defector PGMs - 0.107 -0.257 0.178 
 (0.503) (0.477) (1.215) (0.340) 
Non Coethnic PGMs 0.055 -0.307 -0.218 0.180 
 (0.350) (0.463) (0.983) (0.314) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) 0.315 -0.672 -2.057** 0.905* 
 
(0.451) (0.463) (0.637) (0.379) 
Incompatibility (type) -0.412 0.587 1.379 -0.008 
 
(0.377) (0.568) (1.110) (0.356) 
Post-Cold War 1.752** -0.138 0.470 0.483 
 
(0.628) (0.480) (0.694) (0.347) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) - -0.243 0.304 -0.232* 
 
(0.117) (0.167) (0.227) (0.092) 
Regime Type (Polity) -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.000* -0.000 - -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1) 1.194** -0.478  -0.483 
 
(0.285) (0.511) (0.717) (0.375) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) -0.100 0.654 3.326 0.812 
 
(0.580) (1.380) (2.257) (0.652) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) 1.306* . . -0.721 
 
(0.563) . . (1.119) 
Conflict Years  -0.174 -0.632* -1.774** 0.096 
 (0.114) (0.252) (0.441) (0.088) 
Conflict Years2 0.008  0.108** -0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.038) (0.005) 
Conflict Years3 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -1.155 0.204 -2.651 -1.005 
 (1.423) (1.530) (2.558) (1.009) 
No. of Observations 908 890 890 908 





















Coethnic PGMs 0.373 0.629 -0.236 -0.520 
 (0.469) (0.672) (1.155) (0.447) 
Defector PGMs - -0.098 0.101 1.348** 
 (0.616) (0.577) (1.636) (0.492) 
Non Coethnic PGMs 0.009 0.040 0.154 0.051 
 (0.521) (0.440) (0.988) (0.492) 
Ethnic Rebels (claims/recruit) 0.380 - -2.034** 1.422** 
 
(0.610) (0.524) (0.689) (0.543) 
Incompatibility (type) -0.405 0.933 1.537 -0.267 
 
(0.539) (0.675) (0.978) (0.481) 
Post-Cold War 1.239 -0.786 0.076 -0.136 
 
(0.941) (0.634) (0.880) (0.639) 
Intensity (Battle Deaths - t-1) -0.024 -0.021 0.539* -0.145 
 
(0.172) (0.209) (0.224) (0.147) 
Regime Type (Polity) 0.010 0.004 -0.023 - 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mediation (t-1) 1.575** -0.770 0.215 -1.437** 
 
(0.444) (0.577) (0.683) (0.449) 
Traditional PKO (t-1) -0.549 0.725 2.480 -0.240 
 
(0.773) (1.799) (2.026) (1.230) 
Transformative PKO (t-1) 2.423* . . -0.765 
 
(0.951) . . (1.410) 
Conflict Years  -0.204 -0.512 -1.377** 0.472** 
 (0.170) (0.338) (0.522) (0.165) 
Conflict Years2 0.016 0.054 0.079* -0.032** 
 (0.012) (0.036) (0.032) (0.012) 
Conflict Years3 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001* 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.916 -0.876 -3.553 -0.497 
 (2.109) (1.974) (2.547) (1.393) 
No. of Observations 173 165 165 173 









Chapter 5. Conclusion 
In the last decade, there has been growing research on HIs, which has significantly improved 
our knowledge of political conflict. However, while qualitative literature has suggested HIs are 
related to a wide range of conflict outcomes (see Gurr, 1970; Stewart, 2002; Stewart, 2008), 
much of the empirical literature has focused on militarised disputes, in particular civil war 
(Ostby, 2008; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, 2013; Buhaug, Cederman, 
Gleditsch, 2014; Fjelde and Ostby, 2014; Raleigh, 2014). This thesis KDVIXUWKHUµEULGJHG the 
JDS¶ EHWZHHQ TXDOLWDWLYe and quantitative literature by exploring the relationship between 
ethno-political HIs and a broader set of conflict behaviours.  
In doing so this thesis has provided a number of related and broader contributions. 
Firstly, ethno-political HIs impact different types of conflict behaviour that are not captured in 
conventional civil war datasets. Secondly, the relationship between ethno-political HIs and 
political conflict has been shown to be more complex. This thesis has highlighted new 
mechanisms between HIs and different types of conflict by specifically recognising the 
different aims types of mobilisation associated with different conflict processes. Finally, 
building on recent innovations within the conflict literature, this thesis has used disaggregated 
data at the subnational and actor-levels to further untangle the empirical relationship between 
ethno-political HIs and conflict. The next section will explore these broader contributions in 
more detail by summarising the unique contributions of each paper.  
 
5.1. Ethno-Political Inequalities and Ethnic Riots 
To the best of my knowledge, Chapter 2 has offered the first systematic subnational analysis 
of ethnic riots across various African countries. This chapter has moved beyond studies that 
have explored militarised disputes between the government and rebel forces, or violence 
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between armed and well organised non-state actors. This chapter has shown that the onset of 
ethnic riots relates to elite incentives and bottom-up motivations of civilians, and where ethno-
political differences are extremely severe enough to provoke sporadic and often emotive 
violence.  
Following recent innovations in civil war studies, utilising the use of spatially 
disaggregated data has proved fruitful. This chapter has developed new geocoded data that 
captures subnational ethno-political HIs and the location of ethnic riots, coding all SCAD 
events where two ethnic groups classified in the EPR dataset are engaged in interethnic 
violence. This facilitates the future exploration of ethnic riots across Africa, in which research 
should continue to explore this type of localised violence at the subnational-level. Moreover, 
using this data has enhanced our understanding of where this type of political violence most 
likely to occur. As such chapter 2 has highlighted three threating contexts that are most likely 
to spark ethnic riots: where groups face systematic discrimination, where groups have recently 
lost politically power and fear marginalisation, and where such groups live in close proximity 
with dominant and upgraded groups. 
 
5.2. Ethno-Political Inequalities and Nonviolent Action 
Chapter 3 has offered unique contributions in relation to nonviolent action. Recent research 
HIs has largely focused on protest carried out by ethnic minorities. However, most nonviolent 
movements mobilise across ethnic lines because successful nonviolent action is dependent on 
mobilising large and diverse numbers of people. Chapter 3 has explored mass nonviolent action 
more broadly and has provided us with new insights into the relationship between inequality 
and nonviolent action. Firstly, mass nonviolent action is not directly caused by high levels of 
ethno-political HIs, despite previous assertions in the literature. Divisions within and between 
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ethnic groups have instead been shown to act as an obstacle to mass nonviolent mobilisation. 
Secondly, this chapter has demonstrated that the relationship between ethno-political 
inequalities and nonviolent action is dependent on the existence of cross-cutting grievances. 
These findings have come from the use of spatially disaggregated data. This chapter 
has provided the first systematic attempt to analyse nonviolent action at the subnational level 
and across various countries. Firstly, this analysis has provided strong evidence that cross-
cutting issues increases the feasibility of nonviolent action in multi-ethnic societies, focusing 
on high increases in food prices as a particular type of cross-cutting grievance. This finding 
can explain recent nonviolent campaigns, where record high food prices have facilitated 
mobilisation attempts by: the Activists for Change (A4C) in Uganda, the Concerned Citizens 
in Malawi, and pro-democracy campaigns in Guinea and Egypt. Secondly, this chapter has led 
to the generation a new indicator of mass nonviolent action at the grid-level (based on recoded 
SCAD events), which can be used for future subnational analyses of protest in Africa. Research 
on nonviolent action should seek to explore nonviolent action below the level of the movement.  
 
5.3. Ethno-Political Inequalities, Ethnic PGMs, and Civil War 
Chapter 4 has explored the conditions in which pro-government militias (PGMs) can extend 
civil wars. This chapter has moved beyond assumptions that the government-side is unitary by 
focusing on PGMs as an important civil war actor. Moreover, while HIs literature has explored 
the distribution of ethno-political power and ethnic linkages on the rebel-side of civil war, this 
chapter has provided important insights into the importance of ethnic linkages of PGMs on the 
government-side (or EPGMs). By using a global time-series cross sectional analysis, Chapter 
4 has demonstrated that conflict duration is contingent on whether EPGMs are recruited from 
politically included or excluded ethnic groups. Coethnic PGMs have strong incentives to 
 253 
 
uphold the political power of their own ethnicity, providing the state with a cheap and loyal 
force to prop up the government against internal security threats. However, this has been shown 
to backfire as these same incentives to uphold the regime encourage coethnic PGMs to fight 
on for longer, resist government attempts to concede, and thereby undermine the bargaining 
process. In contrast, the use of defector PGMs (derived from excluded groups) provides 
superior local knowledge, and enables the government to divide and weakened the opposition. 
However, while this chapter finds some evidence that defector PGMs may reduce the 
likelihood of peace-settlements, there is little evidence such PGMs impact conflict duration. 
 
5.4. Future areas of Research  
While this thesis has extended the HIs literature, many more questions remain as to whether 
HIs influence other types of conflict not explored in this thesis. Moreover, the relationship 
between other types of inequality and various conflict behaviour also remains unclear. In the 
next part of this conclusion I will explore ways in which our knowledge of inequality and 
conflict can be further improved. In the final part I will draw upon some key policy implications 
of this study. 
The first obvious limitation in this thesis and the broader literature is data availability. 
New events data (i.e. SCAD, ACLED) have made this thesis possible, by allowing the 
assessment of new conflict outcomes. However, event data remains largely limited to Africa, 
preventing the global analysis of important conflict behaviours at appropriate levels of analysis. 
Once again, data collection on civil war has led the way with the emergence of the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). This compiles events of 
militarised disputes from across the globe, included civil war events, clashes between non-state 
actors and one-sided violence, opening up the possibilities of disaggregated analysis. 
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SCAD has recently extended its data to the Caribbean and Mexico, while ACLED has 
started to collect events data in Asia, but data on other types of conflict remains more limited, 
both in scope and temporal coverage (i.e. ACLED starts at 1997). The development of NAVCO 
3.0, which complies events on civil resistance campaigns will permit the global analysis of 
nonviolent action, but is not yet available. The release of the Integrated Conflict Early Warning 
System (ICEWS) events data (Boschee et al., 2015) represents another promising development, 
providing global machine-coded event data on riots and protest. However, information on 
actors involved and surrounding the event remains severely limited and often unclear, 
preventing a clear disaggregation of different types of riots and protest. Data collection on 
various conflict outcomes still needs to keep pace with developments on civil war data, in order 
to provide new opportunities for future systematic research.  
Secondly, data limitations also extend to the measuring of HIs. As mentioned 
throughout this thesis, capturing ethno-political HIs has now become much easier with the 
development of the EPR dataset. However, extensive data is not yet available to capture the 
socioeconomic and cultural dimensions. Ostby has innovatively used surveys from the 
Demographic Health Survey to create an index of social and economic wellbeing and then 
combining the locations of these survey with regions (see Ostby, 2008). Using this data, Ostby 
was the first to capture social and economic HIs, but was limited to 39 developing countries 
where the DHS has sufficient data, and to rounds of surveys over time. While the DHS is 
continuously being expanded, more data collection is required in this area, so that these 
dimensions can be fully explored across a wider set of countries. Lastly, cultural HIs have been 
scantly explored, mostly due to the difficulty in capturing cultural inequalities (i.e. language 
rights), and is an area that would greatly expand our knowledge. 
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Thirdly, this thesis is mindful that while taking an intermediate level of aggregation and 
deploying a group based approach improves on country-level analyses,78 this is still at odds 
with the ecological fallacy. New findings and mechanisms explored within this thesis help to 
vindicate a group-based approach, yet future research could better explore individual-level 
motivations to participate in political conflict.  
Various micro-level studies have made inroads in this respect. Justino (2009) associates 
participation in armed conflict with high levels of poverty and vulnerability to violence.79 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) conclude that grievances and opportunity explain why 
individuals participate in violence, while Oyefusi (2008) finds that economic opportunities 
drive rebel participation in the Niger Delta. The MICROCON project conducted by scholars at 
the Centre for Poverty and Inequality Research at the University of Sussex has also provided 
indications that grievances facilitate participation in conflict (Nillesen and Verwimp, 2010; 
Muller and Vothknecht, 2011).80 Yet future research could explore this more systematically 
and in relation to other types of political conflict. Recent and innovative research has emerge, 
but remains limited to case-studies (e.g. Scacco, 2012; McDoom, 2013).81 More systematic 
research on individual participation would greatly enhance our knowledge of the collective 
action problem, and better explain why some people participate and others do not. 
Fourthly, while accepting that group boundaries are fluid, existing literature largely 
treats ethnic groups as monolithic. This is an approach that is also followed by this thesis, 
although chapters 3 and 4 show appreciation of divisions exist within ethnic groups. Of course 
ethnic group cohesion is not always guaranteed as is clearly highlighted by research on ethnic 
                                                          
78 The social psychology literature strongly points to the tendency of individuals to identify with and act in 
defence of their group, 
79
 See also studies on participation in terrorist organisations Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and determinant of 
individual support for rebel organisations (Wood, 2003). 
80
 Also see also Guichaoua (2010) for various case study chapters on participation in rebel forces. 
81
 Scacco (2012) has explored participation in ethnic riots in Nigeria, while McDoom (2013, 2014) has 
conducted excellent research on participation in the Rwandan genocide 
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defection (see Kalyvas, 2008; Lyall, 2010), and fragmentation within rebelling communities 
(see Cunningham, 2016). While treating ethnic groups as unitary is necessary in order to 
capture the general relationship between HIs and conflict, future research could explore other 
cleavage structures, which remains poorly understood. Some research has recent begun to 
explore the impact of intra-group and cross-cutting cleavages on the likelihood of conflict. 
Gubler and Selway (2012) find that violent mobilisation is twelve times less likely in societies 
where cleavages cut across ethnic divides. As chapter 3 suggests, cross-cutting cleavages are 
instead likely to facilitate nonviolent action. Similar to food prices, cultural similarities across 
group lines may well also serve this purpose.  
Recent research has begun to conceptualise divisions within ethnic groups, known as 
intra-ethnic cleavages (Vogt et al., 2015) or sub-group fractionalisation (Selway, 2011). Yet 
little research has explored the impact of these cleavages on different types of conflict.82 
However, the emergence of new data provides new opportunities to explore this area of 
research. The EPR-Ethnic Dimensions dataset provides information on intra-group cleavages 
(Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt, 2017), and the ongoing All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) 
project is another promising developing, coding subgroups of more than 1,200 politically 
relevant ethnic groups (Birnir et al., 2015). Combined with other geographical data, this 
potentially could be extended to explore wealth and social disparities within ethnic groups. 
Lastly, and related to above, HIs literature could look at other types of identity, that 
when combined with inequality may cause conflict. While ethnicity is a particularly salient 
type of identity, other identities may matter more in specific contexts. This could relate to sub-
groups such as class, dialects or sub-tribal groups. This may also relate to clan-based or regional 
identities that have played an important role in driving conflict in the ethnically homogenous 
                                                          
82 $UULROD¶VVWXGy on Oromo protest in Ethiopia remains a rare exception. He finds that intra-group 
divisions within the Oromo have undermined their ability to engage in mass nonviolent action.   
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countries such as Somalia. Clan violence can also be significant within the context of ethnic 
conflicts. For example, FODQYLROHQFHLQ0LQGDQDRNQRZQDVµULGR¶ has been prevalent and has 
driven the wider ethno-religious conflict (Ozerdem et al., 2010). In other cases conflict 
ERXQGDULHVDUHGHILQHGE\µQDWLYHV¶DQGµPLJUDQWV¶and manifest in xenophobic violence which 
has recently been systematically explored (Claassen, 2016). Future research could explore the 
effect of different types of group-based grievances that exist within society. 
 
5.5. Policy Implications 
The conclusions derived from this thesis point to a number of important policy implications. 
The broad conclusion is that while grievances matter and are related to different types of 
political conflict, there are various ways to resolve ethno-political HIs and reduce ethno-
political competition.  
Ethnic differences and grievances alone do not cause conflict, and as this thesis 
reaffirms, is related to specific ethno-political contexts. Put simply, new policies are needed to 
rectify HIs within society. In terms of ethno-political HIs, the findings from the thesis and the 
wider literature point to the importance of inclusive political institutions. More accommodating 
and inclusive states have fared much better in terms of political stability, since inclusive 
institutions enable ethnic relations to be managed conventionally and give a voice to all 
segments of the population. Looking for innovative ways to ensure powersharing, coalition 
building, and the avoidance of monopoly seeking are therefore paramount, and HIs scholars 
often point to institutional design that involve autonomy, proportionality, multiparty politics, a 
clear balance of power, and consociational constitutions (Stewart, Brown, and Langer, 2008). 
Moreover, ethno-exclusive policies, which are associated with unequal political 
systems, only serve to increase incentives to engage in ethnic competition. As this thesis has 
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shown, such policies only encourage various types of contentious behaviour in the pursuit of 
ethno-political power. Governments therefore need to be responsive to all citizens and move 
beyond nepotism that only serves to uphold short term political goals. This includes distributing 
state resources and security provisions more fairly across society. HIs scholars also point to 
socioeconomic quotas, positive discrimination programs, and various cultural recognition 
policies which reduce strong ethnic incentives to challenge the state and touch upon other 
dimensions of HIs (Stewart, Brown, and Langer, 2008).  
Policy makers must also be sensitive to the consequences that political change can have 
on ethno-political systems. In chapters 2 and 4, actual or fears of future changes in ethno-
political power can increase interethnic competition, which generates incentives to engage in 
violence. Instruments such as national elections and democratic transitions are often considered 
the cornerstone of peacebuilding, yet if not sensitively designed can actually reinforce 
interethnic competition over power. Again political institutions need to encourage 
inclusiveness, such as proportional representation electoral systems, quotas, and seat 
reservations. 
HIs can also combine with other types of grievances to cause conflict. As chapter 3 
suggests, this appears to be the case with nonviolent rebellions against the state, which often 
seek interethnic support. Food prices have been shown to be a key factor in promoting unity 
among disparate ethnic groups that have various existing ethno-political grievances against the 
government. Governments need to be receptive to grievances within society and effectively 
tackle economic shocks that may emerge. In terms of food prices, governments have a number 
of possible stabilisation mechanisms. This includes subsides, social protection, price 




Finally, ethno-political HIs do not only have consequences for the onset of conflict, but 
also the sustenance of conflict, which relates mostly to findings from chapter 4. Ethno-political 
competition provides incentives for coethnic pro-government militias to fight on in order to 
maintain political power of their group. Similarly, ethno-political competition encourages the 
government to seek divide and conquer tactics, such as co-opting defector militias within the 
opposition, which can backfire in high intensity conflicts and prolong its duration. Again this 
points to inclusive politics that reduce the incentives to maintain political dominance. Policy 
therefore needs to be aimed at inclusive peace processes and transitions that are specifically 
aimed at breaking ethno-political competition and fears of future marginalisation. Providing 
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